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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the effectiveness of Corporate Governance (CG) reforms in 
Pakistan. Using a sample of 160 Pakistani firms from 2003 to 2013 and governance data 
collected manually from the annual reports, this thesis investigates seven closely related 
and important corporate issues that are related to the compliance of governance rules. 
Specifically, it aims to : (i) investigate the degree of CG compliance with 2002 Pakistani 
Code of CG (PCCG); (ii) determine whether the introduction of 2002 PCCG has improved 
Pakistani CG practices; (iii) investigate the determinants of CG compliance and disclosure 
for Pakistani listed firms; (iv) test the nexus between CG compliance with the 2002 PCCG 
and firms’ cost of capital (COC); (v) investigate the impact of  different individual CG 
mechanisms on listed firms COC; (vi) examine  how different ownership structures impact 
on firms’ COC; and (vii) analyse relationship between CG structures and Cost of Equity 
(COE) as well as Cost of Debt (COD) for Pakistani listed firms.  
These empirical investigations report some important results. First, the reported 
findings suggest that Pakistani firms have responded positively to governance disclosure 
requirements over the eleven year period from 2003 to 2013. The results also show that the 
introduction of the PCCG in 2002 has improved CG standards by Pakistani listed firms. 
Second, the reported results related to the determinants of CG compliance demonstrate that 
significant and positive association between institutional, government and foreign 
ownership with CG compliance. However, findings relating to the determinants of CG 
compliance show a negative and significant association between board size and block 
ownership with CG compliance and disclosure. The study finds no significant relationship 
between director ownership, audit firm size and the presence of female board members 
with the constructed Pakistan Corporate Governance Index (PCGI). Third, the 
investigation on the relationship between CG and COC report a significantly negative 
nexus between PCGI and firms’ COC. The investigation on the association between 
ownership structures and COC report a negative and significant nexus between block 
ownership with firms’ COC. Further, a number of robustness analyses performed in this 
study suggest that the empirical results reported in this study are generally robust to  the 
alternative CG variables, alternative COC variables and potential endogeneity problems. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1 INTRODUCTION  
The corporate world has witnessed a number of corporate scandals (e.g., Enron, 
WorldCom and Tyco) that had shaken investors’ faith in capital markets. Traditional 
governance structures were unable to protect shareholders who had been affected by these 
scandals and corruptions. In this regard, professional organizations and regulatory 
authorities in developed countries had to reinstate the confidence of investors in capital 
markets by adopting codes of governance. For instance, USA issued Sarbanes Oxley Act in 
2002 with the view to increasing transparency, accountability, and responsibility in the 
management of companies. Similarly, CG codes have spread around the world and more 
firms are motivated to practice good CG standards.  
The 1997 Asian financial crises was an evolving landscape for Asian policymakers 
and companies. Several institutional and policy weaknesses were uncovered by these crises 
and led to numerous economic reforms in the region. Regulations and guidelines have been 
legislated in developing countries with the support of international organizations such as 
the World Bank and OECD (OECD, 1999). The Pakistan Stock Exchanges have not been 
spared these major reforms in the way companies are managed and controlled which have 
swept across the world in recent times. CG reforms were the most important part of those 
reforms that were aimed to restore investors’ confidence. In this regard, Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) was established under the SECP act of 1997 as 
a market regulatory agency in the country and it is responsible for the supervisory 
functions of the stock exchanges. As it will be discussed further in chapter two, SECP has 
two main departments under the company law division, namely, Corporatization & 
Compliance and Enforcements departments. The Corporatization & Compliance 
department is responsible for administration of the companies Ordinance 1984 or rules 
made under other relevant laws whereas the Enforcement Department is responsible for 
regulation and enforcement of laws affecting firms listed on the stock exchange (SECP, 
2013).  
 With respect to adopting CG codes, and as the case with most of developing 
countries, Pakistan issued its CG code in March 2002 which is regarded as an important 
development for CG reforms. This CG code has been established by the combined efforts 
of SECP and Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP). The requirements of 
the code are comprehensively influenced by UK CG style (Tariq and Abbas, 2013). The 
code has a series of governance provisions that are focused on three main areas including 
  17 
 
better disclosure, strengthening of internal control systems and reforms of the board of 
directors with regards to making it accountable to the stockholders.   
The critical question is whether adopting similar CG provisions from developed 
countries can effectively assist Pakistani firms to increase their firm value by reducing 
their COC. Prior studies in developed countries report evidence that CG can reduce COC. 
For instance, Pham et al. (2012) argued that corporations with weak legal systems perform 
poorly during market down turn and thus should be subjected to a high COC over this 
period. They indicated that when companies have less external monitoring, managers may 
tend to use unnecessary borrowings that increase the company’s market wide risk and, 
eventually, its weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Hence, the above study including 
others (e.g., Zhu, 2012; Tran, 2014) suggests that COC is an important factor that affects 
the firm’s value.  
A numbers of studies have been conducted to examine the impact of several 
governance mechanisms on firm behaviour in Pakistan. These studies can be categorized 
into three main areas. First, prior studies (e.g., Mehar, 2005; Ahmed and Javid, 2009; Afzal 
and Sehrish, 2010; Afza and Mirza, 2011) have investigated the association between 
individual CG mechanisms and dividend policy among listed firms. For example, Afzal 
and Sehrish (2010) found a positive and significant association between board size, 
individual ownership and firm size, and dividend paid, using a sample of 42 firms from 
2005 to 2009. Second, a group of studies (e.g., Ali Shah et al., 2009; Butt and Hasan, 
2009; Rehman et al., 2010) have examined the impact of CG on COE. For instance, Ali 
Shah (2009) examines the association between limited individual CG variables and COE 
with a small sample of 119 firms for a period of five years from 2003 to 2007. They report 
evidence of negative association.  Third, previous studies (e.g., Mir and Nishat, 2004; 
Shaheen and Nishat, 2004; Javid and Iqbal, 2008; Yasser, 2011; Azam et al., 2011; Tariq 
and Abbas, 2013) investigate the influence of CG on financial performance. For instance, 
Tariq and Abbas (2013) have examined the effect of compliance with the code and 
financial performance. They report evidence that the high complaint firms have a 
significant negative relationship with performance (Tariq and Abbas, 2013). The current 
study is different from these prior studies in several ways. First and distinctively from the 
above mentioned studies, the current study investigates CG reforms over a longer period 
from 2003 to 2013 and for 160 listed firms.  Second, the current study uses COC rather 
than either COE or COD in investigating the impact of CG on firms’ COC. Finally, current 
study uses panel data to address and mitigate the endogeneity problems. 
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In addition to level of compliance and factors influencing the level of CG 
compliance, this study also investigate the value creating role of CG mechanisms using a 
different approach to the previous studies (i.e. using individual CG variables and 
investigating the impact CG on COE only) through COC as value creating variable. The 
previous studies examine the nexus between individual governance variables and financial 
performance such as ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. The current study investigates the 
relationship between firm-level governance mechanisms and firm-level COC will be 
investigated by constructing a CG index. Arguably, a better governance environment 
increases the value of the firm by limiting the expropriation of minority stockholders 
(Yasser, 2011; Azam et al., 2011). It is expected that better compliance with CG code can 
reduce a company’s COC which is basically investors’ required rate of return and is based 
on their perception about the risk-level of the firm. Ultimately, a better governed firm can 
have a perception of lower risk, lower COC, and hence increased value.   
1.1 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
This thesis aims to extend the literature by examining CG reforms that have been 
followed by Pakistan since 2002. Three important corporate decisions relating to the 
compliance of governance rules have been investigated in this thesis; namely governance 
disclosure, determinants of level of compliance with CG standards and the impact of CG 
on firms’ Cost of Capital (COC).  This study investigates the extent to which CG reforms 
in Pakistan have enhanced these corporate policy decisions. Using a sample of 160 
Pakistani listed firms from 2003 to 2013, this study aims to achieve the following eight 
objectives. First, by constructing a CG index, it examines the level of CG compliance with 
the provisions of 2002 Pakistani Code of Corporate Governance (PCCG) among Pakistani 
listed firms. Second, it seeks to determine whether 2002 PCCG assisted to increase the CG 
practices among Pakistani listed firms. Third, this thesis investigates the impact of 
traditional firm ownership structures and audit/board characteristics on the level of CG 
compliance and disclosure. Fourth, the study seeks to ascertain whether better governed 
firms (high level of compliance with 2002 PCCG) tend to have lower  cost of capital 
(COC) than those of poorly governed counterparts (lower level of compliance with 2002 
PCCG). Specifically, the thesis examines the nexus between the firm’s compliance with 
2002 PCCG and COC by applying a researcher’s self-constructed Pakistani CG Index (the 
PCGI) containing 70 governance provisions mainly based on the 2002 PCCG. Fifth, this 
study intends to investigate the impact of ownership structures (e.g., director, block, 
institutional, foreign and government ownership) on COC among Pakistani listed firms. 
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Sixth, the thesis aims to examine the impact of audit/board characteristics on firm-level 
COC. Notably, the current study uses a number of audit/board characteristics to investigate 
this relationship which has not been examined widely in the literature. For instance, the 
current study examines the influence of the presence of foreign and female members on the 
board of directors. It also investigates the impact of big audit firms on sampled firms COC. 
Finally, the study investigates the impact of different CG structures on both COE (COE) 
capital and firm’s Cost of Debt (COD), individually. This may assist in understanding that 
how CG practices could have an impact on shareholders and stakeholder.  
1.2 MOTIVATIONS  
The current study on Pakistan is motivated by the several factors. First, like most 
countries in the developing world, Pakistani companies have controlling shareholders in 
the form of family ownership. This provides the controlling shareholders with both the 
incentive in the case of low cash flow rights and opportunity in the case of high free cash 
flows to expropriate outsider minority shareholders (Bozec and Laurin, 2008). Similarly, 
strong CG and investor protection found in the developed countries are believed to be 
much effective as compared to Asian countries (La Porta et al., 1998; Dyck and Zingales, 
2004). Particularly, the Pakistani corporate setting shares some level of similarities and 
differences with the UK corporate environment. On the one hand, and contrary to the Berle 
and Means model of separation of ownership and control, Pakistani foremost firms 
ownership structure bear a resemblance to a concentrated family ownership structure. In 
this regard, majority shareholders not only hold the control of the firm, but also, are 
involved in its management. Arguably, this concentrated ownership structure of Pakistani 
firms is different than those of Anglo-American structure of dispersed ownership. On the 
other hand, and similar to Anglo-American, the Pakistani legal structure is based on 
common law. Similarly, and by ignoring this fact of different ownership structures between 
the countries, Pakistan replicates the UK and South African CG reform initiatives 
(Ibrahim, 2006). The CG mechanisms formulated by following markets with dispersed 
ownership structure may not offer the right remedy to the governance issues for a market 
with concentrated ownership. Therefore, this study may offer interesting and different 
findings than those from the Anglo-American countries.  
Second, the Companies ordinance (1984, XL VII) states that “the minimum threshold 
for seeking a remedy from the court against mismanagement and oppression requires that 
at least twenty percent of the shareholders initiate a compliant. Shareholders representing 
at least ten percent but less than twenty percent of the company’s shares can apply to the 
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SECP to appoint an inspector to investigate the company’s affairs. Because neither the 
Companies ordinance nor the Code recognizes shareholders who represent less than ten 
percent of the company’s share (the minority shareholder), no analogous provision exists 
for these shareholders”. Therefore, it is expected that in the Pakistani context with less or 
no protection for minority shareholders with less than 10% holding, this study offer 
interesting results by investigating the relationship between ownership structure and COC 
than those from the developed world.  
Third, Pakistan’s constitution requires that all laws conform to Islam1. Although, the 
fiduciary duties set by SECP are initially based on Anglo-American common law and 
shareholding model of CG, but more importantly, they must also conform to Islamic 
business ethics (Ibrahim, 2006). In this regard, strong Islamic notions are incorporated in 
Pakistani CG code, such as accountability, transparency and responsibility and these can 
have important implications for the level of CG compliance and disclosure (Abu-Tapajeh, 
2009; Ahmad, 2011a). For example, the Islamic models of ‘Hesab’ and ‘Taklif’ are related to 
several theories discussed in this thesis, such as resource dependence, stewardship, and 
stakeholder theories (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2010). In this regard, the norm of ‘Hesab’ (account) 
specifies that the directors as individuals should be trustworthy with resources under their 
control (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2010). Therefore, directors are answerable to the creator and will be 
rewarded or punished for their actions (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Ahmad, 2011b). Similarly, the 
concept of ‘Taklif’ indicates that the managers, as responsible persons, are the trustees of the 
firm’s resources and should act as guardians and as agents for stakeholders (Rahman, 1998; 
Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2004, Hearn et al., 2011). Such Islamic values can potentially work as 
governance mechanisms which can discipline executives and diminish agency problems.  
Specifically, it can be said that Shariah law2 motivates insiders to reliably signal quality 
information to the stakeholders by offering extensive CG information (Baydoun and Willett, 
2000). Consequently and similar to Anglo-American countries, Pakistan is following the 
traditional shareholding model of CG. However, Pakistani executives are expected to be 
socially responsible as encouraged by the intrinsic Islamic principles. 
                                                 
1 “(Article 2-A of the Annex to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (the Objectives Resolution) and article 
227 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 explicitly incorporate Islam into the Constitution. Article 
2-A of the Annex states:Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as 
enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed; Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual 
and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the 
Sunnah. CONST. ISLAMIC REPUB. PAK., Annex, art. 2-A (1985).).    
 Article 227 of the Constitution of Pakistan states in part: All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the 
Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, in this Part referred to as the Injunctions of Islam, and 
no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions. CONST. ISLAMIC REPUB. PAK. art. 227(1) (1973)”. 
 
2
 According to Cerimagic (2010), “Islamic Sharia laws tend to adhere strictly on the principles and values intimated in 
the Qur’an… The law is there to protect the welfare of all the parties involved. The clearly stated nature of these laws 
can make business easier and have less risk. A central tenet of Islamic law is that it seeks to provide justice and 
fairness to both parties.” 
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Fourth, of close relevance to the current study is a study conducted by Tariq and 
Abbas (2013) who investigate the degree of CG compliance with PCCG using a weighted 
index. They divided clauses of the code into quantifiable units as they believe that all 
provisions of the code are not equal in importance. They then assigned different weights 
ranging from 0 to 5 to the clauses to distinguish the importance of each provision for 
reporting purposes. Their findings suggest that high complaint firms are less profitable 
than average compared to low compliant firms. There can be several reasons for such an 
unpredicted finding. For instance, Bozec and Bozec (2011) argued that the rating of CG 
provisions might significantly be affected by subjective view of analysts which may result 
in incorrect inference, indicating that CG provisions should be equally weighted. 
Additionally, they used a sample of 119 firms which may impact on the generalizability of 
the findings. Therefore, this study re-examine the construction of the CG index using other 
method such as un weighted CG index based on 2002 PCCG to investigate the relationship 
between CG compliance and firm value using COC. 
Fifth, prior studies have not explored the factors influencing the level of 
compliance and disclosure with PCCG 2002. In addition to those traditional CG variables, 
this study examines a number of variables which have not been examined widely before 
even in the international literature.  For example, the study investigates the impact of the 
presence of foreign and female members on the board as well as government and foreign 
ownership on the level of CG compliance for Pakistani listed firms.  
Sixth, studies in Pakistan on the potential impact of CG on different aspects of 
corporate performance have mainly focused on financial performance (Mir and Nishat, 
2004; Shaheen and Nishat, 2004; Javid and Iqbal, 2008; Yasser, 2011; Azam et al., 2011; 
Tariq and Abbas, 2013), dividend policy (Mehar, 2005; Ahmed and Javid, 2009; Ahmed 
and Javed, 2010; Afzal and Sehrish, 2010; Afza and Mirza, 2011), earning management 
(Ali Shah et al., 2009). In contrast, studies investigating the relationship between CG and 
COC for Pakistani firms are limited and only examine the relationship between CG and 
COE (e.g., Ali Shah and Butt, 2009; Butt and Hasan, 2009; Rehman et al., 2010). For 
instance, Butt and Hasan (2009) investigated the impact of board size, board composition 
and CEO duality on leverage and reported mixed results. Similarly, Ali Shah and Butt 
(2009) investigated the impact of CG on COE and report that for the limited CG variables 
that they examined, only board size and managerial ownership has a negative relationship 
with COE whereas board independence and audit committee have a positive relationship 
with COE. This research differs from prior research on Pakistan in several means. For 
instance, prior researches have focused on few numbers of governance provisions (e.g., 
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Javid and Iqbal, 2008) or on one governance variable. However, this study constructs an 
index containing 70 provisions categorised in five sub-indices. Also, prior studies (Butt 
and Hasan, 2009; Shah et al., 2009; Afza and Mirza, 2011; Tariq and Abbas, 2013) have 
studied less firms than the current research. The current study employs balance panel from 
2003 to 2013, while prior studies employed unbalance data and for a smaller period of 
time. Therefore, this study is more comprehensive than prior studies with respect to sample 
size and the time period covered.  
Seventh, using a sample of 19 Pakistani Banks over period of 2005 to 2006, 
Rehman et al., (2010) investigated the impact of several CG mechanisms on COE and 
report empirical evidence that CG has no role in reducing the COE. As explained above, 
most of the studies investigated CG mechanisms and firm performance using individual 
CG variables rather than CG index.  There is no study, to the best of my knowledge, that 
has investigated the relationship between CG and COC with CG index. It can be argued 
that effective CG mechanisms can minimize the risk of the firm which leads to lower COC 
for firms. Therefore, this can lead to an increase in the value of the firm. The current study 
adds to knowledge by providing evidence on the relationship between CG standards and 
firms’ COC.  
Finally, Pakistan has adopted the Anglo-American model in order to improve CG 
standards in its corporate sector. This may raise a critical question as to whether Anglo-
American model of CG is appropriate given the differences in culture between Pakistan 
and those countries. Agency problem is expected to be different in developing countries 
like Pakistan due to the nature of ownership structures where the conflict of interests is 
between minority (outsider) and majority (insider) shareholders instead of managers and 
shareholders as is the case in UK and US (Bozec and Bozec, 2011). For instance, the 
dominance of family members on a board may diminish the influence of Independent Non-
Executive Directors (INED) representations on the board and that is against the spirit of 
good CG (Butt and Hasan, 2009). They provide evidence supporting the argument that 
agency problems vary according to the economic conditions, ownership structures, cultural 
underpinnings, and capital market development. Therefore, family ownership is expected 
to discourage firms from practicing good CG which may impact negatively on firms’ 
decisions, particularly in emerging markets. Therefore, this study sheds light on whether 
the adaptation of commonly accepted CG standards as proposed by Anglo-American 
countries can improve the CG practices in emerging economies like Pakistan. 
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Given the differences and similarities between developed world and Pakistani CG 
environment discussed above, this study seeks to answer the following seven research 
questions. First, what is the level of compliance with the CG provisions of 2002 PCCG by 
Pakistani listed firms? This research question investigates the extent to which Pakistani 
listed firms comply with PCCG. Following the literature (e.g., Elghuweel et al., 2016; 
Ntim et al., 2012a), a CG index has been used to investigate the CG compliance for 
Pakistan. The second research question investigates as to whether the introduction of 2002 
PCCG has improved Pakistani CG practices.  
The third research question investigates the determinants of CG disclosure with the 
2002 PCCG for Pakistani listed firms. The CG literature suggests that the traditional firm 
ownership structures and audit/board characteristics can be the main determinants of CG 
disclosure (e.g., Chalevas, 2011). Thus, following the recent CG literature, the ownership 
structures and audit/board characteristics are investigated in this study. Importantly, this 
study examines a number of CG variables which have not been widely investigated in the 
past in Pakistan such as, the presence of foreign and female members on the board and 
government and foreign ownership.  
The fourth research question deals with the association between CG disclosure and 
the firms’ COC.  Fifth research question investigates the impact of different individual CG 
structures (e.g. audit firm size, size of board and board diversity) on firms’ COC.  Notably, 
the current study uses a number of audit/board characteristics to investigate this 
relationship for the first time for Pakistani listed firms. How different ownership structures 
(e.g. managerial Ownership, Institutional ownership, Government Ownership, Foreign 
Ownership, and Block Ownership) impact on firms’ COC is the sixth research question 
investigated in the current study. Finally, the seventh research question investigates how 
different CG structures impact both on Cost of Equity capital (COE) and on a firm’s Cost 
of Debt (COD).  
1.4 SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS 
Using the data of 160 Pakistani firms for eleven years from 2003 to 2013, this 
thesis has examined the level of compliance with PCGI, factors influencing the level of 
compliance and the relationship between CG structure and firm COC. The reported 
findings relating to the CG disclosure suggest that governance disclosure has improved 
over the study period with an overall increase of 64.6% over eleven years of the PCGI 
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from 2003 to 2013. The findings of the study also suggest that the introduction of 2002 
PCCG has improved CG standards among Pakistani listed firms.  The results of the study 
suggest a positive and significant relationship between institutional ownership, government 
ownership and foreign ownership with PCGI. However, study report significant and 
negative nexus between board size and block ownership with PCGI. Further, the findings 
report no relationship between director ownership, audit firm size, board diversity on the 
basis of gender and board diversity on the basis of nationality with level of governance 
disclosure compliance.  
The results on the relationship between CG and COC suggest that there is a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between PCGI and COC. Similarly, a 
negative and significant association between block ownership with COC is reported. The 
reported results indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
director ownership, foreign ownership and board diversity with COC. However, the 
relationship between Institutional and government ownership, big4 and board size with 
COC reports no significant relationship. 
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
Several studies that include Pakistani listed firms in their samples, either examines 
the nexus between CG disclosure and firm financial performance (Javid and Iqbal, 2006; 
Javid and Iqbal, 2007; Ali Shah, 2009) using ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q or the relationship 
between CG disclosure and COE. These studies do not explore whether and to what extent 
Pakistani firms comply with CG recommendations suggested by the 2002 PCCG, nor do 
they examine the factors influencing the level of compliance. Distinctively, the current 
study uses a researcher’s self-constructed CG index as a proxy to measure the firm-level 
CG compliance and disclosure with 2002 PCCG. An analysis of CG literature advocates 
that a good number of studies have been conducted in developed markets to analyse the 
effectiveness of CG codes. Therefore, investigating CG compliance and disclosure in 
different regulatory, cultural, institutional and CG context is essential as it is likely to come 
up with different findings. In one hand, several researches analysing determinants of CG 
compliance have been performed in the developed markets with generally similar CG and 
institutional settings.  On the other hand, factors influencing the level of CG compliance 
and disclosure in emerging markets like Pakistan, where empirical findings are rare, is vital 
in providing a broader picture of CG compliance and disclosure behaviour.  
This study makes numerous contributions and extensions to the extant CG literature. 
First, using one of the largest manually collected data set on CG in emerging markets 
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directly from firms’ annual reports (i.e., a sample of 160 Pakistani listed firms from 2003 
to 2013, with 1760 firm-year observations), this study reports the findings on effectiveness 
of CG reforms in Pakistan.  Precisely, it provides detailed findings on the CG disclosure 
level with 2002 PCCG. Similar to limited number of prior studies in emerging markets, the 
introduction of 2002 PCCG facilitates consistency of CG standards;  the results 
recommend that CG practices still differ largely among Pakistani listed firms over the 
period eleven year examined. 
Second, the current study offers evidence that adaptation of commonly accepted 
CG standards as proposed by UK Cadbury Report 1992 can improve Pakistani firms’ 
value. Though legal enforcement is not as strong as in developed world, the evidence 
suggests that Pakistani listed firms have complied with PCCG, to some extent, with those 
provisions largely drawn from UK code. Hence, it can be argued that reliance of emerging 
markets on Anglo- American model of CG regime to improve their CG practices is 
justified.  
Third, and following the recommendations of CG literature that governance 
practices may be well investigated with the help of a CG compliance index, the current 
study offers a researcher’s self-constructed CG index that contains five sub indices. With 
the help of this CG index (the PCGI), numerous issues related with CG in Pakistani 
corporate setting may be investigated. Due to the questionable applicability of weighted 
and analysts’ CG indices, this CG index can help Pakistani policy makers and researchers 
to conduct additional empirical studies.  
Fourth, the current study offers empirical evidence on how traditional ownerships 
influence the CG compliance level of Pakistani firms, for the first time. Fifth, the present 
study also provides empirical evidence on how board/audit characteristics can influence 
the CG compliance level. Specifically, it offers evidence for the first time on how gender 
and nationality diversity in the board can influence the CG disclosure level. Sixth, the 
current research offers a multi-theoritical approach to the CG literature that considers most 
of the relevant theories which can be useful for researchers to examine other CG issues in 
Pakistan and similar corporate contexts as distinctive features of Pakistani context is likely 
to result in mixed predictions on CG code’s ability to improve CG standards and firms’ 
value by decreasing COC.  
Seventh, to study the value creating role of CG mechanisms using an alternative 
approach (COC) to those which were used in previous literature (ROA, ROE and Tobin’s 
Q), is another contribution to the extent literature as there is a lack of empirical evidence 
on CG compliance and COC. Finally, this study provides empirical evidence on factors 
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influencing level of CG compliance and on the nexus of CG-COC by applying alternative 
variables, estimations and models. Further, analyses have been performed to test whether 
the main findings of study are robust to alternative variables, firm level characteristics, and 
endogeneity problems. These analyses includes: alternative CG index (weighed CG index), 
alternative COC measure (COE and COD), lagged CG structure, fixed or random effect 
and 2SLS model. Arguably, it has improved the reliability of the findings.   
1.6 THESIS ORGANISATION 
This study is organised into eight chapters. First Chapter aims to present the 
objectives of the study, discusses background, explains main motivations, lists out the 
research questions and summarises the research contributions. Chapter two will define CG 
in detail including shareholding and stakeholding models. This chapter will also present a 
review of Pakistani CG framework. Specifically, the external CG structures including 
regulatory and supervisory bodies will be discussed. Additionally, it will also shed light on 
CG framework including CG reforms and listing rules.  
Theoretical and empirical review of literature on level of compliance with PCCG, 
determinant of CG compliance and CG-COC will be carried out in chapter three. 
Particularly, it is orgnised in four parts. The part one will discuss existing theories related 
to CG practices and firms’ COC.  The second part of the chapter reviews the empirical 
literature on the level of compliance with CG disclosure from both developing and 
developed countries. The third part will review the existing empirical literature of factors 
influencing level of CG compliance and the development of the hypotheses tested in the 
current study. Chapter four will discuss the research design in three sections, namely the 
sample selection and data sources, research methodology and statistical analysis.  Chapter 
five will discuss the modelling techniques used in the study and the empirical findings will 
be presented in chapter six. Chapter seven will report the findings based on the robustness 
analyses and the conclusion of the study will be presented in chapter eight.    
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CHAPTER 2 
2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN: 
BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK 
This chapter aims to define Corporate Governance (CG), provide a brief discussion 
on CG models established within the international Governance literature and then to 
present a comprehensive description of CG framework in Pakistan. This chapter is 
organized as follows. Section 2.1 provides a discussion on definitions of CG.  Section 2.2 
discusses the different CG models. Section 2.3 presents the CG model in Pakistani context 
while section 2.4 presents the summary of the chapter. 
2.1 DEFINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporate governance (CG) has emerged as a new and independent field of study in 
last three decades (Denis, 2001). It cuts across different disciplines (e.g., finance, 
accounting, management, economics, law, politics, organizational behaviour). A number of 
definitions of CG exist in the literature (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; OECD, 1999). 
Although there are many definitions of CG, scholars and researchers categorize these 
definitions into two types as either “broad” or “narrow”. This categorization is based on 
the degree to which a CG system is concentrating to satisfy shareholders only or all 
stakeholders. Hence, it can be called narrow if the system of CG is emphasizing only on 
the shareholders (Sternberg, 2004; West, 2006) and known as broad if it is trying to satisfy 
the wider interests of various different stakeholder groups (Gillan, 2006). 
A narrow CG definition has been given by a number of scholars. For instance, 
Sheikh and Chatterjee (1995, p.5) defined it as “a system whereby directors are entrusted 
with responsibilities and duties in relation to the direction of company’s affairs”.  
Similarly, it is “…the way in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves 
of getting a return on their investment” (Sheifer and Vishny, 1997 p.737).  Sternberg 
(2004, p.28) also defined it as “ways of ensuring that corporate actions, agents and assets 
are directed at achieving the corporate objective established by the corporation’s 
shareholders”. It is clearly noted that these definitions are concentrated on shareholder’s 
wealth.  
The broad CG definition is been given by Sir Adrian in World Bank Report (1999, 
p.7) as “….concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals and 
between individual and communal goals….the aim is to align as nearly as possible the 
interests of individuals, corporations, and society”. Similarly, the OECD (2004, p.11) 
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definition is “…a set of relationships between a company’s board, its shareholders and 
other stakeholders. It also provides the structure through which the objectives of the 
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
are determined”. Another definition is “…the system of check and balance, both internal 
and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to 
all their stakeholder and act in socially responsible way in all area of their business 
activity”, (Solomon and Solomon, 2004, p.14). 
As explained above, the literature has mainly defined CG in these two entirely 
opposing models: the broad and narrow models (e.g., Rossouw et al., 2002; Agle et al., 
2008). A broad CG structure is usually referred to as ‘stakeholding’ due to its perception 
that firms are responsible and accountable to the all stakeholders of whom shareholders are 
merely one. On the other hand, a narrow CG structure is normally called ‘shareholding’ 
due to its consideration of firms to be primarily responsible and accountable to their 
shareholders. Fundamentally, these models have legal and country origins. Particularly, 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) have suggested that ‘stakeholding’ model tend to be 
common in Asia and Europe, like Japan and Germany with civil or Scandinavian origin, 
whilst the ‘shareholding’ CG structure is usually found in Anglo-American countries, such 
as the US and UK with common laws origins. Arguably, Pakistan has an Anglo-Amrican 
or ‘shareholding’ CG structure with common law origin. 
2.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS 
This section provides a brief discussion on ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ 
models of CG including the theoretical assumptions, characteristics and criticisms.   
2.2.1 The Shareholding Model  
According to this model, the purpose of corporation is shareholder value 
maximization and dominance (Schwartz, 1983). Berle and Means (1932) suggest that the 
shareholding model involves the separation of ownership and control, and thus, it assumes 
that the firm must be operating primarily for the interest of its owners. Therefore, there is a 
serious issue of agency problem where the principals (shareholders) have to appoint agents 
(managers) to control their business on their behalf. Hence, it is likely to be risky that 
managers and directors will try to look after their interests rather than that of shareholder 
(Letza et al., 2004).  
In response to agency problems, the shareholding model suggests some solutions in 
resolving conflicts of interest between principals and agents.  Firstly, this model suggests 
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introducing a code of CG which includes discipline, ethics, fairness, independence, 
transparency, and independency to control managers and directors behavior (Cadbury, 
1992). Secondly, this model recommends that constraint free competition must be 
encouraged (Letza et al, 2004). Third, it emphasizes the bringing in efficient contacts to 
control and run the affiliation between the labour and owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Finally, Weimer and Pape (1999) propose the reinforcement of the system of managerial 
incentive by familiarising performance related management reward schemes to align the 
interests of managers and shareholders. On the other hand, the shareholding model limits 
external interventions forced on corporations from central authorities and government 
which may disturb the operations of free market (Hart, 1995).  
2.2.2 The Stakeholder Model   
According to the stakeholder model, the purpose of a corporation is not only to 
maximize the wealth of shareholders, but to maximize the firm value to society, i.e. 
maximize the welfare of stakeholders (Blair, 1995). This model suggests that companies 
should consider the interest of all stakeholders who may be affected by the firm’s 
operations. Theoretically, governance problems are exaggerated because of the absence of 
stakeholders’ participation in the operations of the public and private corporations (Letza et 
al., 2004). Like the shareholding model, this model considers the separation of control and 
ownership as CG problem (Keasey et al., 1997). However, the stakeholder model rejects 
the hypothesis that only managers and shareholders are important partners in such a 
relationship (Blair, 1995).  
The stakeholder model provides different solutions to CG problems. First, it 
suggests a move from one-tier to a two tier board structure for achieving a wider 
representation of the interests of stakeholders (Mallin, 2007). In such a stakeholder 
governance framework, companies have dual board structure including management and 
supervisory board. A supervisory board will have a democratic element with representation 
elected by employees as well as other stakeholders, such as investors, suppliers, and 
government representatives on behalf of broader segment of society (West, 2009). Usually, 
management board strategic decisions-making needs to be verified by the supervisory 
board, which makes it more possible to run the corporations in the best interests of all 
stakeholders. Second, it emphasizes on building long-term and trust worthy relationship 
between stakeholders and firms (Letza et al., 2004). Stakeholding model boosts closer 
contacts among managers, shareholders, suppliers, and creditors to achieve a balance in the 
interest of stakeholders (Rwegasira, 2000). Finally, the presence of block shareholders 
from different stakeholders, such as banks, employee union, and government, leads to high 
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ownership concentration (Rwegasira, 2000). This concentrated ownership provides better 
monitoring of management that reduces the agency cost.  
Stakeholder model has been criticised in several ways. First, it is not suitable with 
the concept of business, governance and property rights (Letza et al., 2004; Solomon, 
2010). Second, the definition of stakeholder also seems to be ambiguous. Since, 
stakeholders are all who can affect or be affected by the business, the number of those 
people whose interests need to be considered is just countless (Sternberg, 2004).  
Third, it is incompatible with the concept of CG. A major CG notion is 
accountability: the accountability employees to managers; the accountability of mangers to 
directors, and the accountability of directors to shareholders (Sternberg, 2004; Solomon, 
2010). The model advocates that firm should be accountable to the shareholders and 
stakeholders as well(Letza et al., 2004). Hence, this model regards firms as accountable to 
everyone. In this regard, King Report (2002) suggests that a firm which is accountable to 
everyone is basically accountable to no one. Although an exception of this is Ackoff’s 
circularity of accountability within democratic corporations. Finally, the model does not 
offer operational independent standards by which corporate managers (agents) can be 
judged.  
2.3  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL IN PAKISTAN 
As discussed in section 2.2, the CG regime in Pakistan is mostly influenced by 
shareholdering model of CG where shareholder’s interests are paramount (Javid and Iqbal, 
2008; Tariq and Abbas, 2013) for the following three reasons. First and like other Anglo-
Amrican countries, Pakistan has a common law origin. Second, Pakistani corporate law is 
based on British India Act of 1913 before the appointment of company Law commission 
by Pakistani government in 1959 which started working under the name of Corporate Law 
Authority (CLA) under the ministry of Finance. Finally, Pakistan benefits from the UK and 
South African CG reform initiatives (Ibrahim, 2006).  For investor protection, the Security 
and Exchange Ordinance (SEO) was issued in 1989 as a basic Securities Law. The 
Companies Ordinance (CO) sets the rules for regulations and governance of the companies 
in 1984 based on common law. A new institution, Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan (SECP) was established under the SECP Act in 1999. The SECP is responsible 
for supervisory functions of stock exchanges including issuing securities, brokers, and 
takeovers. 
For this purpose, the first Pakistani Code of CG (PCCG) was presented by the 
SECP in March 2002. It was an important development for CG reforms in the country. The 
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code was developed by the joint efforts of SECP and Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Pakistan (ICAP) (Javid and Iqbal, 2008). Similarly, the code issued by SECP is intensely 
influenced by UK governance regulations (Tariq and Abbas, 2013).This influence was 
likely for these two main reasons. First, being a commonwealth country, Pakistan has a 
historic link with the UK, as the country was a British colony till its independence in 1947. 
Second, according to Solomon et al. (2003) to attract foreign investments and to be 
globally competitive, emerging countries tend to adopt commonly accepted CG standards.  
The Pakistani CG environment can be classified into external and internal 
framework. Concisely, external CG refers to the control that is exercised over the 
corporations from the outside. In Pakistan, the external CG framework comprises of: (i) the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF); (ii) the Corporate Law Authority (CLA) (iii) the Security and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP); (iv) the State Bank of Pakistan; (v) Karachi 
Stock Exchange (KSE); (vi) Lahore Stock Exchange (LSE); (vii) Islamabad Stock 
Exchange (ISE); and The Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). The Corporate Law Authority 
(CLA) was an attached department of the Ministry of Finance which was restructured into 
SECP in 1997 under the Capital Market Development Plan of the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). Similarly, The PSX is the official stock exchange of Pakistan launched on 11 
January 2016 after the merger of individual stock exchanges’ of Karachi, Lahore and 
Islamabad. On the other hand, an internal CG refers to the way in which corporations are 
governed from within. Internal CG mechanisms of Pakistan consist of: (i) Companies 
Ordinance 1984; (ii) the listing rules; and (iii) the Pakistani Code of Corporate Governance 
(PCCG). In the next subsections, the external and the internal CG framework of Pakistan 
are briefly discussed.  
2.3.1 The External Corporate Governance System 
The external Corporate Governance (CG) framework in Pakistan is shaped by a 
number of influences. First, it is made up of key enforcement bodies and financial 
regulators, which are primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of 
corporate regulations. Second, there are legislative laws and instruments that firms have to 
comply with. The main institutions and regulators that shape the Pakistani external CG 
framework includes: (i) the Ministry of Finance (MOF); (ii) the Security and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (SECP); (iii) the State Bank of Pakistan; (iv) Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE).  
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2.3.1.1 The Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
The SECP is the successor to the erstwhile of the corporate law authority that was 
working under MOF. The reorganization process of CLA has been started in 1997 with the 
plan of Capital Market Development under the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The 
SECP act was approved by the Assembly in December 1997. In pursuance of that act, the 
SECP starts operations in January of 1999 as an autonomous body. This act provided 
financial and administrative independence to the organisation to implement the CG reform 
program for the capital market.  
The SECP was established as a market regulatory agency and it is held responsible 
for supervisory functions of stock exchanges. It is a vital financial regulatory agency in 
Pakistan for the regulation of the capital markets and control of corporate entities. Its 
principal objective is to build an efficient and modern corporate sector with a capital 
market based on comprehensive regulatory values, in order to boost investment and foster 
the country economic growth. The SECP has two main departments under the company 
law division, namely, Corporatization & Compliance and Enforcement department. For 
instance, Corporatization & Compliance department is responsible for administration of 
the companies Ordinance 1984 or rules made under other relevant laws whereas 
Enforcement department is responsible for regulation and enforcement of firms listed on 
stock exchange (SECP, 2013).The SECP has been made responsible for supervisory 
functions of stock exchanges including issuing securities, brokers, and takeovers.  
2.3.1.2 Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) 
The PSX is the official stock exchange of Pakistan with trading offices in Karachi, 
Islamabad and Lahore. By December 23, 2015, 555 companies have been listed on the 
exchange with the overall market capitalization of $67 billion. The investor consists of 
1,886 foreigner institutional financiers and 883 local institutional investors alongside 0.22 
million of retail investors. Additionally, there are about 400 brokerage houses that are 
members of the PSX and 21 asset management firms.  
The Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) Limited was founded on September 18, 1947 
in Pakistan and made responsible for listing firms and trading of shares by protecting 
shareholders’ wealth. It was Pakistan's only formal stock market to provide financial 
information of listed firms to investor and one of the oldest stock exchanges in South Asia. 
The KSE was cited among 10 best stock markets in the world in 2015. According to 
Bloomberg, the Pakistani benchmark stock market index is the third-best performer in the 
world since 2009. In June 2015, Khaleej Times reported that since 2009, the Pakistani 
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equities delivered 26 percent a year for US dollar investors, making Karachi the best-
performing stock exchange in the world.  
The Lahore Stock Exchange (LSE) was the second main stock exchange afterward 
Karachi Stock Exchange in the country. The LSE was established in October 1970, under 
the SEO of 1969 in retort to the requirements of the provincial metropolis of the Punjab 
province. Initially, it had eighty three members and was based in Lahore. The number of 
listed firms was 519 since the inauguration. The LSE has 152 associates of which 81 are 
from corporate, and 54 of them are individual members. In Pakistan, the LSE was the 
pioneer stock exchange to practice the internet and presently 50% of the transactions are 
done through the internet. It assisted firms to raise financing from the public and helped 
investors by providing information to help them make the best investment decision. It was 
formally inducted into the national PSX on the 11th of January 2016. 
Islamabad Stock Exchange (ISE) was the newest of the three stock exchanges of 
Pakistan and it is located in the capital of Islamabad. The ISE was incorporated as a 
guarantee-limited company on 25 October 1989 in Islamabad. It had as its main object, the 
setting up of a trading and settlement infrastructure with an information system and skilled 
resources that is accessible for a fair and orderly market trading. It also aimed to be ranked 
with the best in the world. It was licensed as a stock exchange on 7 January 1992 and 
started trading in July 1992. The ISE was corporatized and demutualized on August 26, 
2015 by the Stock Exchanges (Corporatization, Demutualization and Integration) Act, 
2012. As a consequence thereof, its name was changed to Islamabad Stock Exchange 
Limited. With effect from January 11, 2016 the Islamabad Stock Exchange was integrated 
with the Karachi and Lahore Stock Exchanges Limited to form the Pakistan Stock 
Exchange Limited. 
2.3.2 The Internal Corporate Governance System 
The Pakistani internal CG framework comprises of statutory corporate law and 
codes, including: (i) the 1984 companies ordinance; (ii) the listing rules; and (iii) the 2002 
Pakistani Code of Corporate Governance (PCCG).  
2.3.2.1 Companies Ordinance 1984 
The Companies Ordinance (CO) sets the rules for regulations and governance of 
the companies in 1984 based on common law. For investor protection, the Security and 
Exchange Ordinance (SEO) issued in 1989 a basic securities law. The 1984 CO is a 
comprehensive piece of legislation in Pakistan and according to its own preface, is “an 
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Ordinance to consolidate and amend the law relating to companies and certain other 
associations”. It includes all the legal rules and guidelines for the businesses that are 
registered with the SECP. This ordinance also provides control and legal assisstance to the 
business community in Pakistan, with the SECP observance a close check on the corporate 
and financial entities to assure the interests of stakeholders. The former Companies act of 
1913 was in use for the similar purposes. 
2.3.2.2 The Pakistani Code of Corporate Governance (PCCG) 
As explained above, legislation regulating firms’ behaviour has existed in the form 
of Companies Ordinance 1984. Arguably, CG in Pakistan was formally institutionalized by 
the issuance of Pakistani code of CG (PCCG) in March 2002. This issuance is regarded an 
important development for CG practices in the country. In general, PCCG adopted many of 
the CG standards that had already been advocated by international CG codes. Particularly, 
Pakistan benefits from the UK and South African reform initiatives (Ibrahim, 2006).  The 
PCCG is based on UK reforms initiatives, thus, Table 2.1 compares and summarises the 
key CG provisions of PCCG and the UK 1992 Cadbury report for the following main 
reasons. First, the PCCG is compared with 1992 Cadbury report as the Pakistani CG code 
is principally drawn from the UK code. Second, both CG codes have similar CG provisions 
on board characteristics, including, (i) Board Structure; (ii) Board classification as 
independent, non-executive and executive directors; and (iii) Directors’ trainings. Third, 
despite these similarities, there are differences in few CG provisions between the two 
codes. For instance Pakistani code requires the disclosure of board size with a minimum 
requirement of seven members, number of board meetings with a requirement of minimum 
four meetings annually and disclosure of directors shareholdings among others. Finally and 
as shown in the table 2.1, the 2002 PCCG is largely similar to the 1992 Cadbury report but 
the context of the Pakistan is different from the UK. Therefore, it is important to study that 
either similar CG standards give similar results in different cultural, corporate and social 
settings. Main elements of 2002 PCCG are further discussed in this subsection. 
i. Board of Directors   
Similar to the UK code, the PCCG implicitly recognises and pay attention to the 
significance of effective unitary board of directors’ approach. Pakistani listed firms are 
required to compose their boards of directors mainly from independent non-executive and 
executive directors. Particularly, the 2002 PCCG encourages the effective representation of 
minority shareholders by one independent director to represents their interests and at least 
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one independent director representing financial and non-financial institutions’ interests. It 
also recommends that inclusive of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the executive 
directors should not be more than 75% of the elected directors (2002 PCCG, i). This is 
consistent with resource dependence theory that independent and experienced non-
executive directors may bring independent judgements that may help to acquire resources 
and add value to the firm. 
Due to their immense role and consistent with UK code, the PCCG recognises the 
importance of the firm’s chairperson. It suggests that, preferably, the chairman of listed 
firms shall be selected among non-executive directors. Respective roles and 
responsibilities of CEO and chairman should be clearly defined including whether these 
offices are held by same or separate individual (2002 PCCG, ix).  This is in line with 
agency theory that the CEO is expected to behave opportunistically in order to reap private 
benefits at the shareholders’ expense.  
With regards to board sub committees, the code recognises the crucial role of the 
board to work efficiently and effectively. Similar to UK code, the PCCG suggests that 
board of firms should have audit and remuneration committees. It is recommended that 
these committees should be formed with minimum of three members and with a majority 
of non-executive directors. However, and unlike the UK code, PCCG does not specify the 
nomination committees and its formations. Further, the PCCG puts emphasis on the 
important role of the board of directors by recommending that board have a duty to 
approve financial statements and shall report to the shareholders. Board of directors are 
also required to establish a sound internal control system which has to be implemented 
effectively in the firms (PCCG, viii (c)). In addition, the PCCG expressed concerns about 
the sufficient pool of directors in Pakistan with required knowledge and skills to perform in 
board room. As a solution, it recommends that the listed firms shall make proper 
arrangements to train their directors which enable them to perform the affairs of listed 
firms on shareholders’ behalf.  
ii. Accounting and Auditing 
The 2002 PCCG made several recommendations related to accounting and auditing 
to be followed by the Pakistani listed firms. With respect to accounting, the PCCG 
recognises the importance of accounting standards by encouraging firms to prepare their 
financial reports consistent to the International Accounting Standards (IAS) and adequately 
disclosed in case of any departure (PCCG, xix (d)). In this regard, the code placed several 
responsibilities on directors. First, it mandates directors to include statements in the 
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directors’ report prepared under section 236 of Companies Ordinance, 1984. It should 
include preparation of financial statements that present fairly the state of affairs of firms, 
maintenance of proper books of account, sound internal control system, ability of firms to 
continue as a going concern and a statement of no material departure from the best CG 
practices. Second, it suggests that the financial statements of listed firms shall be published 
and circulated with directors’ review. Third, the code mandates that the trading of shares 
carried out by the firms’ director, CFO, CEO and their spouses shall be disclosed.  Fourth, 
the code mandates the disclosure of board meetings and attendance by each director. 
Therefore, the board is expected to state the fact and assumptions used in their 
assessments. It is also expected to assist in generating serious debates in the board 
meetings in favour of shareholders and firms’ value. 
With respect to auditing, the PCCG recognise the importance of internal audit 
functions to insure the integrity of financial reporting.  As presented in Table 2.1, the audit 
committee should have at least three members with a majority of non-executive directors 
and chairman to contribute in forming an independent judgment. The committee have to 
meet four times a year and in addition to that on request of head of internal audit or 
external auditors. The responsibility of committees includes reviewing the quarterly, semi-
annually and annual financial statements of the firm before the approval of board of 
directors. They are also responsible of reviewing management letter to be issued by 
external auditors and the response of management to that letter. Audit committee is 
supposed to monitor compliance with best practice of CG and identification of any 
significant violations. Therefore, the PCCG recognises the crucial role of audit committee 
that can play in ensuring to produce the accurate and reliable financial reporting.   
iii. External Auditor, Internal Control and Risk management 
Consistent with the UK code, the PCCG recognises the important role of external 
auditors as a CG mechanism and makes a number of recommendations. The code requires 
a firms’ board of directors to appoint the external auditors for one year based on audit 
committee suggestions.  It restricts firms to appoint external auditors that have not been 
given a satisfactory rating by Institute of Charted Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP) or a 
partner of a firm that is non-compliance with the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC) guidelines on ethics. The PCCG recommends that no listed firm’s external auditors 
should be offered services other than auditing and observe IFAC guidelines in this regard.  
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Table 2.1: A comparison of Corporate Governance of 2002 PCCG and the 1992 Cadbury Report UK 
Board of Directors The 2002 Pakistani Code The 1992 Cadbury Report 
Structure of the board The one tier board  The one tier board  
Non-executive director At least one fourth of the board Three directors at least 
Independent director Minimum one director Two directors at minimum  
Chairperson Preferably Non-Executive   Non-Executive  director 
Duality Role A narrative that classifies the role 
of chairman and CEO  
Split role of CEO and Chairperson 
Board classification Independent, non-executive and 
executive directors 
Non-executive and executive 
directors 
Directors’ training Provided, especially for newly 
directors 
Provided, especially for newly 
directors 
Board Size Minimum seven directors Not specified 
Number of board meetings Four time a year Not specified 
Directors share dealings Need to disclose information Not specified 
Sub-Committees of the board   
Suggested committees Internal audit committee  Remuneration, nomination and 
Audit committees 
Remuneration committee  At least three members  with the 
non-executive directors’ majority 
Made by all or majority of the 
director should be non-executive  
Audit committee At least three members with the 
majority of non-Executive 
directors  and chairman 
Form by minimum of three with at 
least two non-executive directors 
Nomination committee Not specified  Made by non-executive directors 
with a majority 
Accounting and Auditing  
Accounting reporting Accounting standards according to 
GAAP 
Accounting standards according to 
IASs 
Internal Auditing Establishment of internal auditing 
function 
Establishment of internal auditing 
function 
External Auditor,  Internal 
Control and Risk management 
 
Internal control effectiveness Have to establish an internal 
control system 
Have to establish an internal 
control system 
External auditing  Appointment and responsibilities  Appointment and responsibilities 
Rotation of external auditors Maximum three years Not specified  
Function of risk management No coverage Coverage with narrow scope 
Going concerns of the firms Have to disclose Recommended to disclose 
Disclosure and Transparency  
Chairman Have to disclose responsibilities Clear responsibilities 
Executive management Not covered Responsibilities and role 
Ownership structure Clear distribution of shareholdings Clear distribution of shareholdings 
Related party transactions Have to disclose  Not covered 
Narrative on compliance Have to disclose  Disclosure recommended 
Board and CEO compensation Have to disclose  Disclosure recommended 
Source: Compiled from the 2002 Pakistani code and 1992 Cadbury Report  
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The code recommends the rotation of external auditors after every three years in 
non-financial sector while after every five years in financial sector. According to the 
PCCG, the external auditors are required to issue management letter to its board of 
directors within thirty days of audit report. The external auditors are also required to attend 
the annual general meeting of the firms at least one meeting audit committee a year.   
iv. Disclosure and Transparency 
Following the UK code, the PCCG recognizes the need of transparent CG 
disclosures3 and recommend several provisions. It suggests that firms should disclose the 
remuneration of top executives and directors in annual financial statements. In addition, the 
PCCG differs from UK code in several CG provisions. For instance, it is mandatory to 
disclose the shareholding patterns with aggregate number of shares along with the names 
of firms, directors or shareholders having more than 10% voting interest in the firm. 
Further, the code recommends that firms should address the agency nexus by disclosing 
third party transactions. In this respect, the PCCG requires firms to disclose information 
regarding transactions that can involve a conflict of interests between principals and 
agents.      
v. Major Achievements and Weaknesses of   PCCG 
As discussed before, Pakistan embarked upon important regulatory and legal 
reforms to improve the CG standards. The issuance of PCCG was one of the most 
important reforms and listed firms are required to comply with its provisions. The code 
contributed in improving the CG practices by recommending several CG mechanisms. 
Though the code is less detailed than the UK code, it was the first attempt in Pakistan to 
offer CG provisions in main areas, such as board of directors, accounting and auditing, 
internal control system and transparency and disclosure. In spite of the reliance on UK 
code, the PCCG has some provisions that distinguish it from that of the UK. For instance, 
the PCCG provides firms with a CG framework that necessitates firms to disclose 
information of related party transactions. Further, the code also requires firms to disclose 
the detailed distribution of shareholding with name of holders.   
                                                 
3
 According to Cambridge dictionary, “Disclosure is the action of making new or secret information known”. According 
to Standard & Poor’s (2004), “transparency involves the timely disclosure of adequate information concerning a 
company’s operating and financial performance and its corporate governance practices. For a well-governed company, 
standards of timely disclosure and transparency are high. This enables shareholders, creditors and directors to 
effectively monitor the actions of management and the operating and financial performance of the company. Disclosure 
is the action of making new or secret information known”. 
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Despite the above mentioned achievements, the PCCG also have some weaknesses. 
First, it fails to recommend that listed firms should institute other committees e.g. CG, 
remuneration, risk and nomination committees. Presences of such committees are likely to 
offer more independence to the board and help it to perform its duties efficiently and 
effectively. Second, the code offers no guidance to enable shareholders to evaluate the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the boards and its sub-committees and thus shareholders 
may not be able to identify and differentiate the performance of directors. Third, and 
importantly, being a Muslim country by law, Pakistani CG code fails to promote Islamic 
values such as ‘Hesab’4 and ‘Taklif’5 as complementary CG mechanisms. The use of such 
Islamic values is expected to improve CG practices by increasing directors’ responsibilities 
and independence to protect shareholders’ interests. Fourth, the PCCG did not introduce 
CG provisions related to informal rules which enable firms to minimize the negative 
impact of these rules and encourage both directors and managers to their official 
responsibilities than social values. For instance, clear CG provisions about the definition 
and responsibilities of independent director are likely to mitigate directors’ inclination 
towards personal relationships at the cost of shareholders’ interest. Fifth, the code failed to 
provide CG provisions to diffuse concentrated ownerships. It could encourage firms to 
disclose more CG information as market is expected to work more efficiently and 
effectively in a business setting with less concentrated ownership. In this regard, agency 
problem is expected to be reduced in less ownership concentration. Finally, the PCCG 
failed to emphasize the social responsibilities of firms and focused mainly on shareholders’ 
interests. For instance, providing more CG provisions regarding society at large is likely to 
motivate firms to disclose more CG information to attract and win their confidence on 
firms’ operations.  
However, in spite of the Pakistani setting and given the PCCG’s dependence on the 
Anglo-American model, the fundamental theoretical prediction is that adopting high 
governance standards in the form of CG code is generally expected to improve CG 
practices. Therefore, it requires to be empirically examined in order to find out: (i) the 
level to which Pakistani firms disclose CG information; (ii) the impact of traditional 
ownership and audit/board characteristics on level of compliance with the PCCG; and (iii) 
impact of level of CG compliance on firms’ COC.  
 
                                                 
4
 ‘Hesab’ specifies that the directors as individuals have been trusted with resources (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2010) and 
therefore, they are answerable to the creator and will be rewarded or punished for their actions consequently in 
hereafter (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Ahmad, 2011b). 
5
 ‘Taklif’ is that the managers, as responsible persons, are the trustee of the firms and are likely to act as guardians and as 
agent of stakeholders (Rahman, 1998; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2004, Hearn et al., 2011). 
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2.4 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter defined Corporate Governance (CG) and presented different CG 
models as well as discussed the CG regime in Pakistan. First, it defined CG including its 
broad and narrow definition. Second, it discussed the CG models. Specifically, it explained 
the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ models of CG. Third, this chapter shed light on 
Pakistani CG model. The CG regime in Pakistan is influenced by Anglo-Saxon model, 
with a particular prominence on protecting shareholders’ interest. Specifically, this chapter 
provided a brief discussion about external and internal CG systems. The external CG 
system included explanations on Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) 
and the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) while internal CG system comprised of 
Companies Ordinance (CO) 1984 and the 2002 Pakistani Code of CG (PCCG). 
Nevertheless, the primary focus was on the 2002 PCCG. The reason for focusing on 2002 
PCCG is because it is the main source for constructing the comprehensive Pakistani CG 
Index (PCGI) used to measure the overall CG standards in Pakistan.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
3 THE REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter reviews the most relevant literature on two important firms’ decisions, 
namely corporate governance (CG) disclosure and corporate Cost of Capital (COC). 
Specifically, it aims to accomplish four main objectives. Therefore, this chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 3.1 discusses the theoretical literature on CG structures and 
firm COC. Section 3.2 investigates the existing empirical literature on the level of 
compliance with CG standards. Section 3.3 sheds light on the determinants of CG 
compliance and also develops hypothesis.  Section 3.4 discusses the empirical literature on 
CG structures and firm COC and develop hypothesis. Section 3.5 discusses the literature 
on CG idex while chapter is reviewed in section 3.6. 
3.1 THEORETICAL LITERATURE OF CG 
DISCLOSUREAND COST OF CAPITAL 
This section discusses the most relevant theories that underlie CG disclosure and 
COC decisions by firms. This assists the present study to develop its hypotheses and 
interpret its findings.  In this regard, it has been suggested that there is no single theory that 
can offer a complete understanding of why and how firms make corporate governance 
decisions (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992). Recently, there have been calls to use multiple-
theoretical approaches to overcome the inability of individual theories to provide adequate 
explanations in relation to the effect of CG on corporate decisions (Filatotchev and Boyd, 
2009). For instance, agency theory was employed extensively by researchers to explain 
such decisions. However, it focuses only on conflict relationships, e.g. between 
shareholders and managers, whereas other stakeholders are generally not considered or are 
of secondary importance. This makes its explanatory power limited.  Reliance on its very 
narrowly defined assumptions to conduct studies may also be problematic. Thus, despite 
the usefulness of each individual theory in assisting researchers to explain firms’ 
motivations for making their CG decisions, the adoption of multiple-theoretical approach is 
considered an appropriate method for reviewing the theoretical literature, developing 
hypotheses and interpreting findings. The multiple-theoretical approach involves the 
following theories: agency theory, managerial signalling, resource dependence, 
asymmetric information and stewardship theories. The choice of these theories is based on 
  42 
 
their direct links with the concept of CG and prior studies use of these theories, which 
seems to fit better with the nature of this study. In this section, the relevant theories are 
discussed in relation to CG and COC.  
3.1.1 Agency Theory 
It is extensively employed by researchers to examine agency problems. The 
principal-agent relationship has been the central focus of this theory which has a direct link 
to CG concept. In this subsection, a brief history of the theory is provided in order to 
highlight a number of key issues that facilitate understanding of its assumptions in relation 
to CG.  
From agency theory point of view, the root of CG can be traced back in separation 
of ownership and control by the emergence of new form of business like professional 
managed companies. Historically,  Adam Smith (1776, p.606) stated that, “The directors of 
such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money 
than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private co-partnership frequently watch 
over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small 
matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation 
from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in 
the management of the affairs of such a company”.  
A number of scholars have addressed this issue including Berle and Means (1932). 
There is a major problem when there are large distributions of shareholders with small 
number of shareholdings. In this situation, shareholders cannot control and monitor 
managerial decision making. This separation of shareholders (principal) and managers 
(agent) in terms of ownership and control leads to the critical issue which is called agency 
costs.  
Similarly, Jensen and Meckling (1976) have focused on the nature of contractual 
relationship between shareholder and mangers and tried to explain and resolve this 
relationship within the given framework of agency theory. They (1976, p.5) defined 
agency relationship “as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engages another person (the agent) to perform some services on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”.  
In similar manner, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.741) defined the agency problem 
as “the difficulties financiers have in assuring that their funds are not expropriated or 
wasted on unattractive projects”. This can be in the context of shareholder or debt holders 
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as both are fund providers and need appropriate return on their investments. In the case of 
shareholders, the return can be in the form of dividend or capital gain whereas a creditor 
needs the periodic interest payment and repayment of principal or loan.  
Although all the above scholars considered agency problem differently, they 
emphasise the need to resolve this problem in modern firms. This need has become urgent 
during the last decades where collapses of renowned firms have shed more light on the 
risks that are in the contractual relationship of the agent and principal. The following 
subsections will discuss the agency problem in the context of agency theory in more detail.  
3.1.1.1 Agency problem 
Agency theory suggests that there are three main types of agency problems: (i) 
separation of control and ownership; (ii) conflict of interest among shareholders; (iii) and 
conflict of interest between firms and other contractors including creditors, customers, and 
employees. Firstly, one of the main agency problems is separation of ownership and 
control in firms. As companies have a widespread of shareholders, it is not possible that all 
shareholders can participate in the firm’s daily operations. Hence, board of the directors 
may mitigate this problem. The members of the board are elected by the shareholders to 
manage the company.  Secondly, other than conflict of interest between the principal 
(shareholders) and agent (Executives/managers), there can be a conflict among 
shareholders themselves (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). For instance, if firms have 
widespread shareholders, the block shareholders will become the agent and the minority 
shareholders will become the principal. Minority shareholders have no or less opportunities 
to influence in the firms’ management, therefore, they depend on majority shareholders to 
monitor the management of the firm. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the interest 
of majority shareholders may differ from those that minority shareholders have. Thus, the 
majority shareholders may easily expropriate the minority shareholders as they are not part 
of managerial decision making and have less voting rights. 
Finally, the conflict of interests between the firm itself and other contractors (i.e., 
customers, employees and creditor) is another type of agency problems. Hansmann and 
Kraakman (2004) indicate that a company can be viewed as an agent in that it behaves 
opportunistically, e.g. by misleading consumers and expropriating rights of creditors. For 
instance, companies can expropriate wealth from creditors by investing in very risky 
projects with high expected returns. In this case, most of the gains will be captured by 
firms, whereas the cost will be borne by creditors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This leads 
creditors to protect themselves through restrictive covenants and monitoring devices which 
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at the same time help to create another type of agency problem related to debt (Smith and 
Warner, 1979). In addition, agency theory suggests that there are three types of agency 
costs due to conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers (Jenson and 
Meckling; 1976). Three different types of agency costs identified are (i) monitoring; (ii) 
bonding; and (iii) residual cost.  
First, monitoring the firm managers’ behaviour is very difficult to observe in 
relation to their extraction of pecuniary and non-pecuniary gains from the firm. Monitoring 
has a cost that is borne by the shareholders to protect their interests. This cost may be 
incurred through contracts that have specific clauses including compensation (incentive) 
schemes. Further, monitoring can be improved with the assistance of CG structures. A 
considerable number of countries have issued CG codes to improve monitoring of 
managers. For instance, firms listed in UK, are required to comply with the Combined 
Code on CG and that code contain provisions for monitoring the behaviour of mangers to 
minimize the agency problem. Similarly, Pakistani Code of CG has several provisions to 
monitor the executives of the firm such as independent directors, internal control system, 
and audit committee, among others (Full details are provided in chapter two).  
Second, the cost required constructing the monitoring structure and complying with 
those structures (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is known as bonding cost. This cost is not 
only the financial, but may also involve generating important information for the 
shareholders and markets. Denis (2001) suggested a solution to design a contract in which 
all future possible events will be mentioned with actions. Mangers may agree to do such a 
contract but it may not be possible to expect every future possible situation. In addition, 
shareholders may have no knowledge of what mangers should do to maximize the wealth 
as shareholders. In fact, managers have expertise and reputation for which they are hired 
by shareholders.  
Third, despite designing bonding and monitoring mechanisms and/or governance 
structures, there can be still some divergence between the decisions that will actually 
maximize the shareholders’ wealth and actual agents’ decisions. Such losses due to 
divergences in decision making are called residual loss. Conclusively, the sum of agent’s 
bonding expenditures, the principal monitoring expenditures and any other residual loss is 
termed as agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
3.1.1.2 The Agency Relationship in Modern Corporations 
As new form of businesses like joint stock companies emerged, agency 
relationships have become more complicated. This has motivated scholars to address 
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agency problems associated with those relationships. Early response was given by Smith 
(1776) followed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) which resulted in the postulation of 
agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify four ways by which managers can 
decrease the wealth of shareholder which in turn increases managers’ own interests. First, 
agent may expropriate shareholders’ residual rights by awarding themselves overgenerous 
remuneration packages. Second, manager may consume the wealth of company to increase 
their own utility. Third, manager may go for investment of free cash flows and not pay the 
dividend even in the absence of availability of attractive projects. Finally, mangers may not 
work properly for the best interest of shareholders by devoting less time and skills to find 
new and attracting investment projects.  
To decrease (increase) the agency costs resulting from the low (high) variance 
between agent and principal’s interests, agency theory suggests that an internal and 
external control system in the form of CG mechanisms can mitigate different agency costs 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). With regard to monitoring cost, it proposes several internal 
CG structures such as board of directors, auditing, salaries, stock options, and 
shareholdings (Eisenhardt, 1989). With reference to bonding cost, contract can be 
constructed between shareholder and mangers, to hire external independent auditors to 
audit firm’s financial accounts, to appoint independent non-executive directors to provide a 
functional board that can effectively monitor agents (managers), and managerial 
shareholdings (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition to internal CG structures, agency 
theory suggests that external CG measures, such as market for corporate control can be 
effective. These measures are built on the assumption that there is an efficient market, 
which ranks managers according to their performance and those with poor managerial 
performance will be acquired (or merged) and improved (Fama, 1980). 
In conclusion, CG structures should increase the firm value by decreasing the 
agency costs including those monitoring, bonding and residual costs. In this sense, firm 
value can be increased in two ways. First, firm value can be increased by maintaining good 
governance in the firm through increasing the future expected cash inflows. This in turn, 
can increase firm’s accounting profit. Second, firm value can be increased by decreasing 
the firms’ COC which is used as discount rate in relation to future cash inflows to calculate 
the firms’ market value.  
3.1.1.3 Governance disclosure and Cost of Capital in the context of agency theory 
In CG compliance and disclosure perspective, agency theory depends on 
managerial incentives as the main motivation to describe why and how firms tend to 
  46 
 
disclose information on their CG practices. Supporters of this theory argue that CG 
disclosure contributes to the shareholders wealth. External CG measures that demand more 
disclosure can decrease information asymmetry and agency cost which leads to a lower 
managerial expropriation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; La Porta et al., 2002). Internal CG 
practices can increase information transparency between shareholders and managers. For 
example, more transparent information can assure shareholders that managers are not 
investing in wasteful (negative NPV) projects for self-interest (Jensen, 1986). Similarly, 
additional disclosure increases shareholders confidence that managers are not awarding 
themselves excessive pecuniary and non-pecuniary   benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Together, internal and external CG arrangements can increase disclosure to reduce 
imperfect and asymmetric information for shareholders and creditors, which can reduce 
investors’ risk and uncertainty and thus reduced the cost of equity and debt financing.    
In relation to COC, agency theory posits that agency cost impact on debt and equity 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). They assume that there are conflict of interests between 
shareholders, debt holders and managers, especially when the firm is near bankruptcy in 
what is known as the debt overhang problem.  
The debt overhang problem arises due to managers maximizing shareholders 
wealth when firm is near bankruptcy to the detriment of creditors by investing in 
excessively risky projects instead of less risky but positive NPV investments. In this 
regard, most of the profit goes to shareholders while the cost (down tail risk) will be borne 
by creditors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, creditors go for monitoring devices 
involving restrictive covenants to protect themselves, is an agency cost in relation to debt 
(Smith and Warner, 1979). The second agency problem arises due to conflict of interests 
between shareholders and managers, i.e. between major and minor residual claim. 
Therefore, it is expected that managers could be involved in excessive perquisite 
consumptions in the form of pecuniary and non-pecuniary terms.  
To mitigate these two agency problems, agency theory suggests that CG 
mechanisms have a key role to play in this regard. It assumes that agency costs associated 
with debt and equity can be minimised by two ways: (i) use of debt financing as a CG 
mechanism to decrease free cash available to managers to reduce managerial 
expropriation; and (ii) increasing the managerial equity shareholdings in firms to motivate 
and align the interest of shareholders and managers.  
In conclusion, agency theory emphasises the crucial role of CG in corporate 
decisions. It identifies the causes that result in agency problems and suggests ways of 
mitigating these conflicts of interests. The main assumption of the theory is the concept 
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that firms’ financing decision can be made by trading off between agency costs (i.e., 
monitoring and bonding) of debt and equity. Adopting and implementing CG structures by 
firms, agency theory argues that agency costs related to both debt and equity can be 
significantly minimised (Mande et al., 2012).Therefore, it is expected that better CG 
practices can reduce the costs of debt and equity, which in turn reduce the COC and 
increase the firm value as CG has been designed to mitigate agency problems and, in turn, 
reduce agency costs. For instance, CG reduces monitoring costs associated with providing 
credible financial information to equity holders (Ajinkya et al., 2005).  
3.1.1.4 Agency theory in the Pakistani Setting 
The government of Pakistan has taken numerous steps in the last decade to reform 
the CG in the country. As discussed in chapter two and subsection 2.3, the issuance of 
Companies Ordinance (CO) in 1984, the Security and Exchange Ordinance (SEO) in 1989, 
establishment of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) in 1999, and 
the issuance of CG code in 2002 constitute the cornerstone of reforms in the country. 
Similar to other CG codes around the world, the Pakistani Code of CG (PCCG) expects an 
increase in accountability, responsibility, and transparency by decreasing conflits between 
shareholder and directors. Specifically, this is important in Pakistani setting because of the 
high level of concentrated ownership in Pakistan. This ownership concentration may 
adversely affect the right of minority shareholders as there may be a conflict of interest 
between minority and majority shareholders (Baydoun et al., 2013). For instance, the 
majority shareholders have the control to employ directors and managers. Such 
managers/directors so appointed may look after the interest of those majority shareholders 
rather than all shareholders and broadly, stakeholders. Additionally,  Boytsun et al. (2011) 
argue that the politically associated personalities can be selected to high-ranking positions 
on the board or management regardless of their capability and experience to accomplish 
those roles. Arguably, these decisions may adversely impact firms’ COC and governance 
compliance level. Therefore, agency theory is important in the context of Pakistan in 
developing hypotheses and interpreting the results of current study.  
3.1.2 Asymmetric information: Managerial Signalling Theory 
Along with agency theory, different theories have been developed to explain the 
potential impact of CG on firms’ decisions. In this regard, Buskirk (2012) argue that the 
signalling theory is an extension of the agency theory. For instance, Ross (1977) addressed 
the relationship between information asymmetry and both capital structures decisions and 
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disclosures. He suggests that if a firm issues debt, it sends a positive and high quality 
signal to the market as an outsider consider debt as a CG mechanism, and thus, the value of 
the firm can rise because it sends signals that managers will work hard to pay, not only the 
interest on the debt, but also, the repayment of the principal amount borrowed or lent. In 
addition, Leland and Pyle (1977) and Ross (1977) developed a hypothesis that financial 
policies of the firms and insider ownership help to solve the problem of information 
asymmetry between external investors and managers.  
Information can be asymmetrical either between a firm and its workers or between 
managers and investors who provide capital (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990). They argued 
that asymmetrical distribution of information between the buyers and sellers of financial 
instruments may limit access to the equity market and other type of financing for 
generating capital. Furthermore, because of asymmetrical information between managers 
and outsider investors, there may also be a capital rationing in the loan market (Greenwald 
and Stiglitz, 1990).   
In decision making process, investors may face the problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard. Specifically, more moral hazard and adverse selection refers to a 
situation where managers may tend to make decisions that conflict with different 
stakeholder’s interests. In this sense, an investor may face a problem in identifying a firm 
with most capable managers who are acting to increase firm value (Rhee and Lee, 2008; 
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007). Different solutions have been proposed to mitigate the 
problems associated with asymmetric information. For instance, Mishkin (1998) suggested 
that investors have to choose between two options. Either to consider the potential costs 
related to adverse selection and moral hazard when they value a firm or take a decision of 
not investing altogether. 
Theoretically, by the good CG practices, a firm can send a signal to investors that 
the management is working to maximize the shareholder wealth. This can attract potential 
investors, which may lead to an increase in the firm’s share price (Beiner et al., 2006). In a 
same way as value of equity capital increase, the cost of equity capital may decrease 
(Black et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2009). Furthermore, the appointment of non-executive 
directors on the board can signal to investors that a firm has higher CG standards which 
can lead to a rise in the price of its shares and ultimately can result in a drop in the cost of 
equity capital (CLSA, 2000; Chen et al., 2009). Similarly, disclosing information in annual 
reports positively signals to the market about good governance practices which leads to a 
decrease in information asymmetry. Ultimately, it can raise the share price (Black et al., 
2006). Overall, scholars have provided the base that can be used to predict the relationships 
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between different factors that may affect both CG and firm value, as well as explain the 
results in different contexts.    
3.1.2.1 Signalling Theory in Pakistani Setting 
Since the setting up in 2002, the Pakistani code of CG has sought to improve 
disclosure and transparency which reduces information asymmetry. Specifically, listing 
rules mandates listed firms to disclose regular information regarding any changes related to 
ownership structure, board structure, significant business transactions and performance 
among others.  This leads to enhancement in firms’ level of financial and non-financial 
disclosure in financial statement published in annual reports (Javed and Iqbal, 2008; Tariq 
and Abbas, 2013). In order to secure external financing, firms are expected to increase CG 
compliance and disclosure to minimise information asymmetry which may assist in 
attracting funds and decrease funding cost ( Hearn, 2011; Morris, 1987).  
3.1.3 Pecking Order Theory 
Existence of asymmetrical information between managers, creditors and 
shareholders is the base of pecking order theory. This theory posits that managers and 
majority shareholders have private and better information about the investment 
opportunities and future returns than perspective investors and creditors (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). It opposes the concept of optimal capital structure in presence of 
asymmetrical information either between shareholder and creditors or between inside and 
outside investor. The proponents of this theory suggest that firms usually follow a pecking 
order in corporate finance where firms prefer internal funding of projects than external, as 
well as debt financing over equity financing.  Myers (1984) argued that this order in 
selection of debt and equity is due to information asymmetry as creditors are not well 
informed about the creditworthy situation of the borrower and shareholders are not well 
informed about the good intention of managers. In this sense, there can be ex-ante problem 
of adverse selection and ex-post problem of moral hazard because of the presence of 
asymmetrical information between principal and agent. This was termed by Akerlof (1970) 
as the ‘market of lemons’.  
Further, the issuing of equity may lead to a negative signal to investors as a result 
of asymmetric information (Myers and Majluf, 1984) where investors are expected to 
finance under-performance firms’ with negative NPV investments. In contrast, firms can 
avoid the under investment problem by issuing debt, which is considered as a positive 
signal to outsiders (Harris and Raviv, 1991). The issuing of debt reflects the firms’ ability 
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to repay their obligations on time and showing that managers are professional in 
performing their duties including investing in positive NPV projects. Asymmetric 
information issues indicate that the selection of equity and debt cannot be made simply by 
balancing the benefits and costs. Such decisions may be beneficial to the firm if it is taken 
with consideration of good corporate governance practices. This can limit the problems of 
asymmetry information which may decrease the cost of capital, and consequently may 
increase the value of the firm. 
3.1.3.1 Pecking Order Theory in the Pakistani setting 
As has been discussed in subsection 3.1.2.1, the issuance of 2002 PCCG has sought 
to improve disclosure and transparency to reduce information asymmetry. Precisely, listing 
rules requires listed firms to disclose information about any changes in ownership 
structure, board structure and significant business transactions among others. Therefore, it 
is expected that information asymmetry can be limited by more CG disclosure among 
Pakistani listed firms and this can improve the level of confidence of creditors and other 
stakeholders. In order to secure external financing, firms are expected to increase CG 
compliance and disclosure to minimise information asymmetry which may assist to attract 
funds and decrease cost of funding (Morris, 1987; Hearn, 2011). Thus, CG practice can 
have an impact on the firms’ capital structure decision.   
3.1.4 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory is opposite to the above mentioned theories. It advocates that 
executive managers are responsible persons (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Letza et al. (2004) 
argued that managers should be completely authorized to run business as they are good 
stewards of the resources. This theory has three assumptions about senior managers’ 
behaviour.  
First, the theory assumes that senior managers normally spend their life in 
governing firms so they can understand the firm better than any other outsider executives 
and can take better decisions (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Second, managers have all 
internal information and knowledge which can help internal executives to make and take 
better decisions (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Third, the availability of efficient external 
and internal market forces can ensure that agency cost is lower because of the managers’ 
fear of future loss of private capital to replace them (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Supporters 
of this theory suggest that managers should be empowered. For instance, the position of 
CEO and company chairman should be merged because supporters believe that the value 
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of the firm can be increased by granting managers with power to take independent and 
quick decisions because ‘managers must manage’ in relation to running the  firm 
efficiently.  
3.1.4.1 Theory of Stewardship in Pakistani setting 
The CG code of Pakistan suggests that at least one director on the board has to be 
independent and non-executive should be one-fourth of the board (PCCG, 2002 p.1 (i.b 
and i.c)). Additionally, the Pakistani CG code insists on the significance of separating the 
positions of chairman and CEO (PCCG, ix). Hence, the objective of CG code is to increase 
the managements’ accountability by increasing monitoring and supervision of managers. It 
is opposing with the suppositions of theory of stewardship as it suggests that the 
managerial executives might be responsible personalities and probably not require wide-
ranging monitoring of their managerial activities. It can be suitable for Pakistani 
environment as family ownership is higher in the country and those family owned firms are 
expected to appoint their relatives as executives and directors. Therefore, and Siebels and 
Knyphausen-Aufseb (2012) argue that these appointed executives are expected to be 
trustworthy.   
3.1.5 Resource Dependence Theory 
It proposes that an internal CG structure, like the board of the directors is not only 
essential to ensure the monitoring, but also to oblige as a vital link to access critical 
resources. Non-executive directors are able to provide resources, e.g. experience, 
independence, knowledge, professional advice, important business contacts, access to 
political elite and link with external stakeholder (pfeffer, 1973; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). It can be argued that good relations 
and links with outside stakeholders make it easier to have access to resources that can 
increase the value of firm (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). This increase in value may result 
from an increase in cash inflows and, decrease cost including COC.  
3.1.5.1 The Theory of Resource Dependency in Pakistani Setting 
The members of the board are likely to play a significant role in acquiring capital 
and other resources. For instance, government can help to provide essential financial 
resources for the firms with higher government ownership. Similarly, the majority of firms 
are owned and controlled by families and such owners may manage their own funding in 
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order to maintain the managerial control of the firms. It may be appropriate in Pakistani 
corporate environment to have good relations with all stakeholders which make easier 
access to resources that can increase the value of firm.  
To sum up, the multi-theoretical approach has been used in this study due to 
complex nature of CG. The agency theory is the core upon which the research is based. 
Furthermore, managerial signalling, information asymmetry, pecking order, resource 
dependence, and stewardship theories are also used. From finance perspective, all the 
above mentioned theories are closely relevant to the issues that the current study is going 
to investigate. Arguably, agency costs can be reduced by adopting an internal CG 
structures which leads to increase in the value of the firm either by increasing cash flows or 
by decreasing the COC.  
Similarly, information asymmetry theories, like agency theory, suggest that 
efficient CG structures can increase the firm value. On the other hand, firm value is closely 
related to the managerial empowerment and trust according to stewardship theory. In 
contrast, according to resources dependence theory, board of directors and other internal 
CG structures facilitate the companies’ ability to provide easy access to the input resources 
which can increase the value of the firm by increasing expected future cash inflows or by 
decreasing the cost of capital. 
CG codes issued by countries around the world are based on these theories that CG 
structures can improve the firm value. This motivation exists behind the empirical research 
that link CG with firm COC. Several researchers have investigated the impact of CG 
structures (by using equilibrium variable model and CG index model)6 on firm value (by 
using accounting, economic and risk variables) employing empirical econometrics models.  
 For instance, several studies have been carried out to investigate the nexus between CG 
mechanisms and firm value based on individual CG mechanisms such as board size, board 
independence, and board diversity among others (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Guest, 
2009).  Similarly, other researchers have used CG indices to study the relationship of CG 
structures and firm performance (e.g., Black et. al., 2006; Henry, 2008; Chen et al., 2009).  
Furthermore, the other channel to examine the relationship between CG structures 
and firm value is to examine firm’s COC. Although this relationship has not been 
investigated extensively, there are a few studies (e.g., Pham et al., 2012; Zhu, 2012). 
Arguably, prior studies suffer from two main weaknesses. First, they were based on 
individual CG mechanisms rather than examining CG as a complete system in the form of 
                                                 
6
 Equilibrium variable model uses each CG mechanism as an independent variable such as board size, board 
independence, and board diversity among others while CG index model uses all related variables in an 
index altogether. 
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CG index. Second, their focus was on developed countries where their findings may not be 
applicable to developing countries because of differences in finance and governance 
systems. Generally, they report evidence that CG has a key role to play in this regard. 
Hence, the study contributes to the existing body of CG studies by examining the nexus 
between CG and COC in a developing country setting.  
The second half of this chapter will review the empirical literature on CG 
mechanisms and firms’ COC. It should be noted that the above discussed theories are 
linked with the empirical literature. 
 
3.2 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE: CG DISCLOSURE 
Afterwards the failure of high profile firms such as Tyco, Enron and WorldCom 
among others, CG codes have been issued globally for the purpose of improving 
disclosures, corporate accountability and transparency (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2009). Noticeably, codes of CG issued by nation states have increased from 72 in 1999 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009) to 409 by the end of April 2014.7 Generally, these 
codes were issued based on two main implementation protocols; namely: principle based 
or rule based. With the view of minimizing compliance cost, following the UK “comply or 
explain” approach, majority of the countries around the globe have adopted principle based 
governance approach. Other countries have followed the USA’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002 
“one size fits all” rules based approach (Reddy et. al., 2010). Although there is no consent 
on whether principle based or rule based approach of CG practices is superior, equally 
each method has observed strengths and weaknesses that can affect the failure of success 
of attaining the anticipated results from code. Importantly, the escalation and widespread 
acceptability of CG codes, as well as different implementation protocols have motivated 
researchers to examine the extent to which complying with CGs’ provisions could assist 
firms to arrive at better performance. In particular, a considerable number of researchers 
have paid close attention to determining the level of compliance with these CG provisions 
(Bozec and Bozec, 2012; McBulty et al., 2013; Griffin et al., 2014). This section further 
seeks to analyse the prior literature on the level of compliance with CG’s codes’ 
provisions.  
                                                 
7http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php (as on 24th April 2014) 
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3.2.1 Compliance with Corporate Governance Provisions 
CG literature shows that compliance with CG’s codes’ provisions in developed and 
developing countries are different since differences in corporate setting. This motivates the 
current study to review previous studies which have been performed in advanced and 
developing countries with particular focus on Pakistan.  
3.2.1.1 Compliance with Corporate Governance Provisions in Developed Economies 
Prior literature presents a higher level of CG disclosures in developed countries. 
For example, Pass (2006) studied 50 UK large listed firms and found that 34% of 
companies completely observed all CG provisions of 2003 UK combined code while 44% 
gave acceptable explanation for non-compliance. As the sample was small and only limited 
to large firms, according to Eisenberg et al. (1998) it may limit the generalisation of the 
study. More recently, Hegazy and Hegazy (2010) examined the level of compliance with 
2003 UK Combined code of FTSE 100 in 2008. They found 70% average degree of 
compliance among UK firms. Further, Hussainey and Najjar (2012) found a high level of 
CG compliance using a CG Quotient (CGQ) Index. The findings of above studies show 
that UK companies largely comply with UK combined code and have a higher level of 
compliance with CG provisions.  
In Germany, Cromme (2005) found 75% level of compliance with German 
governance code in DAX-listed companies. Similarly, Werder et al. (2005) found a higher 
level disclosure with CG standards in a sample of 408 listed firms at Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange (FSE). In Italy, Allegrini and Greco (2013) studied the level of compliance of 
Italian listed companies with Italian civil governance code of 2007 by constructing a 60 
provision CG index. They reported that the disclosure of code provisions has increased for 
the Italian companies. By examining the level of CG disclosure and compliance of 742 
Canadian listed companies, Salterio et al. (2013), found that 39% of the companies were 
fully complying with all those CG recommendations while 82% of the companies were 
complying with some.  
Conclusively, the developed world shows higher levels of compliance with CG 
practices. It may be because of strong economic, cultural and legal systems existent in 
those countries, which are supportive in boosting good CG practices (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; Toledo, 2010; Judge, 2011; Salterio et 
al., 2013).  
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3.2.1.2 The Level of Compliance with CG Provisions in Developing Economies 
Level of compliance with CG provisions widely varies in developing countries 
(Solomon, 2010) because of the type of government in those countries (Samaha et al., 
2012). Prior literature shows a lower compliance with CG provisions in developing 
countries.  Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros (2006) examined the compliance with CG code 
of Cyprus for 2002 by 160 listed companies. They reported evidence that a minor number 
of Cyprus companies observed CG standards. A possible reason of low level of compliance 
may be due to the study period as CG code came into effect in the same year of the study.  
Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012) studied the level of compliance with Saudi CG 
practices by using a CG index consisting of nine CG provisions in 52 listed companies for 
the year 2006 and 2007. Although, they found 53% level of compliance in the sample of 
Saudi listed firm, this percentage may not be the accurate representation of CG practices in 
listed firms because of limited provisions of in the constructed index. A limited 2 year 
study period and a small sample of 52 listed firms could also have affected the results. In 
similar setting, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) examined the level of compliance with Saudi CG 
practices by constructing a weighted index for 87 listed companies in year 2006 and 2007. 
They found that only 42% of sampled companies have disclosed information on their CG 
practices. As such weighted index requires a high level subjectivity in assessing the quality 
of CG disclosures (Hassan and Marston, 2010), it may affect the generality and reliability 
of results (Beattie et al., 2004).  
Tsamenyi et al. (2007) examined the level of compliance by constructing a CG 
index for companies in Ghana. They reported 52% level of compliance among the sampled 
firm. In Egypt, Samaha et al. (2012) studied the level of compliance with CG disclosures 
for 100 Egyptian companies in 2009 to 53 CG provisions. They reported evidence of a 
lower level of compliance with CG provision among the sampled Egyptian companies.  
In Brazil, Schiehll et al. (2013) studied the level of compliance for 68 publicly 
traded companies. They report a limited level of disclosure for ESO plan by those 
companies. This low compliance to CG should encourage researchers and policy makers in 
such countries to identify the obstacles that impede the willingness of firms to comply with 
CG’s provisions. 
In developing countries, other studies have reported an enhancement in obedience 
with CG provisions. For example, Alves and Mendes (2004) studied compliance to the 
1999 CG codes of Portugal and reported a significant increase  in compliance level with 
CG codes of the country. Similarly, Barako et al. (2006) studied the level of compliance 
with Kenyan CG principles by 54 listed companies. They found an improvement in 
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compliance level by Kenyan companies.  Chalevas (2011) studied the level of compliance 
to CG standards by Greek companies from 2000 to 2003. He found improvement in level 
of compliance with CG standards by the sampled Greek companies. Furthermore, Ntim et 
al. (2012a) investigated CG practice in South Africa and impact of South African King 
report. Their constructed CG index consisted of 50 provisions for a period of five years 
from 2002 to 2006 inclusive. They found that CG standards have improved from 47% in 
2002 to 69% in 2006 since the release of 2002 King II report.  
There are number of cross-country studies that have investigated the level of 
compliance with CG provisions. For instance, Klapper and Love (2004) studied the level 
of CG disclosures in 14 developing countries and found a wide disparity in firm-level CG 
disclosures for sampled firms. This variance in CG disclosure may possibly be due to 
inconsistencies in governance, cultural, legal and social systems in those countries 
(Bauwhere and Willekens, 2008). 
  Conclusively, current empirical studies have investigated the levels of CG 
compliance in developing world needs to be more comprehensive. Prior studies in such 
countries appear to suffer from serious limitations, such as small sample size, short study 
period and reliance on limited CG’s provisions. The evidence in these past studies 
indicates that CG compliance levels are generally very low. Researchers also have not 
investigated the factors that may cause such low compliance levels. This suggests the need 
for more studies on the determinants of CG compliance and disclosure in the developing 
country like Pakistan.  
3.2.1.3 Compliance with Corporate Governance Provisions in Pakistan 
 As discussed in chapter two, and after the issuance of 2002 CG code, few studies 
have been performed to examine the compliance with governance practices in Pakistan 
(e.g. Javed and Iqbal, 2008; Tariq and Abbas, 2013). For instance, Javed and Iqbal (2007) 
examined compliance by 50 firms from 2003 to 2005 inclusive that are listed on the 
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). They measured CG by constructing an index consisting of 
22 provisions and finds that the CG code may possibly have improved compliance and 
disclosure by KSE listed firms. Similarly, Javed and Iqbal (2008) examined CG standards 
of 50 KSE companies from 2003 till 2007 and reported an improvement in CG quality 
because of SECP’s monitoring role. More recently, Tariq and Abbas (2013) studied 119 
Pakistani listed firms over a period of eight years from 2003 to 2010 on their level of 
compliance and disclosure. They used a weighted index consisting of 50 provisions and 
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report that although the compliance and disclosure level has increased since the issuance of 
2002 CG code, in essence compliance with the CG code is minimal.  
Briefly, the current study differs in several ways and brings substantive contribution. 
First, prior research focuses on smaller sample size over a shorter period of time (e.g., 
Javed and Iqbal, 2007; Javed and Iqbal, 2008). For instance, Javed and Iqbal (2007) use 
only 50 listed firms and study period is limited to 3 years. In contrast, the current study is 
examining a balanced panel of 160 firms over a longer period of 11 years (2003 to 2013). 
Second, previous studies using a CG index focuses few provisions of CG code (e.g., Javed 
and Iqbal, 2007, 2008). For instance, Javed and Iqbal (2008) use only 22 provisions to 
construct CG index which may not represent the level of compliance with CG code. On the 
other hand, current study investigates 70 CG code provisions. These provisions are devided 
in five indices. Finally, prior studies examine the level of compliance by using an ordinal 
coding scheme to construct CG index (Javed and Iqbal, 2007; Javed and Iqbal, 2008; Tariq 
and Abbas, 2013). Distinctively, this study is employing the binary coding scheme for the 
construction of PCGI to be used in the analyses.  
3.3 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT: DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE COMPLIANCE AND DISCLOSURE 
Prior studies suggest that firms comply with CG codes differently depending on the 
country involved and that various factors determine compliance. Due to the voluntary 
nature of most CG codes, researchers continue their examinations to understand the key 
drivers that encourage/discourage firms in engaging in good CG practices. Identifying and 
understanding of firms’ motivations to comply with CG codes and disclosure of 
information can help policy makers to improve some CG provisions and introduce new 
policies. Thus, several studies have been conducted to determine the factors that influence 
such CG disclosure and compliance. Most of those studies have been conducted in 
developed world (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Bozec and Bozec, 2012) whereas limited 
studies have been conducted in developing countries. Due to limited empirical evidence 
and differences in corporate settings between developing and developed countries, there is 
expectation that the findings reported in developed countries may not be applicable to 
developing countries hence, the current study contributes to the CG literature by examining 
the determinants of CG disclosure in a developing world with particular focus on Pakistan.  
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   Relying on theories and drawing from previous studies and the Pakistani context, 
the current study identifies the key determinants that are considered to have significant 
influence on firm level CG disclosure for Pakistani listed firms. These determinants are 
categorised into two main types. First, ownership structure variables made up of: director; 
government; institutional; block; and foreign ownership. Second, board and audit 
characteristics variables consisting of: board size; board diversity in gender; board 
diversity in nationality; and audit firm size. The following subsections review the 
theoretical and empirical literature and set up hypotheses related to each determinant.  
3.3.1 Ownership Structures 
A greater emphasis on ownership structures and their role in corporate decisions 
have been underpinned by theories such as agency theory, stewardship theory and resource 
dependence theory among others. For instance, agency theory assumes that governance 
practices and disclosures can be enhanced by shareholders as they have the ability to 
monitor the managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Manso, 2011). Past 
studies are inconclusive in their findings regarding ownership structures and their impact 
on CG compliance and disclosure. Importantly, most previous studies focus on few types 
of ownership structures (e.g., block ownership and institutional ownership) and their 
findings may not provide with a complete understanding of their roles in this regard. In 
contrast, the Pakistani context offers opportunity to examine the impact of six different 
types of ownership structures; namely director ownership, institutional ownership, 
government ownership, block ownership and foreign ownership on firm-level CG 
disclosure. 
3.3.1.1 Director Ownership and Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Director ownership is considered as one of the most important ownership factor 
influencing the level of compliance. From agency theory perspective, Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) argue that the link between CG disclosure and director ownership is not certain. For 
instance, directors may use inside information to maximise their wealth which may not 
necessarily be in the best interest of the firm. On the other hand, managerial ownership 
may result in same safeguard to the insiders and outsiders because of the alignment of 
interest of shareholders and directors (Samaha et al., 2012; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Therefore, executives and managers are expected to improve level of CG compliance to 
maximise the value of the firm.  
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Empirical evidence supports a significant and negative association between CG 
compliance and director ownership (e.g., Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Samaha et al., 
2012). For instance, Bauwhede and Willekens (2008) examined the nexus between CG 
practices and inside ownership by using a sample of 130 firms from 20 European 
countries. They report a negative relationship between the variables. In the same way, 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) investigated the nexus between managerial ownership and 
CG disclosure index by using a sample of 130 UK listed firms. They report empirical 
evidence of a negative relationship between managerial ownership and CG compliance for 
UK listed firms.  
In Pakistani context, this relationship is not studied yet. A good percentage of 
ownership is owned by the directors in Pakistani firms, therefore it is expected to have an 
impact on CG disclosures. Thus, in line with the theoretical prediction and negative 
empirical evidence, director ownership is expected to motivate Pakistani listed firms to 
disclose less CG information. Therefore, the first null hypothesis proposed is: 
H1 There is a negative relationship between ownership of directors and CG 
compliance level. 
3.3.1.2 Institutional Ownership and CG Disclosure 
Agency theory proposes that the monitoring is considered very significant in 
reducing the conflict of interests between directors and stakeholders in general and 
shareholders in particular (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Solomon, 2010). Among 
stakeholders, institutional investors have the capability of monitoring and helping firms to 
improve CG compliance (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Barako et al., 2006). These investors with 
a significant shareholding are proposed as important CG mechanism for three main reasons 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). First, having a 
considerable portion of shareholding and voting power permits them to take necessary 
actions (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Second, having resources and capabilities allow 
them to have more information than minority shareholders (Smith, 1976). Third, with 
better knowledge and expertise, they can evaluate the firm’s decisions and can interpret the 
disclosed information in annual reports (Chung et al., 2002; Bos and Donker, 2004). 
Additionally, a firm with more external financing needs may tend to disclose more 
information in order to meet institutional investors’ expectations (Bushee et al., 2010). In 
contrast,  it has been argued that such investor may not influence firms to disclose CG 
information (Ruiz-Mallorqui and Santana-Martin, 2009). 
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According to the literature, evidence of the relationship between institutional 
ownership and CG disclosure is generally consistent. A considerable number of studies 
show that CG compliance level is positively associated with the level of institutional 
investors (e.g., Laidroo, 2009; Chung and Zhang, 2011). For instance, Chung and Zhang 
(2011) examine the impact of institutional ownership on CG disclosure. They find a 
positive relationship between the two variables. Similarly, Aggarwal et al. (2011) examine 
a cross country sample of 23 countries. They argue that higher institutional ownership 
improves CG standards. Additionally, using a sample of 169 firms listed on Johannesburg 
Security Exchange from 2002 to 2006, Ntim et al. (2012a) reports a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and CG disclosure. On the other hand, few studies have 
found different results. For example, by studying 51 Irish listed firms, Donnelly and 
Mulcahy (2008) find no significant relationship between the two variables.  
In Pakistani context, as this relationship of CG disclosure and intuitional ownership 
has not been studied yet, this study offers evidence on this relationship for Pakistani listed 
firms for the first time. Thus, consistent with the predictions and overwhelming positive 
association, institutional ownership is expected to motivate Pakistani listed firms to 
disclose more CG information. Hence, the second null hypothesis proposed is: 
H2 There is a positive association between CG compliance and institutional 
ownership.  
3.3.1.3 Government Ownership and Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Firms’ CG disclosure can be influenced by government ownership especially in 
emerging countries  ( Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012; Cornett, 2010; Shleifer, 1998). In 
this regard, it is argued that higher government ownership may cause an agency problem 
(Eng and Mak, 2003). Additionally, government ownership may lead to intervention in 
firms’ operations which may result in poor CG practices (Konijn et al., 2011). For 
instance, government may appoint CEO and directors regardless of experiences and 
qualifications ( Cornett et al., 2010; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). Arguably, Firms may take the 
benefit of higher government ownership and raise financing at a preferred rate which may 
not motivate them to disclose more CG information. In this regard and from resources 
dependence theory perspective, firms with higher government ownership can easily access 
financing from government (Eng and Mark, 2003).  
On the other hand, theory of stewardship perspective is that the CEOs and directors 
may not be affected by government ownership as government interests are aligned with 
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other corporate owners (Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012). Precisely, CEO may seek 
to improve the firm performance and disclosure to improve and protect their reputation 
(Conyon and He, 2011). Additionally, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) argue that firms with 
higher government ownership may be forced to provide more CG information as 
government is accountable to stakeholders.  
Empirically, the relationship between CG disclosure at firm level and government 
ownership has not been widely examined (Ntim et al., 2012a). This suggests that this can 
be a fertile area of research to investigate the relationship between CG disclosure and 
government ownership to contribute the international literature. The findings of some prior 
studies report a positive relationship between CG disclosure and government ownership. 
For instance, using a sample of 1342 Chinese firms from 2001 to 2005, Conyon and He 
(2011) empirically found that government ownership enhances CG practices. Similarly, the 
nexus between government ownership and firm level CG disclosure is investigated by 
using a sample of 169 firms listed on Johannesburg Security exchange from 2002 to 2006 
(Ntim et al., 2012a). They report empirical evidence of positive association between 
government ownership and CG disclosure.  
On the other hand, other studies (e.g., Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Huafang and 
Jianguo, 2007; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011) examine the relationship of government 
ownership with CG disclosure and report no significant relationship. For example, Samaha 
and Dahawy (2011) examine the impact of government ownership on CG disclosure using 
a sample of 100 firms listed on Egyptian Stock Exchange and report no significant 
relationship between the two variables. Similarly, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) examine 
the same relationship using a sample of 87 Malaysian listed firms also report no significant 
relationship between government ownership and CG disclosures.  
In Pakistan, the government dominates in the corporate landscape with a 35% of 
ownership on average in all companies (World Bank, 2005). Pakistani firms with a 
considerable percentage of government ownership are probably less motivated to disclose 
more CG information as these firms are expected to have strong political connections in 
Pakistan. Therefore, and by considering the Pakistani context, the hypothesis number three 
is: 
H3 The CG disclosure level and government ownership are positively 
associated. 
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3.3.1.4 Block ownership and CG Disclosure 
Generally, ownership concentration is common in most developing countries that 
potentially create severe agency problems between majority and minority shareholders. 
Therefore, it is more likely that firms with ownership concentration may disclose less to 
shareholders as their interests may not be aligned with those of minority shareholders. On 
the other hand, stakeholder theory proposes that block holders8 can have a positive 
influence on CG disclosure (Konijn et al., 2011). For instance, Konijin et al. (2011) report 
that block investors may limit excessively large compensations of managers due to their 
power. In this regard, block holders can have more influence in terms of their abilities to 
discipline managers than minority shareholders to limit agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997).  
Empirical studies report mixed evidence in the relationship of block holders and 
CG disclosures. In this regard, a considerable number of prior studies presents a negative 
nexus between block ownership and CG compliance (Barako et al., 2006; Laidroo, 2009; 
Samaha and Dahawy, 2011; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). For instance, Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013) report empirical evidence of negative association between block 
ownership and firm level CG disclosure. On the other hand, a limited number of studies 
show a positive relationship between block ownership and CG disclosure. For instance, 
Huafang and Jianguo (2007) report a significant and positive association between block 
ownership and CG disclosure for Chinese listed firms. Few studies report no significant 
evidence of relationship between the CG compliance and block ownership. For example, 
Conyon and He (2011) studied the impact of block holders on shareholders’ rights 
measured by governance disclosure index by using a sample of US. They report no 
association between the presence of block holder and governance disclosure index.  
Given the Pakistani context, firms with the high level of block ownership are 
expected to disclose less CG information. Thus, the fourth hypothesis proposed is:  
H4 The CG compliance level and block ownership are negatively associated.  
 
                                                 
8
 Any shareholder having 5% or more of a firm’s shares,  is considered as block holders (Konijn et al., 2011)  
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3.3.1.5 Foreign Ownership and Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Information asymmetry is relatively higher among foreign investors because of 
language and distance (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). Thus, it can be argued that they may 
require greater disclosure to minimise information asymmetry and to better monitor the 
actions of management (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). In this regard, firms having foreign 
investors may disclose more CG information to meet the expectations of foreign investors. 
Specifically, this can be true for developing countries as they attract foreign investors to 
improve the efficiency of their capital markets (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Elsayed, 
2010). In this regard and to support the argument, Leuz et al. (2010) report that US 
investors usually do not invest in countries with lower CG disclosure requirements. 
Additionally, literature suggests that foreign institutional investors are considered as major 
promoter and exporters of better CG practices around the world (Aggarwal et al., 2011).  
Empirically, there is a lack of international evidence on the relationship between 
foreign ownership and firm-level CG disclosure (Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). This 
relationship is examined by few studies ( e.g., Barako et al., 2006a; Haniffa and Cooke 
2002) and report a positive impact of foreign ownership on CG disclosures. For instance, 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) report evidence of a positive relationship between CG 
disclosure and foreign ownership for a sample of 167 firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange. Similarly, using a sample of 599 Chinese listed firms, Huafang and 
Jianguo (2007) report empirical evidence of a positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and CG disclosure.  
In Pakistan, ownership is concentrated among principal controlling shareholders 
including, state, foreign and families (World Bank Report, 2005). The impact of foreign 
ownership on CG disclosure has not been investigated yet in Pakistan. Therefore, in line 
with a positive theoretical prediction and empirical evidence, the fifth hypothesis of the 
current study is:  
H5 Foreign ownership and level of CG disclosure are significantly and 
positively linked.  
3.3.2 Audit firm and Board Characteristics 
In addition to above ownership variables, other CG mechanisms have been studied 
in literature to ascertain how and why those variables influence the firm-level CG 
disclosures. Among those CG mechanisms, audit firm and board characteristics are 
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considered as important factors (Adelopo, 2011; Nelson, 2014). The  relationship has not 
been examined yet in Pakistan. This research brings the evidence for the nexus between 
audit firm/board characteristics and CG disclosures among Pakistani firms. The current 
study investigates a number of audit and board variables, including audit firm size, board 
size, gender diversity in board, and nationality diversity in the board of directors.  
3.3.2.1 Audit Firm Size and CG Disclosure 
It is common in most countries where firms are required by national company laws 
to obtain confirmation from external auditors that the disclosed CG information is fair and 
true. Similarly, it is mentioned in Pakistani CG code of 2002 (xlvi) that “all listed 
companies shall ensure that the statement of compliance with the best practices of 
corporate governance is reviewed and certified by statutory auditors, where such 
compliance can be objectively verified, before publication by listed companies”. From 
agency theory perspective, external auditors may impact the quality and level of CG 
compliance (Barako et al., 2006). This influential power of external auditors may depend 
on audit firm’s characteristics (e.g, fee, tenure and size). It has been reported that big four 
auditing firms have improved auditing principles (Alsaeed, 2006), as such firms are 
expected to have very skilled, experienced and qualified auditors. Additionally, big4 are 
expected to be more  independence than their counterpart (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) and 
they may pressure firms to disclose more CG information to maintain this reputation (Unag 
et al., 2006).  
Empirically, several studies (e.g., Bassett et al., 2007; Kent and Stewart, 2008; 
Omar and Simon, 2011; Nelson, 2014) present a positive nexus between firm-level CG 
disclosure and audit firm size. For instance, Omar and Simon (2011) report the evidence of 
a positive relationship between CG disclosure and audit firm size for a sample of 121 firms 
listed with Amman Stock Exchange. Similarly, Ntim et al. (2012a) show empirical 
evidence that the size of audit firm is positively and significantly related with CG 
disclosure.  
On the other hand, some other empirical researches ( e.g.,  Aly et al., 2010; Barako 
et al., 2006a; Alseed, 2006 ) find no significant relationship between audit firm size and 
firm-level CG disclosure. For instance, Barako et al. (2006a) examine the impact of audit 
firm size on CG compliance and report no significant relation between the two variables. 
Similarly, Aly et al. (2010) examine the relationship between Big four audit firms and 
corporate internet reporting using a sample of Egyptian firms and find no significant 
relationship between the two variables.  
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In Pakistani context, this relationship has not been investigated yet. In line with a 
positive theoretical prediction and empirical evidence, it is expected that there will be a 
positive relationship between audit firm size and firm-level CG disclosure for Pakistani 
listed firms. Thus, the sixth hypothesis of this study is:  
H6 There is a positive relationship between audit firm size and level of CG 
disclosure.  
3.3.2.2 The Size of the Board and CG Disclosure 
Theoretically, the board of directors is considered as one of the most effective CG 
mechanisms in order to reduce agency cost by monitoring the managerial behaviour (Jesen, 
1993). In this regard, shareholders have expectation of more CG disclosure from board 
memebrs because they are steward and represent shareholders’ interests (Davidson et al., 
1996). Therefore, it is expected that the board of directors may significantly affect the CG 
compliance and level of disclosure. Among other board characteristics, agency theory 
considers the size of the board as one of the crucial factors in minimizing agency cost by 
observing their behaviour (Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Supporters 
of this view argue that managerial monitoring have a positive impact on CG disclosures 
(Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Furthermore, Coles et al. (2008) argue that the large 
number of directors may improve the firms’ monitoring and control. Similarly, Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) argue that firms with large board members can enjoy more diversity in 
terms of skills and experience, which may positively impact on firm disclosure.  
In contrast, Jensen (1993) argues that smaller boards are more effective than larger 
boards in mitigating agency conflicts. In support of this argument, Yermack (1996) 
suggests that a more board members can cause a reduced harmonization as well as poor 
communication, which may allow CEO to dominate the board and have an adverse impact 
on responsibility of management (Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Arguably, this 
may weaken the power of board to monitor managers and result in a negative impact on 
CG disclosure. Therefore, boards with small number of members are likely to impact 
positively on firms’ CG compliance and disclosure due to better co-ordination and 
communication among directors than board with larger members (Yermack, 1996).  
Empirically, most of the prior developing country studies report that CG 
compliance level and board size are positively associated (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Kent 
and Stewart, 2008;). For instance, Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) report empirical evidence that 
board size is positively associated with level of CG compliance. The potential limitation of 
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their study can be the adoption of index that is used by developed world and may not 
consider the contextual differences (Meek et al., 1994). Similarly, using a sample of 169 
South African listed firms; Ntim et al. (2012a) report findings of positive association 
between the size of the board and CG disclosure. 
On the other hand, some prior studies find no significant relationship between the 
board size and CG disclosure (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). 
For instance, Arcay and Vazquez (2005) report empirical evidence that there is no 
significant relationship between board size and CG disclosure in a sample of 91 Spanish 
firms in 1999. Similarly, using a sample of 104 Singaporean public firms in 2002, Cheng 
and Courtenay (2006) report empirical evidence that board size has no significant 
association with CG disclosure. 
In Pakistan, the relationship between CG disclosure and board size has not been 
documented. The PCCG recommend that the firm’s boards should have a minimum of 
seven members but it does not specify any maximum limit. The average board size is 8.22 
members in Pakistani listed firms. To investigate whether board size has any impact on CG 
disclosure and following the mixed theoretical and empirical arguments, the current study 
expect either a positive or negative between the firms’ board size and CG disclosure. Thus, 
the seventh hypothesis in the current study is: 
H7 The CG compliance level and firm’s board size are significantly associated. 
3.3.2.3 Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Governance Disclosure 
From resource dependence and agency theories perspective, board diversity 
improves level of CG compliance and disclosure (Bear et al., 2010). Resource dependence 
theory emphasises on importance of the board’s role in ensuring the provision of resources 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Further, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argue that the board 
provides a channel to communicate information between the stakeholders and executive 
which is expected to improve corporate disclosure. Agency theory highlights the role of 
board members in monitoring managers to protect shareholders’ interest (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). In this regard, the experience and capabilities enable the board to 
manage and assess strategies which may improve the firm disclosure. Several studies have 
been conducted to examine the impact of different types of diversity on the board (e.g., 
gender, education, race, occupation and age) on different corporate decisions (Rose, 2007; 
Dezso and Ross, 2012; Ntim, 2014). In the best of researcher’s knowledge, the impact of 
gender diversity on CG disclosure has not been examined. Therefore, it underlines the need 
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to extend the existing literature to understand the impact of board-gender diversity on CG 
disclosure. 
Theoretically, several studies that have examined the impact of board-gender 
diversity find that women directors have influence on firms’ board (Huse and Solberg, 
2006; Admas and Ferreire, 2009; Peni and Vahamaa, 2010; Cater et al., 2010). For 
instance, Admas and Ferreire (2009) argue that the boards with more female member can 
lead to a greater participation of directors in decision making. Similarly, gender-board 
diversity may improve CG disclosure as differences in gender can potentially lead to 
distinctive approaches to information disclosure (Terjesen et al., 2009; Cater et al., 2010). 
Additionally, Nielsen and Huse (2010) argue that the absence of female members from the 
board means that the firm is losing an opportunity to increase the talent pool and board 
skills that may negatively affect the CG disclosure.  
Empirically, several developing country studies have examined the impact of 
board-gender diversity on different issues and find that women directors have influence on 
firms’ board (Rose, 2007; Bøhren and Strøm, 2010; Dezso and Ross, 2012; Ntim, 2014). 
Given the positive theoretical prediction and absence of substantive number of developing 
country empirical studies on the relationship between gender-board diversity and CG 
disclosure in Pakistan, the eighth hypothesis in this study is: 
H8 There is a statistically significant and positive association between the 
presence of female on the firm’s board and level of CG disclosure.   
3.3.2.4 Board Diversity on the basis of Nationality and Corporate Governance 
Disclosure 
Relying on resource dependence theory, firms are likely to gain competitive 
advantages from directors’ characteristics, such as gender, education, age, occupation and 
race. In this regard, Oxelheim and Rondøy (2003) suggest foreigner board membership as 
one mechanism that may enhance CG disclosure and practices. This argument is supported 
by Ramaswamy and Li (2001) who state that “for firms from emerging economies, there is 
also the advantage of strategy formulation insights foreign directors might bring along 
them….. Foreign directors, having been involved in a variety of managerial positions and 
activities during various stages of their career, possess information and expertise about 
the intricacies of different strategic approaches, and may be in a unique position to 
influence strategic management processes in firms that they oversee”.  
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Furthermore, Choi and Hasan (2005) suggest that foreigner board members can 
offer three main benefits to the board including: (i) providing more independence to the 
board than local external directors; (ii) giving effective monitoring; and (iii) adapting 
advanced foreign corporate strategies.  Specifically, Frias-Aceituno et al. (2013) argued 
that the presence of foreigner board members promote firms’ information disclosure 
practices. Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a) argue that foreigner board members can help 
firms to have better link with stakeholders by improving information disclosure in addition 
to enhancing managerial monitoring.  
Empirically, the impact of foreigner board members on CG disclosure has not been 
studied in Pakistan. Most prior studies on corporate disclosure focus on the relationship 
between the foreign board members and corporate social responsibility (e.g., Khan et al., 
2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a) and find that firms with foreign board members provide 
more corporate social responsibility information. However, there are few firms in Pakistan that 
employ foreign members on their boards in key positions. This suggests that the presence of 
board members with different nationalities have distinctive values and may have important 
implications for CG compliance and disclosure behaviour. Therefore, it is expected that the 
presence of non-Pakistani directors on firms’ board may motivate firms to disclose more CG 
information than those with only local directors. Thus, the ninth hypothesis in the current study 
is:  
H9 There is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the 
presence of foreigner on the firm’s board and level of CG disclosure. 
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3.4 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT:  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
FIRM COST OF CAPITAL 
A typical argument is that CG affects the value of firm by increasing future cash 
flows due to reducing managers and majority shareholders’ ability to extract private 
benefits.   Similarly, CG can impact firm value through the firms’ COC. That is, it impacts 
on the discount premium applied to expected future cash flows; this is known as COC 
effect. In this regard, Hail and Leuz (2006) argue that the valuation effect of CG may 
reflect the investors’ risk premium demand. In their view, better CG disclosure and more 
transparent firm can reduce the information asymmetries and, thus, lead to a decrease in 
the uncertainty of firms’ future cash inflows. While financing the firm, creditors and 
shareholders face increase in risk in relation to interest and dividend payments. Outside 
investors, including minority shareholders and creditors actually face the risk of 
expropriation by managers and majority shareholders. Therefore, the higher the uncertainty 
equity and debt investors face regarding their cash flows, the higher the risk premium they 
will demand. As a result, the firm’s COC is likely to increase.  
One of the main objectives of CG is to protect outside investors, including both 
creditors and shareholders, against expropriation by managers or controlling shareholders 
(La Porta et al., 2002). CG mechanisms such as better and timely disclosure, independent 
non-executive members working on the board of directors and in audit committee, and 
independent auditors, are expected to reduce the risk of investors and firms’ COC in 
several ways. First, better CG serves to monitor controlling shareholders or manager’s 
actions, and, thus, minimising the risk of expropriation (Chen et al., 2009). Second, the 
better CG can reduce information asymmetry between the controlling shareholders and 
other outside investors (Verrecchia, 2001), and, hence reduces the uncertainty of future 
expected cash flows (Clarkson et al., 1996). Finally, as suggested by Lombardo and 
Pagano (2002), better CG disclosure reduces the monitoring cost of outside investors, and, 
thus, they are likely to demand a lower required rate of return, which can increase firm 
value.  
Prior literature has used two models to investigate the relationship between CG 
structures and firm COC. One is equilibrium-variable model and the second one is 
compliance-index. Ideally, strong CG can lower the firms’ risk which can result in a 
decline in the firms’ COC. Lower risk is better for both shareholder and creditors point of 
view. Lower risk with reference to shareholders, will reflect on the discount rate (Cost of 
Equity) which will be applied to discount the firms’ expected future cash flows. Debt 
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holders also face detrimental managerial excessively risky investments that favour 
shareholders, especially when the firm is potentially at a risk of default. This is known as 
the debt overhang problem. Effective CG can decrease risk to debtors, which decreases the 
Cost of Debt (COD) to the firm and ultimately lowers the overall COC.  
In this study, the three main themes of CG structures will be used to develop various 
hypotheses. First, the firm level CG index (PCGI). Second, ownership variables including: 
(i) director; (ii) institutional; (iii) government; (iv) block; and (v) foreign ownership. Third, 
the individual CG variables, including: (i) audit firm size; (ii) board size; and (iii) gender 
diversity in board. 
3.4.1 Firm level Corporate Governance Index (PCGI) and Cost of 
Capital 
Prior studies (e.g., Bowen et al., 2008; Bozec and Bozec, 2011) suggest that it is 
imperative to study CG mechanisms as an integrated system such as an index instead of 
examining them as individually since some of those can substitute or complement each 
other. Regardless of limited number of studies on the relationship between CG and COC, 
most prior studies have examined individual CG mechanisms rather than firm-level CG 
indices (Bozec and Bozec, 2011). The current study measures CG by employing the CG 
index (PCGI) based on the 2002 Pakistani code of CG in order to investigate how firm-
level CG can influence firms’ COC.  
Theoretically, CG encompasses different mechanisms that can assure creditors and 
shareholders of the firm on a return on their investments (Shleifer and Vinshny, 1997). In 
the case of most developing countries, when firms have controlling shareholders (see 
Clasessen et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002), CG mitigate agency problems between 
insiders shareholders and outside investors, including both creditors and minority 
shareholders. Insider shareholders enjoy the control of the firm’s operation by having a 
large portion of voting rights and therefore may expropriate outside investors, including 
minority shareholders and creditors (La Porta et al., 2002). In this context, good CG 
practices are intended to safeguard minority shareholders and creditors among other 
outside investors against the expropriation of controlling shareholders. Arguably, when 
investors feel protected, they are motivated to participate in capital market more actively, 
and are more likely willing to pay more for such firms’ securities.  Thus, firms can enjoy 
lower cost of raising capital, which in turn raise the firms’ value.  
Despite limited number of studies on relationship between CG index and firms’ 
COC, studies provide empirical evidence of negative relationship between firm-level CG 
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and firms’ COC (Blom and Schauten, 2008; Chen et al., 2009; Bozec and Bozec, 2011). 
For instance, Bozec and Bozec (2011) examine the effect of CG index on firm-level COC 
for a sample of 155 Canadian firms listed on S&P/TSX from 2002 to 2005. They report 
significant empirical evidence that both firms’ COD and COE decrease as the quality of 
CG practices increases. Specifically, they measured firm level CG and report that Canadian 
firms with higher ROB scores have a lower COC. 
In Pakistani context, the relationship between firm-level CG disclosure and COC 
has not been documented yet to the researcher’s knowledge. The current study expects that 
COC and CG disclosure level are negatively associated following the extant literature and 
theory. Thus, the tenth hypothesis in the current study is: 
H10  There is a statistically significant and negative relationship between firm-
level CG disclosure and firms’ COC.  
3.4.2 Ownership Variables 
Although a limited number of prior studies have examined the impact of ownership 
structures on firms’ COC, it has been argued that ownership structure can have an impact 
on firms’ COC. In this regard, ownership structures play an important role in mitigating 
agency cost and reducing information asymmetry between shareholders and debt holders 
or shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Jensen, 1986).  This subsection will briefly set out the central theoretical arguments 
regarding the link between the ownership variables and firms’ COC.  The empirical 
evidence related to each type of ownership structure is also reviewed in order to develop 
the hypothesis of the study. 
3.4.2.1 Director ownership and Cost of Capital 
Theoretically, it can be argued that director ownership may worsen the agency 
problem as outsider and insider can have conflicting interests (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). 
In similar vein, it has been claimed that higher director shareholdings are expected to make 
firms more exposed to collusion between the firms’ management and directors (Vafeas and 
Theodorou, 1998; Konijin et al., 2011). From a managerial signalling perspective, 
Bebchuk and Weisbah (2010) argue that the directors have more information about the 
firms compared to outsider (minority shareholders and creditors). Therefore, it is more 
likely that the executives can use the firms’ private statistics for the personal interests that 
shifts risk to rather than share risk with outside shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) 
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which in turn, may increase the information asymmetry problem between directors and 
outside investors (minority shareholders and creditors). Therefore, it is likely that the firm 
with higher director ownership can have a higher cost of borrowing and a negative impact 
on profitability. 
In Pakistani context, this relationship has not been documented yet. Therefore, 
following the negative theoretical arguments and empirical findings, the current study 
expects that COC impacted positively. Thus, eleventh hypothesis in the current study is: 
H11 There is a positive and statistically significant association between director 
ownership and firms’ COC.  
3.4.2.2 Institutional ownership and Cost of Capital 
Institutional investors usually have a greater monitoring power and it has been 
suggested that they can play a crucial role by forcing managers to make decisions in the 
best interest of shareholders (Shliefer and Vishny, 1986). In this regard, Crutchley et al. 
(1999) argue that institutional investors can have an impact on firms’ capital structure. 
Theoretically, monitoring can be beneficial to reduce the agency cost by minimising the 
conflicts of directors and investors (Solomon, 2010; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Arguably, intuitional investors with a significant shareholding are proposed as important 
CG mechanism for three main reasons (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Donnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008). First, having a considerable portion of shareholding and voting power 
permits them to take necessary actions (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Second, intuitional 
investors have resources and capabilities to have more information than minority 
shareholders (Smith, 1976). Third, with better knowledge and expertise, they can evaluate 
the firm’s decisions and can interpret the disclosed information in annual reports (Chung et 
al., 2002; Bos and Donker, 2004). Thus, it is expected that institutional ownership can 
increase firm value by decreasing firm’s COC.  
A limited number of studies only provide evidence on the relationship between 
institutional ownership and one component of COC (Piot and Missonier-Piera, 2009; 
Bhoraj and Sengupta, 2003). For instance, Piot and Missonier-Piera (2009) examine the 
relationship between firms’ COD and institutional ownership among other factors on firm-
level CG disclosure for a sample of 102 French firms listed on SBF 120 index from 1999 
to 2001. They report significant empirical evidence that firms’ COD decrease as the 
institutional equity ownership increases in the firm. Similarly, using a sample of over 1000 
bond issues from 1991 to, Bhoraj and Sengupta (2003) examine the effect of institutional 
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shareholding on firm-level bond rating and bond yield. They report that lower bond yield 
and better bond ratings when percentage of institutional shareholding increases.  
In Pakistani context, this association has not been documented. This study expects a 
negative and significant relationship between the institutional shareholding and firm COC. 
Thus, the twelveth hypothesis in the current study is: 
H12 Institional ownership and firms’ COC are significantly negatively 
associated.  
3.4.2.3 Government ownership and Cost of Capital 
From resources dependence theory perspective, firms with higher government 
ownership can easily access financing from government (Eng and Mark, 2003). Arguably, 
firms may take the benefit of higher government ownership and raise financing at a 
preferred rate which can minimise the overall firm’s COC and, in turn may increase the 
firm value. Similarly, Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseb (2012) argue that government 
ownership may not effect the managers due to its aligned interests with other corporate 
owners. Specifically, executives may strive for improvement in the firm performance to 
improve and protect their reputation (Conyon and He, 2011). In contrast, Eng and Mak 
(2003) argue that higher state-owned firms may origin the agency problem. In this regard, 
government ownership may cause intervention in firms’ operations which may bring about 
poor CG practices (Konijn et al., 2011). For example, government may employ directors 
and CEO irrespective of qualification (Cornett et al., 2010; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). In other 
words, this may create additional information asymmetry problem between controlling and 
outside investors which may result in an increase in firm COC.  
Few extant studies that exist only provide evidence on the relationship between 
government ownership and one component of COC. For instance, Borisova and 
Megginson (2011) examine the effect of government ownership on firm-level COD. They 
report significant empirical evidence that decrease in government ownership results in an 
increases in the cost of debt.  
The current study expects a negative association between the government and 
COC. Therefore, thirteenth hypothesis in current study is: 
H13  Firms’ COC and government ownership are significantly and negatively 
associated.  
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3.4.2.4 Block ownership and Cost of Capital 
Theoretically, it may impose some risk on minority shareholders as agency 
conflicts says that excess control causes agency cost. In this regard, Bechuck et al. (2000) 
argues that minority shareholders’ rights may be expropriated by majority shareholders. 
The dominance of majority shareholders in publically traded firms demonstrates the 
willingness to accept risk by minority shareholder. Bozecc et al. (2014) argues that such 
risks are accepted by minority shareholder on the basis of compensation. High risk results 
in higher COC for firms (i.e., higher COD and COE). Arguably, higher COC means higher 
rate of return for investors which can be a form of compensation to them. Hence, it can be 
argued  that block ownership are expected to have a more direct link with COC rather than 
financial performance and firm value, particularly as value is not only affected by risk but 
also by the firm’s growth opportunities (Hail and Leuz, 2006). 
Empirical studies reports mixed evidence in the relationship of block holders and 
firm-level COC. For instance, Bozec et al. (2014) report significant empirical evidence of 
positive relationship between excess control and weighted average COC.  Similarly, Elston 
and Rondi (2006) report empirical evidence that concentrated inside ownership is 
significantly and positively associated with firm COC for Italian firms while having no 
significant relationship between the variables for German firms. In contrast, Pham et al. 
(2007) report significant empirical evidence of negative relationship between concentrated 
ownership and weighted average COC. 
In Pakistan, the relationship between block ownership and COC has not been 
documented. In line with the mixed empirical results, the current study expects a 
significant association between the block ownership and firm COC based on theoretical 
arguments outlined above. Thus, the fourteenth hypothesis in the current study is stated 
below: 
H14 There is a statistically significant association between block ownership and 
firms’ COC.  
3.4.2.5 Foreign ownership and Cost of Capital 
A firm’s choice of issuing debt or equity to finance their activities can be affected 
by foreign investors. Theoretically, information asymmetry is relatively higher among 
foreign investors because of language and distance (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). Higher 
foreign ownership may lead to debt financing as a governance mechanisms, thus, may 
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force firms to issue debt over equity (Le and Phung, 2013). Additionally, firms may prefer 
debt rather than equity as they may take the advantage of foreign investors’ relationship 
and reputation to have easy access to international capital markets, which will usually 
provide lower cost of borrowing and thus, lower COC. 
There are evidence of negative nexus between foreign ownership and COC (e.g. 
Chen et al., 2014) who report that a firm’s COD decrease as the foreign ownership 
increases. In Pakistani context, the association between foreign ownership and firm-level 
COC is not documented. Following negative theoretical predictions and the empirical 
literature, the current study expects a negative and significant relationship between the 
foreign ownership and firm-level COC. Thus, the fifteenth hypothesis in the current study 
is stated as: 
H15 Firms’ COC and foreign ownership are significantaly and negatively 
associated.  
3.4.3 Corporate Governance variables 
Limited numbers of past studies have investigated how CG can influence firms’ 
COC (Bozec and Bozec, 2011). This subsection will briefly set out the central theoretical 
argument that links CG variables and firms’ COC. The empirical evidence is also reviewed 
in order to develop the hypothesis. Following the prior studies and due to data limitations, 
this study limits it hypotheses to the following individual CG variables, including audit 
firm size, board size, and gender diversity in the board.  
3.4.3.1 Audit firm size and Cost of Capital 
Theoretically, external auditors have been suggested as one of the most effective 
CG mechanisms that can reduce agency cost by reducing information asymmetry between 
shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). In 
this regard, the quality of external auditor is important in reducing information asymmetry 
and this can be influenced significantly by audit firm size (DeAngelo, 1981). Big audit 
firms are expected to provide better audit quality than those of smaller firms because of 
more resources, experience, and reputation as quality auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; Uang et 
al., 2006). Arguably, big4 audited firms may have less problems of information asymmetry 
and as such the big audit firms can influence these firms to disclose more information to 
earn the confidence of outside investors, which in turn is expected to decrease the firms’ 
COC. In this regard, literature suggests that engaging with high reputation auditors can 
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contribute to the efficient resolution of contracting problems that leads to risk shifting by 
producing reliable and valuable information on ex-post investment decisions (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).   
Few studies provide evidence of the relationship between audit firm size and one 
component of COC (e.g., Pittman and Fortin, 2004; Beatty 1989; Balvers et al., 1988). For 
instance, Pittman and Fortin (2004) studied the link between auditor choice and debt 
pricing of firms that went public from 1977 to 1988. They report that choosing a big 
auditor, which can reduce monitoring costs by improving the reliability of annual reports 
and financial statements enable firms to lower their cost of debt.  Similarly, Balvers et al. 
(1988) and Beatty (1989) report that auditor with high reputation enable firms to reduce 
uncertainty. Additionally, Diamond’s (1989) predicts that firm decrease their cost of debt 
and, hence, COC by developing their reputation.  
In Pakistan, the relationship between audit firm size and COC has not been 
documented yet. For first time, this study offers evidence on this relationship for Pakistani 
listed firms. Following the negative theoretical and empirical evidence, the current study 
expects a negative and significant relationship between the audit firm size and firm COC. 
Thus, the sixteenth hypothesis in the current study is as follows: 
H16 There is a statistically significant and negative relationship between audit 
firm size and firms’ COC.  
3.4.3.2 Board size and Cost of Capital 
Theoretically, board of directors is considered as one of the most effective CG 
mechanisms, which can mitigate different type of agency problems by ensuring that firm 
operates competitively and efficiently (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). 
Precisely, it has been argued boards with more members can raise cost of managerial 
activities that can have an adverse affects the value of the firm and may increase cost of 
funding (Yawson, 2006). Resource dependence theory proposes a negative relationship 
between board size and firms’ COC.  In this regard, Goodstein et al. (1994) suggest that 
large board can improve firm value as firms can access critical resources. In the same way, 
it is argued that a large board have ability to appeal highly experienced and qualified 
directors that can result in btter decisions. Additionally, large board can signal the presence 
of wide stakeholders’ representation (Pfeffer, 1973; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Hence, 
more board members may improve communication between majority shareholders and 
other investors, which can increase the firm value by decreasing the firms’ COC through 
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lower COD that leads to lower COE due to low likelihood of asymmetry information and 
excessive risky investment decisions that shifts risk between investors.  
Although there is a lack of empirical evidence on relationship between board size 
and firm’s overall COC, the impact of board size have been investigated either on firms’ 
COE or COD (e.g., Bozec and Bozec, 2011; Shah and Butt, 2009). For instance, Bozec and 
Bozec (2011) examine the effect of CG index on firm-level COC in a sample of 155 
Canadian firms listed on S&P/TSX from 2002 to 2005. They report significant empirical 
evidence that both firms’ COD and COE decrease as the quality of CG practices increases. 
Similarly, using a sample of 114 firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange from 2003 to 
2007, Shah and Butt (2009) examine the effect of board size on firm’s COE. They report 
empirical evidence that suggests board size is significantly and negatively associated with 
COE. Thus, the seventeenth hypothesis in the current study is: 
H17 Firms’ COC and size of the board are significantly and negatively 
associated.  
3.4.3.3 Gender Diversity in the board and Cost of Capital 
With respect to the impact of board-gender diversity on different types of 
managerial decisions, several studies have examined the impact of different types of 
diversity on the board (e.g., gender, education, race, occupation and age) on different 
corporate decisions (Rose, 2007; Dezso and Ross, 2012; Ntim, 2014). Admas and Ferreire 
(2009) argue that the boards with more female members can lead to a greater participation 
of directors in decision making. Further, gender-board diversity may improve 
communication between different stakeholders and, hence, can reduce risk shifting and 
thus COC. Additionally, Nielsen and Huse (2010) argue that the absence of female 
members from the board means that the firm is losing an opportunity to increase the talent 
pool and board skills that may negatively affect the firm value and increase COC. 
Empirically, several studies have examined the impact of board-gender diversity on 
different issues and find that women directors have influence on firms’ board (Rose, 2007; 
Bøhren and Strøm, 2010; Dezso and Ross, 2012; Ntim, 2014). The current study expect a 
negative and significant relationship between the gender diversity on the board and firm 
COC. Thus, the eighteenth hypothesis in the current study is: 
H18: Firms’ COC and gender diversity are significantly and negatively 
associated. .  
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3.5 CG DISCLOSURE MEASUREMENT: LITERATURE 
ON CG INDICES 
 CG literature suggests that CG mechanisms should be examined collectively rather 
than individually (Ntim et al., 2012). In response to this, researchers use CG indices as a 
method to examine CG mechanisms by relying on national CG codes (e.g., Al-Malkawi et 
al., 2014) or international CG codes (e.g., Cheung et al., 2007; Hooghiemstra, 2012;). 
Following previous studies (e.g., Elghuweel et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2012a), this study 
employs an index in order to examine CG practices in Pakistan.  This section discusses the 
literature related to self-constructed versus analysts’ ratings indices and ordinal coding 
scheme versus binary coding scheme.  
In this study, a self-constructed CG Index based on Pakistani CG code will be used 
to measure the level and determinants of compliance with CG provisions of the PCCG. 
The PCGI is also used to examine its impact on the COC. The adoption of self-constructed 
CG index as a methodological approach is justified in subsection 3.5.1. Briefly, the use of 
PCGI is suitable as (i) it is directly applicable to Pakistani context; (ii) the PCGI is 
designed to incorporate most of the CG aspects that have been suggested by literature; and 
(iii) there is no theoretical guidance which offers a criterion for the selection of indices to 
be used in the study. Furthermore, it is consistent to many recent researches (e.g., Tariq 
and Abbas, 2013; Hooghiemstra, 2012) that investigated the level and determinants of CG 
compliance by relying on national (e.g., King Report II, 2002) codes in constructing their 
CG indices (Hooghiemstra, 2012). The PCGI contains 70 CG provisions (See Table 4.3) 
covering five broad aspects. The PCGI is constructed from the PCCG 2002.  The listing 
rules were also used as additional source in order to develop a comprehensive index. Table 
in appendix 1 explains each provisions and the source included in the PCGI.  
3.5.1 Self-Constructed versus Analysts’ Ratings Indices 
 According to the literature, CG disclosures are measured by two commonly used 
indices (Bozec and Bozec, 2012; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). First, self-constructed indices 
developed by researchers using national CG standards. Prior studies (e.g., Tariq and 
Abbas, 2013; Price et al., 2011) utilize national CG codes to examine different issues 
related to the relationship between CG and corporate policy decisions. Second, analysts’ 
ratings indices offered by independent professional organizations based on general CG 
principles. Such CG indices have been used by some studies (Toledo, 2010; Henry, 2008; 
Clacher et al., 2008) to investigate the extent to which CG is able to enhance firms’ policy 
decisions.  
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Both measures have strength and weaknesses. First, analysts’ ratings indices are 
reliable, as constructed by professionals whereas self-constructed indices may not be as  
reliable as the researcher constructs the index by himself (Francis et al., 2008; Hasan and 
Marston, 2010). Second, analysts’ ratings indices are less labour-intensive than 
researchers’ constructed indices and can be used for a large number of firms (Beattie and 
Thomson, 2007). Finally, unlike researchers’ self-constructed indices where the annual 
reports are regarded as the main data source, the indices developed by analysts use several 
reports including: (i) quarterly reports; (ii) firms’ announcements; (iii) investors relations; 
and (iv) annual reports among others (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Alsaeed, 2006).  
Despite the advantages of analysts’ ratings indices, the current study uses the 
researcher’s self-constructed index to measure firms’ CG disclosures for the following 
reasons. First, as most of the analysts’ ratings indices are developed by international 
professional organisations, by following developed nations’ CG principles. Additionally, 
many of these analysts’ ratings indices may not be used due to changes in CG regulations. 
Second, analysts’ ratings indices normally cover certain CG aspects, such as shareholding 
patterns and board characteristics (e.g., Chung and Zhang, 2011; Yermack, 1996) while the 
Pakistani CG index (PCGI) is constructed to incorporate all of the CG aspects that have 
been suggested by the literature. The PCGI comprise of 70 CG provisions categorised into 
five main elements, namely, board of directors, internal auditing and committees, 
shareholders right, transparency and disclosure, and internal control, external auditor and 
risk management. Third, there is no theoretical guidance which offers a criterion for the 
selection of indices to be used in the study (Hassan and Marston, 2010). Fourth, adopting 
researcher-constructed indices is in line with prior studies (e.g., Tariq and Abbas, 2013; 
Samaha et al., 2012; Price et al., 2011), which in turn enables the current study to compare 
its results with those of past studies.   
3.5.2 Choice between ordinal and binary coding schemes 
According to literature (Beattie et al., 2004), there are two commonly used schemes 
for scoring indices: (i) ordinal coding scheme; and (ii) binary coding scheme. In the first 
scheme, a weight is assigned to each provision based on its importance and the degree of 
information related to it; hence, CG indices coded by this scheme are called weighted CG 
index. Such indices can be developed with the help of surveys from experts about both the 
importance of each provision and the level of disclosure of that particular provision 
(Hassan and Marston, 2010; Beattie et al., 2004). For instance, if a firm does not disclose 
any information about a specific CG provision it is assigned 0, if firm discloses qualitative 
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information only it is assigned 1, and if it discloses quantified information about that 
specific provision, a score of 2 is assigned. Obviously, the rating of a particular provision 
and weighting of disclosure vary among the researchers (e.g., Shah et al., 2009; Tariq and 
Abbas, 2013). In the second scheme, a score of 1 is assigned to a particular provision if it 
is disclosed, 0 otherwise; hence, indices scored by this scheme are known as un-weighted 
index.  
Despite the advantages and drawbacks in both schemes, the current study relies on 
binary coding scheme to code the PCGI. This choice was made for five main reasons. 
First, there is no theoretical suggestion offering guidelines on how to choose between the 
two schemes. In this regard, binary coding scheme is considered preferable because it 
avoids making a bias towards any specific CG provision as it can be the case of ordinal 
coding scheme (Botosan, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). 
Second, it is considered an appropriate method as the PCGI is designed to measure 
whether a particular provision is disclosed or not. Unlike the ordinal coding scheme, it only 
scores the absence or presence of a CG provision because the current study does not 
examine the quality of CG. Instead, it examines the level of CG compliance and disclosure 
and how this may drive firms’ COC. For instance, a CG provision related to directors’ 
independence necessitates only assigning a score of 1 if at least one member of the board is 
independent and 0 otherwise; therefore, a use of such scheme is considered to be an 
appropriate approach.  
Third, unlike the ordinal coding scheme, binary coding scheme is often less biased 
as there is no personal judgment is required to assign the weights to any particular 
provision (Hassan and Marston, 2010). In support of this method, Tsipouri et al. (2004) 
state that binary coding scheme prevents the subjectivity of researchers where different 
provisions may be weighted differently. This should increase the reliability of PCGI as it 
can be easily replicated by another researcher.  
Fourth, binary coding scheme is widely used by recent CG literature (e.g., Allegrini 
and Greco, 2013; Samaha et al., 2012) which enables current study to compare its results 
with those studies. This is especially true in developing countries where researchers face a 
problem in finding a professional CG organisation that helps in assigning weights to CG 
provisions. Finally, due to the fact that there is no theoretical foundation to give weights to 
different CG provisions, the present study takes two steps to mitigate the problems 
associated with binary coding scheme. The first step was to minimize the inequality 
between the weights of different provision where all the possible provisions were included 
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in the PCGI (Beattie et al., 2004). In the second step, the PCGI’s provisions were 
classified into five indices.  
3.6 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter offered an empirical and theoretical review of literature of nexus 
between firms’ COC and CG disclosure level. The chapter was divided into five main 
sections. First, it discussed the most relevant theories that underlie CG disclosure and COC 
decisions by firms. In this regard, the study adopted a multiple-theoretical approach which 
involves agency theory, managerial signalling, resource dependence, asymmetric 
information, trade-off theory, and stewardship. This assisted the present study to develop 
its hypotheses and interpret its findings. Second, the literature was reviewed with respect to 
level of CG compliance and disclosure with CG codes. Literature has been discussed with 
respect to developed and developing countries in general and with respect to Pakistan in 
particular. The literature suggested that there is a difference in the CG compliance level 
between the developing and developed countries. Literature suggested that economic, 
cultural and legal system may attribute this difference in the level of compliance.  
Third, this chapter reviewed the literature of factors influencing level of compliance 
with CG codes and developed hypothesis related to each determinant. These factors are 
categorised into two main types. First, ownership structure variables made up of: director; 
government; institutional; block; and foreign ownership. Second, board and audit 
characteristics variables consisting of: board size; board diversity in gender; board 
diversity in nationality; and audit firm size. The fourth section examined the literature of 
CG-COC relationship and developed hypothesis for PCGI, ownership structure and 
board/audit characteristics with COC. The fifth section discussed the literature related to 
self-constructed versus analysts’ ratings indices and ordinal coding scheme versus binary 
coding scheme. In this study, self-constructed index and binary coding scheme are being 
used to construct the PCGI and the reasons of selection are discussed in detail.  
The next chapter discusses the sample selection, data sources, methods of study and 
robustness analyses of the current study investigating level of compliance and disclosure 
with 2002 PCCG, factor influencing level of CG compliance with 2002 PCCG and the 
nexus between CG and COC.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter provides detailed discussion of the research design and methodological 
issues in the study. Specifically, it aims to attain the subsequent three objectives. Firstly, 
this chapter discusses sample and data sources used in the study. Secondly, it provides a 
comprehensive description of the research methodology used in this study. Thirdly, it 
discusses the sensitivity analyses that are employed. Therefore, 4.1 discusses sample 
selection and data sources. Section 4.2 discusses the research methodology. Section 4.3 
will discuss a number of statistical tests performed before and after examining the study 
hypothesis while section 4.4 summarise the chapter. 
4.1 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA SOURCES 
The criteria for selecting sample, data sources employed and sampling limitations 
are discussed in this subsection.  
4.1.1 Sample Selection Procedure 
The sample used in analysing the CG compliance level Pakistani CG index (PCGI) 
and its impact on Cost of Capital (COC) is made up of Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) 
listed firms. A total of 579 firms were listed on KSE9 on December 31, 2014. Table 4.1 
describes the sample for this study.  
Table 4.1 also shows the industrial composition of firms listed on the KSE. The 
listed firms are grouped into eleven major sectors. The composition is made up of 
automobile and engineering, cement, chemical, electricity, financial, food, oil and gas, 
pharmaceutical, textile and general industrial. Panel A of Table 4.1 shows that the 
Pakistani market is dominated by chemical, cement, financial, food and textile industries as 
these industries represents 76% of the entire KSE listed firms while the remaining five 
industries presents only 24% of KSE listed firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Karachi Stock Exchange can be found on http://www.khistocks.com. 
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Table 4.1: Sample selection procedure  
Panel A: Industries of all listed 
Firms on the KSE as on 31 December 2014 
Firms in 
Industry 
Percentage 
of firms(%) 
Automobile and engineering 
Cement 
Chemical 
Electricity and Electronics 
Financial 
Food and Beverages 
Household 
Misc 
Oil and gas 
Pharmaceutical 
Textile 
26 
36 
35 
24 
137 
56 
33 
30 
14 
  9 
179 
4.49 
6.22 
6.04 
4.15 
23.66 
9.67 
5.70 
5.20 
2.42 
1.55 
30.92 
Total population 
        Less: Financial Industry 
579 
(137) 
100.00 
23.66 
Total KSE listed non-financial firms 442 76.34 
Panel B: Industries of 
Firms to be sampled 
No of firms  Firms’ percentage (%) 
Automobile and engineering 
Cement 
Chemical 
Electricity and Electronics 
Food and Beverages 
Household 
Misc. 
Oil and gas 
Pharmaceutical 
Textile 
26 
36 
35 
24 
56 
33 
30 
14 
  9 
179 
 5.88 
 8.14 
7.92 
 5.43 
12.67 
7.50 
6.80 
 3.17 
 2.04 
40.50 
Firms available for sample 
  Minus: Missing data firms 
442 
(282) 
100% 
63.80 
  Total samples firms with full data 160  36.20% 
Panel C: Industries of        
  Final sampled firms 
 No. of Firms in 
 final sample 
Percentage    
of firms (%)                                        
Automobile and engineering 
Cement 
Chemical 
Electricity and Electronics 
Food and Beverages 
Household 
Misc. 
Oil and gas 
Pharmaceutical 
Textile 
19 
24 
18 
  9 
19 
  8 
14 
13 
  7 
29 
11.88 
15.00 
11.25 
5.63 
11.88 
5.00 
9.00 
08.13 
4.38 
18.13 
Total 160 100.00% 
 
In this study, the financial industry is not included in the final sample for three 
main reasons. First, financial firms have a different capital structure than those of non-
financial firms which may have impact on firm value (Lim et al., 2007; Shah and Butt, 
2009). Second, financial firms have been suggested to be heavily regulated. In the case of 
Pakistan, financial firms are required to comply with more regulations than their industrial 
counterparts. This is expected to have different impact on financial firm values from those 
of non-financial firms.  Third, financial firms are excluded in line with previous studies in 
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order to make the results comparable with prior studies (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Tariq and Abbas, 2013). 
Panel B of Table 4.1 shows the industrial composition of all remaining 442 firms 
(76.33% of entire KSE population) that were available for possible inclusion in the sample. 
This is further discussed in the following subsections.  
4.1.2 Criteria for Selecting the Sample 
 To be included in the sample of this study, a firm has to meet two conditions. First, 
the firms’ eleven year annual reports from 2003 to 2013, inclusive, must be available.  
Second, its corresponding eleven year financial and stock market information had to be 
available. The above criteria were specified for the four main reasons.  
 First, the majority of KSE listed firm’s annual reports became publically available 
in 2003 with required CG information after the issuance of Pakistani CG code in 2002. 
This makes it possible to gather data from 2003 when the code was effectively 
implemented and firms started to publish their annual reports. Second, the sample ends in 
2013 as it was the most recent year with available data at the time of data collection. Third, 
these criteria permit the current study to benefit from panel data characteristics. In this 
regard, there are several benefits associated with panel data approach including : (i) panel 
data has both time series and cross-sectional observations that allow contrast and facilitate 
the testing of  more realistic behavioural models (Hsiao, 1985; Gujrati, 2003); (ii) unlike 
either cross-sectional or time series data, panel data permits the present study to collect a 
large number of observations, which decreases the problem of multicollinearity and also 
increase the degree of freedom (Gujrati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2009); (iii) differently from 
both cross-sectional and time series data, panel data allows the researcher to control for 
firm’s heterogeneity in individual variables (Wooldridge, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012b); and 
(iv) it provides a way to minimize statistical problems in general and those related to CG in 
particular,  such as endogeneity (Larcker and Rusticus, 2007; Ntim et al., 2012b). Further, 
use of panel data method is consistent with previous CG (e.g., Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; 
Ntim et al., 2012a) and COC (e.g., Pham et al., 2012; Soha, 2011) studies where this study 
would be able to compare its results to prior studies. Fourth, the above criteria facilitate 
meeting the conditions for using a balance panel data analysis which favours the inclusion 
of only firms with consecutive years of data (Cheng et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a).   
Under the above mentioned criteria panel C of Table 4.1 presents 160 firms for the 
period 2003 to 2013 with 1760 firm-year observations that met the selection criteria. The 
final sample includes firms from all 10 sectors of KSE listed firms. The textile and cement 
remain the largest sectors with 29 (18.13%) and 24 (15%) firms out of a total of 160 firms 
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respectively. By contrast, Pharmaceutical and Electricity are the smallest sectors with 7 
(4.38%) and 9 (5.63%) firms respectively whereas the share of the remaining sectors range 
from 8% to 13% of sampled firms. Generally, the distribution of the sample is consistent 
with the industrial composition of all firms available at the time of collecting the data. This 
allows the current study to be more able to generalize its results where each sector has been 
fairly presented. For instance, Electricity and Electronics sectors make up 5.43% and 
5.63%, respectively of the final sample.    
  A sample of 160 listed firms with 1760 firm year-observations over 2003 to 2013 
is considered to be large enough to make significant contributions to the extent literature.  
The final sample is different from prior studies in Pakistan in two main aspects. First, the 
present study’s sample is considered as large enough used in Pakistani study on CG. For 
instance, in examining the relationship between CG and dividend payment, Afzal and 
Sehrish (2010) employ only 42 listed firms. More recently, Tariq and Abbas (2013) use 
119 listed firms to study the nexus between compliance level and firm value. With 
particular reference to the current study, Shah et al. (2009) use a sample of 114 in their 
examination of the influence of CG on cost of equity. Thus, literature shows that the 
number of firms included in prior Pakistani studies’ samples is less than in the current 
study’s sample. Arguably, this limits the prior studies’ findings. In contrast, using a sample 
of 160 listed firms enables the present study to improve the examination of Pakistani CG 
level and determinants, including the impact on COC.  
Second, and apart from differences in number of firms, the sample time period used 
by previous studies in Pakistan are discernibly far shorter than the present study time 
period. For instance, Afzal and Sehrish (2010) and Shah et al. (2009) document their 
empirical evidence based on only five-year period. The longest time period examined in 
past Pakistani studies on CG is by Tariq and Abbas (2013)’ who employ sample from 
2003-2010. In contrast, the current study investigates Pakistani CG reforms over the 2003-
2013 period, which is far longer period and more recent compared with previous studies on 
Pakistan. Therefore, the current study is the most recent and extensive time period that has 
been investigated within the Pakistani context in relation to CG in general and the impact 
of CG on COC in particular. 
A balance panel data of 1760 firm-year observations is regarded as one of largest 
data sets that can be used in studies in developing countries to examine issues that are 
related to CG variables given the fact that these variables are extracted manually from 
annual reports which is considered a highly labour-intensive activity (Hussainey et al., 
2003; Beattie et al., 2004). Despite great efforts that have been made to extend the sample, 
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practical limitations like data availability, funding and time restrict the sample size but 
ensure that the research is accomplished within the planned time frame of a PhD study. 
4.1.3 Data and Source 
There are three types of data are being used in this study including: (i) CG 
variables; (ii) Financial variables; and (ii) Stock Market variables. First, using content 
analysis approach, CG variables were manually collected from the annual reports of the 
sampled firms. These annual reports were collected from different sources: Rest of world 
of World Filings of the Perfect Information Database, companies’ website and KSE 
website. Firms’ annual reports that were not available in the above sources were obtained 
from SECP head office in Islamabad, Pakistan.10 Second, the data on financial variables of 
130 firms were collected from Datastream while the data for the remaining 30 firms were 
collected from Balance Sheet Analyses of State Bank of Pakistan’s publication. Sampled 
firms monthly stock prices, Government of Pakistan T-Bill rates and Market indices 
variables constitute the third type of data used in this study which were collected from 
Datastream. Missing or in-sufficient data related to Company’s monthly stock prices, 
Government of Pakistan T-Bill rates and Market indices data were collected from the 
website of business recorder.11 
4.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of the study is discussed in this section. As discussed in chapter 
one, the objective of this study is to answer three main research questions. First, what is 
the level of compliance with governance provisions contained in 2002 Pakistani code of 
CG (PCCG) and to what extent has the introduction of PCCG improved CG practices in 
Pakistani context? Second, it investigates the factor that determine the CG compliance 
level with provisions contained in PCCG? Third, what is the association between CG 
mechanisms and COC of Pakistani listed firms?  
 
                                                 
10
 For the missing annual reports of the sample, researcher visited Pakistan and accessed those reports from 
SECP head office Islamabad, Pakistan.  The coding for those reports had been done with in premises of 
SECP for a period of one month.  
11http://www.brecorder.com 
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4.2.1 The coding steps and sources of Pakistani Corporate Governance 
Index (PCGI) 
As discussed in section 3.5, a self-constructed CG Index based on Pakistani CG 
code will be used to measure the level and determinants of compliance with CG provisions 
of the PCCG. The PCGI is also used to examine its impact on the COC. The adoption of 
self-constructed CG index and binary coding scheme as a methodological approach is 
justified in section 3.5. The PCGI is constructed from the PCCG 2002. The listing rules 
were also used as additional source in order to develop a comprehensive index. Table in 
appendix 1 explains each provisions and the source included in the PCGI.  
Following prior literature (e.g., Elghuweel et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2012), this 
study employs governance index in order to examine CG practices in Pakistan.  This 
subsection discusses data sources of Pakistani CG index, the validity and reliability of CG 
index.  
4.2.1.1 Data Sources of Pakistani CG Index (PCGI) 
  Hassan and Marston (2010) demonstrate that companies provide information in 
different ways which include: (i) annual reports;(ii) analyst presentations; (iii) conference 
calls; (iv) interim reports; (v) investor relations; (vi) press releases; (vii) prospectus;  and  
(viii) websites among other sources. Among these resources, this research depends on 
annual reports of the firms as a source to manually extract CG information. In particular, 
the reliance on those reports in constructing the PCGI was due to the following reasons.   
 First, annual reports are considered by prior studies as a significant reporting 
document in examining different empirical issues. Knutson (1992, p.22) says that “the 
annual report is the major reporting document and every other report is in some respect 
subsidiary or supplementary to it”. Second, annual report provides both quantitative and 
qualitative data.  This allows the present study to obtain both the CG and financial data 
which cannot be found in other data sources, especially CG variables. Third, it has been 
argued that disclosure level in firm’s annual reports is positively associated with the 
disclosure disclosed through other means (Botosan, 1997). Fourth, annual reports are 
primarily addressing shareholders’ interests since managers are accountable to them 
(Alsaeed, 2006). This increases the credibility of annual reports (Samaha et al., 2012). 
Fifth, the KSE listing rules, specifically Article 35(Xl), mandate the listed firms to provide 
annual reports audited by external auditors. This makes the annual reports highly reliable 
source to collect CG information. Sixth, reliance on annual reports is in line with recent 
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studies (Al-Jandi et al., 2013; Tariq and Abbas, 2013), which in turn, improves the 
comparability with these studies.  
4.2.1.2 Validity, Reliability and Coding Procedure of self-constructed Index (PCGI) 
 There are two methodological concerns that have to be addressed while using a 
researcher’s self-constructed index, namely validity and reliability. This subsection 
discusses a number of steps that were carried out by the current study to ensure that PCGI 
is a valid and reliable tool.  
Saunders et al. (2007, p.614) defined the validity as “the extent to which data 
collection methods accurately measure what they were intended to measure”. Thus, an 
index can be considered as valid, if it reflects what the researcher intended (Omar and 
Simon, 2011). Hassan and Marston (2010) argue that there are three main types of validity 
which are: criterion- related validity, construct validity, and content validity. Sekaran 
(2003, p. 206) defined criterion-related validity as “established when the measure 
differentiates individuals on a criterion it is expected to predict”. Construct validity is 
instrument’ measurement while content validity is about the adequacy and representation 
of indices’ items (Sekaran, 2003).  
The validity of PCGI was improved by applying following measures related to 
criterion, construct, and content validity. First, the Pakistani CG index is developed by 
researcher himself rather than using analysts’ ratings. The PCGI largely depends on 2002 
PCCG that enables this index to reflect accurate CG practices among Pakistani listed firms. 
Second, the construction of index was guided by CG literature to cover all important areas. 
For instance, in line with several past studies, the current study paid close attention to the 
board of directors. Third, the validity of PCGI is enhanced by reviewing it twice before 
finalising it: (i) once PCGI is constructed from PCCG, each provision was discussed in 
detail with researcher’s supervisors who are expert in CG. This enabled the researcher to 
utilise their suggestions in refining the PCGI; and (ii) the draft of PCGI was further 
discussed in annual doctoral conferences.12 The PCGI has improved on the basis of 
comments received from those academics and experienced researcher from the field of CG. 
This improves the criterion and content validity of the PCGI; hence, PCGI is considered a 
valid instrument.  
The second methodological concern, however, is reliability. Hassan and Marston 
(2010) state that reliability “concerns the ability of a measurement instrument to reproduce 
consistent results on a repeated measurement (some refer to it as the stability of the 
                                                 
12
 It was presented at the 2014 British Accounting and Finance Doctoral Colloquia,   and Scottish Doctoral Colloquia.  
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measurement instrument over time)”. Literature shows that reliability can be assessed by 
two measures namely: consistency and stability (Sekaran, 2003).  
With respect to consistency, it is defined as “an indicator of how well the different 
items measure the same issue. This is important because a group of items that purports to 
measure one variable should indeed be clearly focused on that variable” (Litwin, 1995). 
Following the prior literature (e.g., Gul and Leung, 2004), the current study employes 
Cronbach’s alpha13 (Cronbach, 1951) to measure internal consistency of PCGI. 
Table 4.2: Cronbach's Alpha Reliability test for Pakistani Corporate Governance Index (PCGI) 
Sub-Indices of PCGI Cronbach’s Alpha if item deleted 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items 
The board of directors 0.951 
 
 
0.964 
Internal auditing and committees 0.949 
Shareholders right 0.950 
Transparency and disclosure 0.945 
Internal Control, External Auditor and  
Risk Management 0.940 
The Cronbach’s alpha value can be from zero to one; the higher the coefficient 
alpha, the higher the reliability of the measurement. According to Allegrini and Greco 
(2013), the Cronbach’s alpha value above 0.80 proposes that this instrument is consistent. 
As shown in Table 4.2, the coefficient alpha value (based on standardise data) for five 
subcategories of PCGI is 96.4% which indicates that the constructed index is highly 
reliable. Table 4.2 show that all “Cronbach’s Alpha if item deleted” are lower than the 
“Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items” which means that the exclusion of any 
sub-index can significantly harm the reliability of the PCGI.  
With regards to stability, it is a case where the researcher should be able to obtain 
the same results over time by using the same measuring procedure (Hassan and Marston, 
2010). In line with previous literature (e.g., Omar and Simon, 2011; Samaha et al, 2012), 
this study uses test-retest approach to measure the stability of the index. In doing so, three 
steps have been taken to achieve PCGI’s stability. First, before starting the coding of 
PCGI, all contents of each sampled firms’ annual reports were read carefully. This helped 
the researcher to be aware of the activities of firms, which was helpful to identify the 
applicable and non-applicable CG provisions (Omer and Simons, 2011). This allowed the 
researcher to make sure that all PCGI provisions are applicable to all sampled firms. 
Second, firm wise coding was performed for whole sample in the first round. For instance, 
each firm was coded for the 11 year period starting from 2003 to 2013 before the next firm 
                                                 
13Cronbach’s alpha is one of the most popular tests to measure internal consistency by measuring the correlation between 
the items and showing how well the sub items complement each other in the measurement of different aspect of a 
variable (Litwin, 1995). 
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was coded. This assisted to improve the consistency and accuracy in coding. Third, the 
coding of all sampled firms was double checked to identify if any mistake has been made 
in the first round coding.  
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Table 4.3: The Pakistani CG index provisions 
Pakistani Corporate Governance Index 
Section No. PCGI Provision 
 
Range of 
Scores 
Total 
Provisions 
I. Board of Directors 18 
 
1 Whether firm discloses the categorization14 of directors in annual 
report 
0-1 
 
 2 Whether at least one member of the board is independent 0-1  
 3 Whether firm has a director representing minority shareholders 0-1  
 4 Whether at least one fourth of the board is non-executive 0-1  
 5 Whether the firm discloses the director’s membership in other boards 
of listed companies in their annual report 
0-1 
 
 6 Whether the directors of firms have not more than seven/ten positions 
simultaneously 
0-1 
 
 7 Whether board Chairman is a Non-Executive  director 0-1  
 8 Whether there is a clear narrative that classifies the role of chairman 
and CEO 
0-1 
 
 9 Whether the CEO position is separate from the chairman position 0-1  
 10 Whether firm disclose the directors’ orientation course 0-1  
 11 Whether the board meetings are disclosed in annual reports 0-1  
 12 Whether at least board meet 4 time in a year 0-1  
 13 Whether the name of the directors is born on the register of National 
Tax Payers is disclosed 
0-1 
 
 14 Whether non defaulter information about directors is disclosed in 
annual report 
0-1 
 
 15 Whether no involvement of directors in brokerage business is 
disclosed in annual report 
0-1 
 
 16 Whether firm discloses that the statement of ethics and business 
practices is prepared and circulated 
0-1 
 
 17 Whether firm discloses that the fiduciary powers are exercised by the 
board of directors 
0-1 
 
 18 Whether firm discloses future outlook in annual reports 0-1  
II. Committees and Auditing  14 
 19 Whether firm has a Remuneration or HR Committee 0-1  
 20 Whether Committee has at least three members with a majority of 
non-executive directors 
0-1 
 
 21 Whether firm discloses the numbers of different committees meetings 
held during the year 
0-1 
 
 22 Whether it publishes the attendance of meetings by each member  0-1  
 23 Whether firm discloses the names of the members of the committees 
of the board in each annual reports 
0-1 
 
 24 Whether the names of audit committee are discloses in annual reports 0-1  
                                                 
14
 Categorization of directors in term of Independent, Non-Executive or Executive 
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Table 4.3: The Pakistani CG index provisions 
Pakistani Corporate Governance Index 
Section No. PCGI Provision 
 
Range of 
Scores 
Total 
Provisions 
 25 Whether minimum members of Audit Committee is at least three 0-1  
 26 Whether Non-Executive director is the Chairman of the audit  
Committee 
0-1 
 
 27 Whether Non-Executive directors are in the majority in audit  
Committee 
0-1 
 
 28 Whether audit  Committee members do arrange meetings four times 
in one years  and this information is available in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 29 Whether The Head of Internal audit Committee and a Representative 
of External Auditors attended Audit Committee meetings and this 
information is discloses in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 30 Whether Audit Committee Review of quarterly, Half-yearly and 
annual financial statements prior to the approval of Board of Director 
and discloses in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 31 Review of Management letter issued by external auditors and 
discloses in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 32 Whether audit committee appointed a secretary and this information 
is discloses in the annual reports 
0-1 
 
III. Shareholders Right 6 
 33 Whether firm issued a notice of AGM about  the meeting to 
shareholders 
0-1 
 
 34 Whether firm issued a notice of AGM at least 21 days before the 
meeting date 
0-1 
 
 35 Whether firm held AGM within three/four15 months following the 
close of its financial year, 
0-1 
 
 36 Whether firm held AGM within the same town as company has 
registered office 
0-1 
 
 37 Whether the notice of the AGM specify the date, place, time, and the 
business to be transacted, 
0-1 
 
 38 Whether the notice of the AGM specify that shareholder can 
participate personally or through proxy 
0-1 
 
IV. Transparency And  Disclosures 14 
 39 Whether firm discloses its ownership structure in annual reports 0-1  
 40 Whether firm discloses the name wise detail of shareholdings of 
directors, CEO, their spouse and minor children’s 
0-1 
 
 41 Whether firm discloses the shareholdings of ten percent or more 
voting rights 
0-1 
 
                                                 
15
 According to Companies Ordinance 1984, till 2008 this period was 4 month and then changed to 3 months. 
Data is collected accordingly.  
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Table 4.3: The Pakistani CG index provisions 
Pakistani Corporate Governance Index 
Section No. PCGI Provision 
 
Range of 
Scores 
Total 
Provisions 
 42 Whether it is discloses that firm is a going concern entity and 
explanation if not 
0-1 
 
 43 Whether firm discloses its outstanding taxes and other charges with 
reason in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 44 Whether firm discloses the operations, cash flows and change in 
equity in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 45 Whether firm discloses the last six years financial and operating 
performance in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 46 Whether firm discloses operating results and significant deviation 
from last year, if any  and reasons explained in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 47 Whether firm discloses the trade of shares of companies  carried out 
by directors, executives, their spouses and minor child 
0-1 
 
 48 Whether firm discloses Mission, Vision and Corporate strategies in 
annual reports 
0-1 
 
 49 Whether it provides an encouraging declaration on compliance with 
the PCCG16 in reports 
0-1 
 
 50 Whether firm discloses the reason of a bonus share (if any) or not 
paying dividend 
0-1 
 
 51 Whether the firm discloses evidence of every contract in which 
parties are firm and its directors or any other executive is or was 
materially interested and clear statement in case of no such 
transaction 
0-1 
 
 52 Whether firm discloses the detail of  payment in form of 
remunerations in annual reports to the board of directors 
0-1 
 
V. Internal Control, External Auditor And Risk Management 18 
 53 Whether firm discloses that there is an effective and sound internal 
control system established, implemented, and monitored by the BoD 
0-1 
 
 54 Whether firm provides a description about the actual and potential 
risk of the company 
0-1 
 
 55 Whether firm provides a clear description of risk management 
policies in annual report 
0-1 
 
 56 Whether auditor reports provide a narrative that  internal control 
system has been reviewed by the auditor 
0-1 
 
 57 Whether auditor reports provide a narrative financial reports have 
been reviewed by the auditor 
0-1 
 
 58 Whether the reports are ratified by the firms’ board and sign up by 
the authorised executives, CEO and CFO earlier to circulation to the 
0-1 
 
                                                 
16
 PCCG stands for Pakistani Code of Corporate Governance.  
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Table 4.3: The Pakistani CG index provisions 
Pakistani Corporate Governance Index 
Section No. PCGI Provision 
 
Range of 
Scores 
Total 
Provisions 
shareholders 
 59 Whether firm discloses that proper book of accounts are maintained 
in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 60 Whether firm discloses appropriate accounting policies applied in 
preparation of accounting estimations and  financial statements in 
annual reports 
0-1 
 
 61 Whether firm discloses that financial statements are according to IAS 0-1  
 62 Whether External Auditors have Satisfactory rating under the Quality 
Review Program by Institute of Charted Accountants of Pakistan and 
this information is discloses 
0-1 
 
 63 Whether Compliance with International Federation of Accountants 
Gridlines on code of ethics is published in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 64 Whether Auditor perform duties according to IFAC,  no management 
role and this information is discloses in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 65 Whether external auditor of the company attends the annual general 
meeting and this information is discloses in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 66 Whether Statutory Auditors of company  Reviews the  Corporate 
Governance Compliance Statement and disclose this information in 
annual reports 
0-1 
 
 67 Whether half yearly financial statements with statutory auditor’s 
review information discloses in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 68 Whether Annual audited financial statements not later than four 
month from close of financial year discloses in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 69 if Compliance with relevant Statutory Requirements is determined by 
external auditors and discloses in annual reports 
0-1 
 
 70 Whether if external auditors are Monitoring Compliance with Best 
Practices of Corporate Governance and Identification of Violence if 
any discloses in annual reports 
0-1 
 
Five  Sections Total Corporate Governance Provisions  70 
 
4.2.2 Determinants of Corporate Governance Compliance and 
Disclosure Model 
The current study aims to examine the factor influencing the level of CG 
compliance for Pakistani listed firms. The Table 4.4 presents factors employed in the study 
to test hypothesis developed in subsection 3.2.3. Drawing from theories, empirical studies 
and Pakistani context, factors under investigation include: ownership structure, CG 
variables and general firm characteristics. Subsection 4.2.2.1 explains the dependent 
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variable. Subsection 4.2.2.2 explains the independent variables, while the subsection 
4.2.2.3 presents the control variables used in this model. 
Table 4.4: Detail of variable  in determinants of CG compliance  
Dependent Variable 
PCGI Pakistani CG Index (PCGI) consists of 70 provisions from PCCG, which takes a binary 
number of 1 in case the CG provision is published in reports of company, otherwise 0. 
Explanatory  variables 
DOWNP Percentage of shares owned by directors to the total shares held by firm. 
IOWNP Percentage of shares owned by institutions to the total shares held by firm. 
GOWNP Percentage of shares owned by government to the total shares held by firm. 
BOWNP Percentage of shares owned by shareholders with at least 5% of total shares to the total 
shares held by firm. 
FOWNP Percentage of shares owned by foreigner to the total shares held by firm. 
BIG4 1 if firm is audited by one of the big-four17 audit firms, 0 otherwise. 
BSZ The total number of directors on the board of firm at the time of AGM.  
BGEN 1 if firm has a female board member, 0 otherwise.  
BNAT 1 if firm has a foreign board member, 0 otherwise.  
The Control Variables 
LTA It is measured as the log of total assets of the company.  
ROE Earnings before interest and tax to total equity of the firm.  
SALESG Sales in this year menus sales in the previous year divided by sales in the previous year.  
LEVG Total book value of debt to total book value of assets.  
CETA Percentage of total capital expenditure to the total assets of the firm.  
INDUSTRY In this study a dummy variable is employed for each of the ten industry. 
YERDUMY In this study a dummy variable is employed for each of the eleven year.  
4.2.2.1 The Pakistani CG Index (PCGI) 
The Pakistani CG index (PCGI) is employed as the main dependent variable in this 
study. The PCGI is the collection of 70 broad set of CG provisions contained in the 2002 
Pakistani CG code. Distinctively, it is different from past research (e.g., Haider et al., 
2013) in two main aspects. Firstly, unlike the previous studies (e.g., Butt and Hasan, 2009; 
Ali Shah and Butt, 2009; Haider et al., 2013) that focuses mainly on individual CG 
measures, such as, board characteristics, PCGI covers all CG aspects (see Table 4.3). 
Second, unlike some past studies that rely on international CG codes to construct their CG 
indexes (e.g., Al-Malkawi et al. 2014), the current study constructs its index based on 
Pakistani CG code. The PCGI has been constructed by using a binary code scheme and 
data is taken from annual reports. In this method of scoring, value ‘1’ is awarded to a CG 
provision if it has been published in the firms’ annual report and otherwise ‘0’.  
4.2.2.2 Independent variables: CG Mechanisms 
The literature shows that there are two main types of CG variables that influence 
the level of CG disclosure namely; ownership structure and board/audit characteristics 
(Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a;  Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Chalevas, 2011). In this regard, 
                                                 
17
 Big-four are Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.  
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and unlike considerable number of prior studies who restrict their analyses to limited CG 
variables, the current study employs large number of CG variables in its investigation for 
the determinants of CG disclosure. These factors are: (i) ownership structure that consists 
for five types of ownership: director ownership (DOWNP), institutional ownership 
(IOWNP), government ownership (GOWNP), block ownership (BOWNP), foreign 
ownership (FOWNP) and (ii) board and audit variables include18: audit firm size (BIG4), 
board size (BSZ), gender diversification (BGEN) and nationality diversification (BNAT). 
As discussed in section 3.3, the choice of the above variables were based on theory past 
empirical literature and availability of data. Additionally, Table 4.4 shows how these 
variables were measured.  
4.2.2.3 The Control Variables 
In addition to ownership structure and CG variables, prior studies provide evidence 
that some firm characteristics have impact on CG compliance and disclosure. Hence, this 
study includes firm size, leverage, growth, profitability, capital expenditure, as well as year 
and industry factors as control variables. The inclusion of these variables was to take 
account of their effects and mitigate some statistical issues, such as endogeneity problem. 
Although this study includes the most common firm attributes that have been used by 
previous studies, the choice of these were restricted by the data availability. Each control 
variable is defined in Table 4.4 and the reason for including in the model on the basis of 
theoretical argument and empirical literature is explained in the following subsection.  
 
(i) Firm Size (LTA) 
Size of the firm is one of the important factor which can influence good CG 
practices (Samaha et al., 2012). Generally, firm size is considered to be positively 
associated with CG disclosure. In this regard, a number of theoretical studies support the 
view that the larger firms disclose more CG information. For instance, Agency theory 
predicts that larger firms have complexity in their capital structure which causes a greater 
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Bebchuk and 
Weisbach, 2010). Thus, such firms are expected to enhance CG compliance to minimise 
asymmetric information (Eng and Mark, 2003; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Similarly, 
resource dependence theory argues that the large firms are motivated to disclose more CG 
information in order to secure required resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
                                                 
18
 Audit committee characteristics are not used as explanatory variable in the regression model as the characteritics of 
audit committee are coverd by the 2002 PCCG and hence included in PCGI.  
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Additionally, Firth (1979) recognizes three main reasons that larger firms are expected to 
disclose more information. First, as large firms rely more on stock market for capital 
financing, they may disclose more information in order to raise capital at low cost. Second, 
such firms may disclose more CG information as they can afford the cost of collection and 
publication of information. Third, small firms may disclose less CG information, as it may 
affect their competitiveness in the market with those large firms.  
With regard to empirical literature, a considerable number of studies (e.g., Sharma, 
2014; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Omar and Simon, 2011) 
report significant and positive nexus between the size of the firm and CG compliance. For 
instance, Allegrini and Greco (2013) studied the factors that may influence the CG 
disclosure by constructing a CG disclosure index. Following prior studies, the current 
study measure the size of firm by calculating the log of total assets of the firm and labelled 
as LTA.  
 
(ii) Leverage (LVG) 
Theoretical and empirical literature shows that firm’s capital structure can have a 
significant impact on its corporate decisions. Theoretically, high debt in firm capital 
structure may increase the agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Both shareholder 
and creditors can have concerns with such firms. For instance, shareholders may want to 
ensure that managers will not expropriate their wealth by investing in wasteful projects. 
Similarly, creditors want to ensure that the firm can meet its debt obligations (Smith and 
Warner, 1979). In this regard, firms may disclose more CG information to mitigate these 
concerns of shareholders and creditors. In addition to agency theory, Legitimacy and 
resource dependence theories also proposes that the more leveraged firms may disclose 
more CG information to insure the creditors about their performance and to secure their 
resources.  
Empirically, there is no consensus on the relationship between leverage and firm 
level CG disclosure. For instance, a number of empirical studies (e.g., Omar and Simon, 
2011; Sharma, 2014) have reported a positive and significant association betwen leverage 
and firm level CG compliance. For instance, Omar and Simon (2011) examined Jordanian 
listed firms and have reported significant and positive relationship between leverage and 
firm level CG disclosure. On the other hand, a few studies (e.g., Adelopo, 2011; Mallin 
and Ow-Yong, 2011) have reported a significant and negative relationship between 
leverage and firm level CG disclosure. For instance, Adelopo (2011) examined 63 listed 
firms of Nigerian Stock Exchange and have reported a significant and positive relationship 
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between leverage and firm level CG disclosure. Some other studies (Alkhtaruddin et al., 
2009; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013) have reported insignificant 
association of leverage and firm level CG disclosure. For instance, Alkhtaruddin et al. 
(2009) examined 105 listed firms on Bursa Malaysia and reported an insignificant and 
negative relationship between leverage and firm level CG disclosure. Following prior 
studies (Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Samaha et al., 2012), leverage is measured as the ratio 
of total debt to total assets and labelled as LVG.  
 
(iii) Growth (SALESG) 
Theoretically, firm growth is considered as an influential factor in CG disclosure 
and is predicted to have a positive relationship with CG disclosure. For instance, agency 
and signalling theory predicts higher information asymmetry and agency cost in firms with 
higher growth and investment opportunities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; 
Gaver and Gaver, 1993). This may lead such firms to disclose more CG information to 
deal with information asymmetry issues. Similarly, Legitimacy theory argues that firm 
with higher growth may disclose more CG information to attract funds despite higher 
bankruptcy risk associated with their activities. Therefore, more CG disclosure is expected 
by such growing firms in order to attract financing at lower cost (Collett and Hrasky, 2005; 
Khurana et al., 2006).  
Empirically, several researcher (Laidroo, 2009; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a; Ntim 
and Soobaroyen, 2013b) found a significant and positive relationship between the growth 
of the firm and CG compliance and disclosure. Following the previous literature (e.g., 
Ntim et al., 2012a), growth is calculated by the this year sales minus last year sales divided 
by the last  year sales and labelled as SALESG in the current study.  
 
(iv) Profitability (ROE) 
Theoretically, literature shows that profitable firms disclose more CG information 
than those are less profitable. For instance, both agency and signalling theory argue that 
managers of profitable firms can have an incentive to disclose more information to justify 
and maintain their compensation and position. In this regard, several prior studies (Wallace 
and Naser, 1995; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) reported that profitable firms are motivated to 
disclose more CG information to distinguish their firms from those less profitable firms. 
Similarly, legitimacy theory predicts that profitable firm’s managers are expected to 
disclose more information in order to legitimise their continued presence as stewards (Ntim 
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and Soobaroyen, 2013). In contrast, profitable firms may not disclose CG information in 
order to avoid some cost and protect their competitiveness (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). 
Empirically, a number of prior studies (Omar and Simon, 2011; Nitm et al., 2012a; 
Samaha et al., 2012) supports this positive theoretical prediction. For instance, by 
examining Egyptian firms, Samaha et al. (2012) reported a positive and significant 
association between profitability and the level of CG disclosure. On the other hand, several 
researcher (Hossain and Hammami, 2009; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Allegrini and 
Greco, 2013) have reported an insignificant relationship between firm profitability and 
level of CG disclosure. Following the literature, profitability is calculated by dividing 
operating profit to firm total equity and labelled as ROE in the current study.  
(v) Capital Expenditure (CE) 
It has been suggested that the capital expenditure (CE) is associated with firms’ growth 
(Pfeffer, 1972; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Firm growth suggests the need for increase in capital 
expenditure. It requires additional monitoring from the board of directors and better 
accountability to protect the wealth of shareholders (Conyon and He, 2011). Thus, increased 
CE is expected to improve CG compliance and disclosure. Empirically, prior CG literature 
suggests that there is a weak nexus between CG disclosure and capital expenditure (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013). However, significant association between CG disclosure and capital 
expenditure is postulated in this study based on theory. Capital expenditure is measured by 
dividing the capital expenditure with the firms’ tolal assets.  
 
(vi)  Industry and Year Dummies 
It is widely recognised that CG practices may differ industry wise and with time. 
For instance, industries are significantly different from each other in different ways 
including, the line of business, capital structure, complexity of operations, ownership 
structures, and corporate governance practices (Lim et al., 2007). In this regard, Deutsche 
Bank (2002) argued that CG standards differ across the industries. Similarly, Henry (2008) 
argued that CG practices changes across the firm over time. For instance, Shabir and 
Padget (2005) reported a positive association of time with CG code by examining 350 
listed firms of UK. Thus, to capture this potential unobserved heterogeneity and following 
the prior studies (Black et al., 2006, Henry, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012; Bozec et al., 2014), 
the current study employs dummy variables for ten different industries and for eleven 
years.  
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4.2.2.4 Model Specification 
This study employs multiple linear regression analysis and uses Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS), where the PCGI is regressed on independent variables to test the above 
hypotheses. Following prior studies, and with the assumption of linearity, the ordinary 
least square is estimated as follows: 
∑
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Where: 
 
 
Subscript i and t  
 
 
 
represent firms and time respectively 
PCGI Pakistani CG Index 
α
 
Constant term 
DOWNP Percentage of shares owned by directors 
IOWNP Percentage of shares owned by institutions 
GOWNP Percentage of shares owned by government 
BOWNP Percentage of shares owned by shareholders with at least 5% 
FOWNP Percentage of shares owned by foreigner 
BIG4 Audit firm size 
BSZ Board size 
BGEN Board diversity on the basis of gender 
BNAT19 Board diversity on the basis of nationality 
CONTROLS Control variables includes: firm size (LTA), profitability (ROE), sales growth 
(SALESG), leverage (LEVG), Capital expenditure (CETA) industry, and year 
dummies. 
ε
 
Error term 
4.2.3 Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm COC 
This study also investigates the impact of CG disclosure on firms’ COC. Table 4.5 
shows the detail of all variables employed in the current study to examine the hypothesis 
developed in subsection 3.4. Drawing from theories, empirical studies and Pakistani 
context, factors under investigation include: ownership structure, CG variables and general 
firm characteristics. COC is used as proxy for firm value which is in line with literature 
(e.g., Bozec and Bozec, 2011; Pham et al., 2012).  Specifically, subsection 4.2.3.1 explains 
the dependent variable. Subsection 4.2.3.2 explains the independent variables, while the 
subsection 4.2.3.3 presents the control variables used in this model. 
                                                 
19
 Board diversity on the basis of nationality is used in this model as an explanatory variable but not in the second model 
of CG and COC due to its usage as alternative CG variable in robustness analysis of the model (see subsection 7.2.6).  
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4.2.3.1 The Dependent Variable:  Cost of Capital (COC)  
Finance literature shows that Weighted Average COC is used to measure firms’ 
COC. For instance, in interviews of 27 highly regarded U.S. firms, Bruner et al. (1998) 
reports that 89% of the CFO use WACC to compute the discounted cash flows of their 
firms. Similarly, Meier and Tarhan (2007) found that 71% of respondents use WACC to 
discount the estimated cash flows in their survey of 127 firms. Bierman (1993) find in a 
survey of Fortune 500 firms that 93% of 74 respondents use WACC to discount the 
estimated cash flows. Supporting evidence is also provided by UK and Australian 
companies. Truong et al. (2007) used a sample survey to analyse the capital budgeting 
practices in Australian listed firms and found that firms normally discounting their cash 
flows of all divisions by same rate of WACC. More recently, Bozec et al. (2014) argue that 
firms estimated cash flows should be discounted by COC using WACC as firms have 
several sources of capital to fund their projects.  
Therefore, the current study examines firms’ COC by using WACC that is in line 
with previous literature (e.g., Pham et al., 2012; Bozec and Bozec, 2011) that use WACC 
to examine different issues related to capital structure. Following prior studies (e.g., Bozec 
et al., 2014), COC is calculated based on the following equation (a):   
).(..............................)/()1)(/( aKeEDEKdTEDDCOC ++−+=
   
 
Where:  
    COC Weighted Average COC is based on target weights of debt and equity with respect to 
their cost  
    D indicate market value of debt 
    E indicate market value of equity  
    Kd indicate cost of debt (before tax)  
    Ke indicate cost of equity 
In the next subsections, both Cost of Debt and Equity capital are further discussed 
in order to demonstrate how they were calculated. Two main issues are discussed, namely 
the models that have been used by prior literature to calculate Cost of Debt and Equity 
capital and the reason for choosing a particular model.  
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Table 4.5:  Summary of Variables used in Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm COC Model 
Dependent Variable 
COC Weighted Average COC is computed using after-tax cost of debt and cost of equity by 
using weights of total debt and total equity to total market capitalization of the firm. 
Independent Variables 
PCGI Pakistani Corporate Governance Index (PCGI) consists of 70 provisions from PCCG, 
which takes a value of 1 if a particular CG provision is disclosed in annual reports of 
company, 0 otherwise. 
DOWNP Percentage of shares owned by directors to the total shares held by firm. 
IOWNP Percentage of shares owned by institutions to the total shares held by firm. 
GOWNP Percentage of shares owned by government to the total shares held by firm. 
BOWNP Percentage of shares owned by shareholders with at least 5% of total shares to the total 
shares held by firm. 
FOWNP Percentage of shares owned by foreigner to the total shares held by firm. 
BIG4 1 if firm is audited by one of the big-four20 audit firms, 0 otherwise. 
BSZ The total number of directors on the board of firm at the time of AGM.  
BGEN 1 if firm has a female board member, 0 otherwise.  
The Control Variables 
LTA Natural log of total book value of assets of the firm.  
ROE Earnings before interest and tax to total equity of the firm.  
SALESG This year sales menus last year sales to last year sales.  
LEVG Total book value of debt to total book value of assets.  
β Three years monthly stock returns are used to calculate beta of firm by using a regression 
of stock return to market returns. 
INDUSTRY In this study a dummy variable is employed for each of the nine industry. 
YEARDMY In this study a dummy variable is employed for each of the eleven year. 
 
(i) Cost of Equity Capital 
 Investors are often interested in the Cost of equity (COE) capital as it is 
regarded as the required rate of return for them, but its estimation is more challenging as it 
is not a directly observable variable. In this regard, several models have been suggested in 
the literature to calculate the cost of equity capital. The most common models include: (i) 
Gordon growth model (1956); (ii) Gordon model (1959); (iii) Capital Assets Pricing Model 
(1964); (iv) Linter Model (1965); (v); three factor pricing model (1995). As is the case in 
many finance issues, there is no consensus among researchers about the best model that 
should be used (Fama and French, 1997).  
                                                 
20
 Big-four are Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.  
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Thus, the current study employs Capital Assets Pricing model to calculate Cost of 
equity capital which in line with many past studies (Bozec et al., 2014). There are four 
main reasons for choosing this model. First, there is no theory suggesting which model 
should be used as a best proxy to calculate cost of equity capital. Second, Kester et al. 
(1999) conducted an international survey of six Asian Pacific Countries and Australia. The 
result of the survey shows the popularity of the use of CAPM to calculate the COE, which 
was used by the 73% of surveyed firms. Similarly, Graham and Harvey (2001) report US 
evidence that the adoption of CAPM to calculate the COE for capital budgeting has been 
widespread.  Recently, Truong and Partington (2007) conducted a survey in Australia and 
found that Capital Assets Pricing model (CAPM) is the most popular model used in 
estimating the COE. Third, CAPM has been used by past studies (Bozec et al., 2014) in 
examining the relationship between CG and COC, which in turn enable the current study to 
compare its results with prior studies. Finally, data limitation forces the present study to 
rely on this model. Therefore, cost of equity capital is calculated using the following 
CAPM equation (b):    
( ) ).(........................................RRK ffe bRm −+= β  
Where  
Ke Is the cost of equity capital and is calculated by Sharp (1964) model. 
Rf Represent risk free rate of return. In this study, the three monthly Government of 
Pakistan Treasury yield prevailing at the date are used. 
β Three years monthly stock returns are used to calculate beta of firm by using a 
regression of stock return to market returns following (Ali Shah, 2009; Bozec et 
al., 2014). 
Rm Stands for market return and calculated by using KSE index. 
 
Once cost of equity capital was calculated, the next step is to calculate the cost of debt 
capital.  
(ii) Cost of Debt Capital 
As explained in subsection 4.2.3, COC can be measured through calculating both 
cost of equity and debt. Several different proxies have been used in the literature to 
measure the cost of debt (COD). There are three common methods of calculating cost of 
debt, namely yield spread, credit rating and interest rate on the firm’s debt calculated from 
financial statements.  The present study employs interest rate on the firm’s debt as method 
to calculate cost of debt as no theory offers the best way to calculate cost of debt. In this 
regard, Francis and Pereira (2005) suggest that this proxy of cost of debt is closely 
  104 
 
associated to the firm’s disclosure practices and by following Pittman and Fortin (2004) 
considerable number of other researchers used this proxy. Further, using of this method 
consistent to prior literature (e.g.,  Zhu, 2009; Piot and Missonier-Piera, 2007; Soha, 2011; 
Zhu, 2012).  
4.2.3.2 The independent Variables 
As indicated earlier, the third central research question that is going to be examined 
in this study is either better-governed firm employ lower COC compared with those of 
poor-governed. Thus, dependent variable is COC that is regressed on PCGI, ownership 
structures and board/audit characteristics. Briefly, and as discussed in subsection 4.2.1, the 
PCGI is the collection of 70 broad set of CG provisions contained in the 2002 code of CG 
for Pakistan. Similarly, ownership structure and board/audit characteristics21 are included 
in the study’s examination to further investigate the extent to which traditional ownership 
structures and board attributes have influence on COC. The theoretical/empirical 
foundation of these variables and their measurements were discussed earlier.     
4.2.3.3 The Control Variables 
In addition to ownership structure and CG variables, prior studies provide evidence 
that some firm characteristics have impact on firm COC. Hence, this study includes firm 
size, profitability, growth, leverage, and beta, as well as year and industry factors as 
control variables. The inclusion of these variables is to take account of their effects and 
mitigate some statistical issues, such as endogeneity problem. Although this study includes 
the most common firm attributes that have been used by previous studies, the choice of 
these are restricted by the data availability. Each control variable is defined below and its 
reason for inclusion in the model is explained below.  
(i) Size of the Firm (LTA) 
Unlike small firms, large companies are normally more diversified which reduce 
firm potential risk and ultimately it may decrease the firm COC. Empirically this 
relationship is supported by Botosan and Plumlee (2005). On the other hand, because of 
complex operations, higher regulatory and political costs, and cost of compliance with 
code, as well as agency problem, the size of the firm is likely to be positively related with 
better corporate governance (Beiner et al., 2006). Botosan (1997) argued that larger firm 
may enjoy lower cost of external capital or/and receive a higher market valuation. Haniffa 
                                                 
21
 Audit committee characteristics are not used as explanatory variable in the regression model as the characteristics of 
audit committee are covered by the 2002 PCCG and hence included in PCGI. 
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and Hudaib (2006) also find a positive relationship between firm size and return on equity 
(ROE). Therefore, this study expects significant and positive association between LTA and 
return on equity (ROE).   
(ii) Profitability  
Profitability is one of the firm characteristic that has been identified as one of the 
most influential factors on corporate policy decisions as profitable firms have adequate 
internal funds, their financing behaviour may not be the same as less profitable firms. 
Therefore, profitability is considered as a determinant for firms when they are looking for 
additional or new financing. Theoretically, it is expected that more profitable firms can 
issue debt than equity for the following three reasons. First, firms with surplus earnings are 
likely to use their internal funds for their capital investment. If additional financing will be 
required, then financing will be raised through debt as a second choice (Myers, 1984; 
Myers and Majluf, 1984). Second, debt financing offers profitable firms with a worthwhile 
CG instrument that permits them to diminish the agency costs related with free cash flow 
available to managers (Jensen, 1986). Third, firms with surplus earnings are expected to 
issue more debt than less profitable firms to in order to make benefit from tax shields 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Finally, due to their surplus earnings that help them to pay 
their financial obligations well in time, profitable firms are favoured by creditors, which 
motivate firms to issue debt rather than equity (Peterson and Rajan, 1994; Elliott et al., 
2008).  
In contrast, more profitable firms are expected to issue equity rather than debt. 
Previous studies offer evidence that profitable firms offer more comprehensive information 
(e.g., Samaha et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2012; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). This suggests that 
profitable firms are less prone to asymmetric information, which may encourage them to 
issue equity rather than debt as new financiers would prefer to finance such firms where 
there is no need to gather expensive information. Empirically, a negative nexus is reported 
in the literature (Zhu, 2009). Therefore, it is expected that there will be a negative 
relationship between firm COC and performance.  
(iii)  Firm Growth (SALESG) 
Growth is the other variable which needs to be controlled and it will be measured 
by market value to book value of equity. Theoretically, growing firm at a faster pace may 
be more valuable as probably they can have a better performance in the future (Klapper 
and Love, 2004). In a same way, firms with better growth opportunities will need to raise 
external capital. This will encourage such firms to adopt good corporate governance 
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practices to attract capital and to minimize the COC (Beiner et al., 2006). On the basis of 
above discussion and following the prior literature (Henry, 2008; Ntim et al, 2012), it is 
expected that there will be a a negative relationship between firm growth and firm COC.  
(iv) Leverage (LVG) 
Despite Modigliani and Miller (1958) theory of capital structure irrelevance, a 
widespread theoretical and empirical literature has developed. This literature strongly 
suggests that a firm’s capital structure have an impact on the profitability of the firm 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Myers, 1984). Negative relationship between profitability 
and leverage (Bevan and Danbolt, 2004) can be explained in two theoretical viewpoints: 
agency and tax. From agency view point, it is argued that higher level of leverage may 
improve performance by decreasing the agency problem. Debt financing can also improve 
firm performance because of the bringing of extra monitoring mechanism by the creditors 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). From tax viewpoint, a highly levered firm can generate a 
better financial performance because of interest payment and tax deductibility of interest 
payments (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). On the other hand, the risk of financial distress in 
the form of bankruptcy and credit risk by having higher level of credit may minimize the 
ability of firm to pursue attractive investment opportunities (Myer, 1977). On the basis of 
above discussion and in line with the previous corporate governance research (Klapper and 
Love, 2004; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012), leverage is controlled for. 
However, on the basis of mixed theoretical and empirical evidence, it is expected that 
leverage (LVG), which is equal to total debt to market value of equity will be significantly 
related with firm COC.  
(v) Beta (β) 
Theoretically, literature shows that a firms risk can have a significant impact on its 
financing cost. It has been argued that as uncertainty increases, investors demand higher 
rate of return. Thus, it is expected that Cost of Equity (COE) capital is likely to increase 
with increased risk (Johnson, 1999). In this regard, beta is regarded as most widely 
accepted measure of risk (Fama and French, 1992). Based on theoretical perception, a 
positive relationship is expected between COC and market beta for Pakistani firms. 
Empirically, literature (e.g., Bozec et al., 2014; Shah, 2009; Botosan, 1997) suggests a 
positive relationship between beta and firms’ COC.  
Three years monthly stock returns for sampled firm and market index are used to 
calculate beta for firms in the sample.  Following the literature (e.g., Bozec et al., 2014; 
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Shah, 2009; Botosan, 1997), beta is estimated by market model via regression of stock 
return of firm i at time t on the returns of market index.  
Beta is estimated by the following equation (c):  
 
).........(.............................. cRR ittmit εβα ++=  
Where: 
 
i and t subscript  
 
 
represent firm and time respectively 
Ri Stands for firms’ stock return I for a period of 36 month 
α
 
Constant term 
Rm Stands for market return and calculated by using KSE index. 
ε
 
Error term 
 
(vi) Industry Dummies (INDM) 
Industries are significantly different from each other in different ways including, 
line of business, capital structure, complexity of operations, ownership structures, and 
corporate governance practices (Lim et al., 2007). On the other hand global and economic 
developments may also impact in a different way on each industry. For example, 
manufacturing and industrial firms heavily depend on energy for production. In this case, 
any increase in prices of petroleum products may have negative impact on profitability of 
manufacturing and industrial firms because of increase in cost of production but may have 
a positive impact on Oil and Gas firm’s financial performance. A study conducted in 
emerging markets by Deutsche Bank (2002) argued that corporate governance standards 
differ across the industries. In line with previous studies (Black et al., 2006, Henry, 2008; 
Ntim et al., 2012; Bozec et al., 2014) and to capture this potential unobserved 
heterogeneity at industry level, a dummy variable will be used for different industries.  
(vii) Year Dummies (YRDM) 
Henry (2008) argued that corporate governance practices change across the firm 
over time. Using a sample of 350 listed firms of UK, Shabir and Padget (2005) report 
significant and positive association of time with code of CG compliance. Similarly, 
different economic states may affect the profitability and risk of the firm in a different way. 
On average, during the economic boom period, firms are likely to perform better than a 
recession period. Changes in government regulations, policies of tax and change in 
technology may affect the firm financial performance, firm level of risk and corporate 
governance structure in a different ways over the time. Finally, prior research on corporate 
governance, COC and firm financial performance have also controlled for year (Henry, 
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2008, Ntim et al., 2012, Bozec et al., 2014). On the basis of above discussion, to control 
the probable unobserved firm level heterogeneity over the period of ten years, ten dummies 
will be included in the model.  
 
4.2.3.4 Model Specification 
Due to a number of reasons, such as funding, accessibility, and time, a quantitative 
approach is adopted in this study rather than either qualitative or mixed approach. 
Following the prior studies, and wish the assumption of linearity, the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression equation to be estimated is as follows:  
Model 2 
∑
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Where: 
 
I and t subscript  
 
 
represent firm and time respectively 
COC Cost of Capital calculated by Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
PCGI Pakistani CG Index 
α
 
Constant term 
DOWNP Percentage of shares owned by directors 
IOWNP Percentage of shares owned by institutions 
GOWNP Percentage of shares owned by government 
BOWNP Percentage of shares owned by shareholders with at least 5% 
FOWNP Percentage of shares owned by foreigner 
BIG4 Audit firm size 
BSZ Board size 
BGEN Board Gender Diversity 
CONTROLS22 It includes: firm size (LTA), profitability (ROE), sales growth (SALESG), leverage 
(LEVG), beta (β),  industry, and year dummies. 
ε
 
Error term  
4.3 Statistical Analysis 
The current study uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) as a main estimation 
technique to estimate regression coefficient. To esnure that OLS is an appropriate 
estimation method, a number of statistical tests are applied pre and post analysis. Thus, 
subsection 4.3.1 discusses tests related to the OLS assumptions while subsection 4.3.2 
discusses the robustness tests. 
                                                 
22
 Unlike model 1, capital expenditure is not used as a control variable in this model due to its usage as alternative CG 
variable in robustness analysis of this model (see subsection 7.2.6) while beta is used in this model as risk is 
positively associated with COC.  
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4.3.1 The OLS Assumptions 
Before applying OLS the following assumptions were tested to make sure that OLS 
is the proper estimation to use. These assumptions include: autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity, linearity, multicollinearity, and normality. These assumptions have been 
tested using different statistical tests. First, Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test is 
used to deduce the presence of autocorrelation. Second, the White general test is performed 
to investigate the extent to which the used model is heteroskedastic. Third, explanatory 
variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% level to mitigate the problem of outliers. Fourth, 
multicollinearity has been investigated by constructing a matrix of correlation for all 
variables. Finally, normality of residual is tested using standardised skewness and kurtosis 
statistics. The results of all these tests are reported in section 6.1 of chapter 6.  
4.3.2 Robustness tests 
In addition to the testing of OLS assumptions, as indicated in subsection 4.2.4.1, a 
series of statistical tests was performed to ascertain the level that the results of this analysis 
are robust to different theoretical and statistical issues. These were included robustness of 
results against the: (i) potential endogeneity problems, (ii) alternative CG proxy, (iii) 
alternative COC measures, and (iv) the differences in the firms’ characteristics that 
remains same over time.  
4.3.2.1 Endogeneity problems 
Endogeneity is a statistical problem that can arise from measurement errors, 
simultaneity and omitted variables (Wooldridge, 2009; Lacker and Rusticus, 2010). The 
presence of such problem may question the validity of empirical results (Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010). Thus, the current study has sought to mitigate this issue by applying other 
solutions to ascertain whether the present study’s findings are seriously affected by the 
presence of endogeneity problem. Both non-econometrics and econometrics solutions are 
briefly discussed below.   
With respect to non-econometrics solutions, the current study uses three approaches 
to mitigate endogeneity problems. First, it employs an eleven year panel data to examine 
its hypotheses. It has been suggested that panel data can assist in reducing effects of 
endogeneity problems (Larcker and Rusticus, 2007). Second, the measurement error, as 
one cause of endogeneity, is mitigated by using self-constructed index rather than using 
analysts’ rating (see subsection 4.2.1.2) CG measurement (Lacker et al., 2005). Finally, 
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and as discussed in subsection 4.2.3.3, a number of control variables were included in the 
model to mitigate this problem that may result from omitted variables. Hence, it is believed 
that the above solutions are likely to limit the potential effects of endogeneity.  
With regard to econometrics solutions, accounting and CG literature suggest that 
two-stage least square (2SLS) and lagged structure models are commonly used by 
researchers to address endogeneity problem. Following this suggestion in literature, 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test is used first to investigate the presence of 
endogeneity problem (Lacker and Rusticus, 2008). The subsequent subsections discuss 
how Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, 2SLS and lagged structure model are 
performed.  
(i) Durbin-Wu-Hausman Endogeneity Test 
It has been suggested that endogeneity test on key independent variables should be 
conducted to ascertain whether endogeneity exists or not (Lacker and Rusticus, 2008). 
Consistent with previous studies, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Endogeneity test is adopted to 
test the presence of endogeneity. This test is performed in two stages. First, and as shown 
in equation 3 and 4, the PCGI was regressed on control variables either in the first model 
(factors influencing firms’ CG compliance and disclosure) or in its second model (the 
impact of CG on COC), and the predicted values from the regressions were saved as P-
PCGI for the first model and P-PCGII for the second model. The first stage of Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test is is performed using the following equation:  
∑
=
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Where the PCGI refers to Pakistani Corporate Governance Index and CONTROLS 
variables remain the same in equation 323 as explained in equation 1.  
 
 
 
Similarly, the first stage of Durbin-Wu-Hausman that is related to model two is 
performed using the following equation: 
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23
 As equation (3) and (4) belongs to different regression models, both have a different set of control 
variables.  Equation (3) belongs to the factor influencing level of compliance while equation (4) belongs 
to the CG and COC model.  
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PCGI stands for the Pakistani corporate governance Index and the CONTROLS variables 
remain same in equation 4 as explained in equation 2.  
In the Second stage of Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, the PCGI was regressed on P-
PCGI and control variables in case of model 1 as specified in equation below: 
∑
=
++−+=
n
i
ititiitit CONTROLSPCGIPPCGI
1
10 εββα                            (5) 
Where PCGI denotes to Pakistani Corporate Governance Index, P-PCGI denotes the 
predicted values from regression of equation 3, and CONTROLS variables were the same 
as in equation 1. 
 
In the case of model 2, and as specified in equation 6, the COC was regressed on PCGI, P-
PCGII and control variables as follows: 
∑
=
++−++=
n
i
ititiititit CONTROLSPCGIIPPCGICOC
1
210 εβββα                     (6) 
Where PCGI denotes to Pakistani corporate governance index, P-PCGII denotes the 
predicted values from the regression of equation 4, and CONTROLS variables will remain 
the same as explained in equation 2.  
Once Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is performed, the current study will be able to 
accept or reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. The guidance of this examination 
suggests that if the coefficient of P-PCGI or P-PCGII is significant, which rejects the null 
hypothesis of no endogeneity; it means that endogeneity problem exists (Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010). Thus, in the presence of endogeneity it is advisable to investigate the 
extent to which the main results are affected by this problem. As explained below, two 
methods are widely used by researchers to address this issue, namely 2SLS and lagged 
structure model.  
(ii) Two-stage least square (2SLS) 
As explained earlier, if Durbin-Wu-Hausman test shows that the coefficients of P-
PCGI and P-PCGII are significant in model 1 and 2, then the present study will use the 
2SLS technique to find out how far the results are biased and inconsistent because of 
endogeneity problems. The following subsections will discuss how the 2SLS technique 
will be applied with respect to model 1 and 2.  
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 With regard to model 1, each of nine CG variables will be regressed over control 
variables and the predicted values for each individual CG variable will be saved in the first 
stage as specified in the following equations.  
∑
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1
0 εβα                (7) 
∑
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∑
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 In second stage, equation 1 will be re-estimated by replacing the ten CG variables 
with their predicted values as follows: 
∑
=
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++++
++++=
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ˆˆˆˆ
εββ
ββββ
ββββα
           (16) 
With regard to model 2, the PCGI is assumed to be exogenous in equation 2, in 
which case OLS may be biased and inconsistent. In the first stage, the PCGI will be 
regressed on four alternative CG variables, Nationality diversity in board, board non-
executive members, meetings of board members and firms’ capital expenditure. The 
alternative CG variables’ selection is based on literature (e.g, Ntim et al., 2012; Pham et 
al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2013; Tariq et al., 2014) and availability of data. The equation below 
specifies this regression where the predicted value of PCGI and residuals will be saved as 
P-PCGIII and R-PCGI. The current study will consider the P-PCGIII as a valid 
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instrumental variable if P-PCGIII is significantly associated with PCGI and insignificantly 
related to R-PCGI. This decision will be taken based on correlation matrix that includes 
PCGI, P-PCGII, and R-PCGI. 
∑
=
++++++=
n
i
ititiititititit CONTROLSCEBMFNEXDBNATPCGI
1
43210 εβββββα   (17) 
Where PCGI denotes Pakistani corporate governance index, and BNAT, NEXD, BFM, and 
CE are known as board nationality diversity, the percentage of non-executive directors in 
the firm board, the board frequency of the meetings, and the capital expenditure, 
respectively. The CONTROLS remain similar to the explanation of equation 2. 
 
In second stage, and once the P-PCGIII is considered as a valid instrumental 
variable, equation 2 will be re-estimated using P-PCGII instead of PCGI as follows: 
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          (18) 
The analyses of 2SLS that relate to both models 1 and 2 will be presented and discussed in 
details in sections 7.1 and 7.2 of chapter seven, respectively.  
(iii) The Lagged Structure 
The current study further addresses endogeneity problem by employing lagged 
structure model that takes into account a time lag in CG disclosure practices, as well as a 
lagged CG disclosure practices and COC. Following prior literature (e.g., Ntim et al., 
2013; Larcker and Rustics, 2010), all independent and control variables in models 1 and 
2will be lagged by one period as indicated in equations below.  
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The analyses of lagged structure model for models 1 and 2 will be presented and 
discussed in details in sections 7.1 and 7.2 of chapter seven, respectively.  
4.3.2.2 Alternative governance mechanisms 
As discussed in chapters 2 and 4, the PCGI contains five sub-indices in which each 
sub index vary in number of provisions, hence, differs in weights gained by each individual 
sub index. Specifically, the PCGI assigns a weight of 25%, 20%, 8.5%, 20%, and 25% for 
board of directors, internal auditing and committees, shareholders’ right, transparency and 
disclosure, and internal control, external auditor and risk management, respectively. In this 
regard, using of the un-weighted CG index to examine CG quality has been criticised in 
literature as all CG provisions are equally important. Thus, the current study addresses the 
suggestion in the literature of using a weighted CG index can bring different results of the 
study. This allows the study to make sure whether its actual results are robust to the use of 
weighted index. Following prior studies (Beiner et al., 2006), each sub-index will be 
equally weighted by assigning 20% of weight, labelled as Weighted Pakistani Corporate 
Governance Index (WPCGI). In doing so, the PCGI will be replaced by WPCGI in 
equation 1 and 2 to check the level at which the robust with WPCGI. These regressions are 
specified by equations 22 and 23 below.  
∑
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The results of these analyses for models 1 and 2 are reported and discussed in section 7.1 
and 7.2 of chapter seven, respectively.   
4.3.2.3 Alternative COC measures 
As discussed in subsection 4.2.3.3, the main findings are based on WACC as a 
main measurement to calculate COC. Thus, the current study employs alternative proxies 
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for COC in order to account for the possibility that the main findings are sensitive to 
different proxies. In particular, and consistent with prior literature (e.g., Pham et al., 2012), 
cost of equity (COE) and cost of debt (COD) will be used as alternative COC’s 
measurements. The relationship between PCGI and COC will be analysed again with the 
help of COE and COD rather COC as stated bellow. 
∑
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These analyses are further discussed in section 7.2 of chapter seven. 
 
4.3.2.4 Fixed-Effect vs Random-Effect Model 
As discussed in subsection 4.2.4.2, the current study employs OLS to conduct its 
analyses where firms’ characteristics can differ among firms, but remain same over the 
time, which may not be captured by OLS estimation. This may lead to bias in the results. 
Thus, it is advisable to check the extent to which the main results are sensitive to firms’ 
characteristics by employing either fixed or random effect model. The Hausman test will 
be applied to select between the fixed effect and random effect models. To perform this 
test OLS regression will be estimated by using Random effect model. Once regression is 
estimated, the output of Hausman test will be ascertained to assist in deciding either to use 
the random or fixed effect morel. The null hypothesis of this test is that random effect is 
appropriate than fixed effect analysis and alternate hypothesis is that fixed effect better 
suites this data to capture the effect of firms’ characteristics that differ among firms, but 
remain same over the time. As shown below, equation 1 and 2 will be re-estimated 
accordingly.  
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The results of these analyses will be reported and discussed in section 7.1 and 7.2 of 
chapter seven.  
4.4 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
The research design of the study was comprehensively discussed in this chapter. 
Specifically, the chapter aimed to attain the subsequent three objectives. Firstly, it 
discussed sample and data sources used in the study. Firms’ annual reports, KSE website, 
business record and DataStream are used as main sources of data for the study. Following 
the sample selection criteria, final sample consists of 160 firms for the period 2003 to 2013 
with 1760 firm-year observations including firms from 10 sectors of KSE listed firms.  
Secondly, it provides a comprehensive description of the research methodology used 
in this study. In this regard, the level of compliance with 2002 PCCG will be investigated 
using descriptive statistics of PCGI while for analysing the determinents of CG disclosure 
and relationship between CG and COC will be analysed by OLS regression. Third, it 
discussed the sensitivity analyses that are employed in the study. In this regard, a number 
of statistical tests will be performed before and after examining the study hypothesis 
including tests related to the OLS assumptions and robustness tests.  
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CHAPTER 5  
5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
This chapter discusses the descriptive statistics of variables employed. Specifically, 
this chapter aims to attain the subsequent three main objectives. First, it discusses the 
descriptive statistics related to the level of disclosure with PCGI based on all provisions. It 
helps in answering the question of level of compliance with 2002 PCCG. Additionally, the 
analysis of CG compliance level of sub-indices and industries are discussed to ascertain the 
potential factors that influence the disclosure level of PCGI. The second main objective of 
this chapter is to pursue to conclude that the introduction of PCCG has helped to improve 
the CG standards in Pakistani settings. The third objective of this chapter is to present the 
descriptive statistics of dependent, independents and control variables employed in this 
study.  
Therefore, the following section is organised in two sections. Section 5.1 discusses 
the descriptive statistics of PCGI while section 5.2 summarises the chapter. 
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE PAKISTANI CG 
INDEX (the PCGI) 
This section discusses the descriptive statistics of level of disclosure with PCCG to 
explore the answer of (i) what average compliance level with 2002 PCCG is?; (ii) to what 
extant has the introduction of 2002 PCCG improved CG practices among Pakistani firms?. 
In addition, CG literature suggests that firm characteristics, industry type may impact the 
compliance and disclosure level with CG provisions (Eng and Mark, 2003; samaha et al., 
2012; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Allergrini and Greco, 2013). Hence, following the 
literature, the current study performed a comprehensive analysis of industry type on the 
level of CG compliance and disclosure. This analysis can provide assistance to conclude 
whether CG score is explainable by the firm characteristics.  
The rest of the chapter is further devided into five parts. Subsection 5.1.1 explains 
the level of compliance with PCGI based on full sample of 160 firms. Subsection 5.1.2 
reports the compliance level with PCGI with sub-indices. Subsection 5.1.3 presents the 
compliance level with PCGI with industry type. Subsection 5.1.4 reports the descriptive 
statistics related to the determinants of level of compliance model while subsection 5.1.5 
presents the descriptive statistics related to the CG and COC model.  
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5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics of PCGI  
The Pakistani CG index (PCGI) is constructed to examine the compliance and 
disclosure level for the sample of balanced panel of 160 Pakistani listed firms for 11 years 
from 2003 to 2013. The PCGI consists of 70 CG provisions, which were mainly derived 
from the 2002 PCCG. Table 5.1 presents the level of compliance and disclosure with each 
CG provision for the eleven years among Pakistani listed firms.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: The compliance level with the PCGI based on the full sample 
 
Two important findings can be concluded from the descriptive statistics of PCGI. 
First and as shown in Figure 5.1, the CG compliance level with PCGI is significantly 
enhanced over the period of eleven years from 2003 to 201324. The findings of row 3 of 
table 5.1 shows that the mean score of PCGI has increased from 20.6% in 2003 to 85.2% 
in 2013 with an overall increase of 64.6% in eleven years. This improvement in level of 
compliance and disclosure is consistent with studies conducted in other emerging countries 
(e.g., Akkermans et al., 2007; Ntim et al., 2012a). Similarly, Table 5.1 shows that the 
overall mean of level of compliance and disclosure with PCGI is 55% for eleven years 
                                                 
24
 The level of compliance is calculated using the yearly average of PCGI. Year wise increase in level of compliance is 
also presented in this figure.                          
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which is also consistent with the prior studies conducted in other emerging countries 
(Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Garay and Gonzalez, 2008; Adelopo, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a; 
Albu and Girbina; 2015). For instance, Tsamenyi et al. (2007) reported an average of 52% 
CG compliance level. Similarly, Albu and Girbina (2015) provide the empirical evidence 
that a good percentage of Romanian listed firms disclose high levels of CG information.  
The improvement in compliance level and disclosure is traced back in early 2000 
CG reforms in Pakistan. As discussed in Chapter Two, Pakistani policy maker has 
established Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) in late 1990s to bring 
CG reforms in the country. In 2002, SECP introduced important CG regulations known as 
Pakistani Code of Corporate Governance (PCCG). Noticeably, the introduction of PCCG 
has improved the CG standards in the country. Such increase in level of disclosure may 
decrease the information asymmetry (Alshehri and Solomon, 2012; Al-Nodel and 
Hussainey, 2010; Al-Abbas, 2009). Therefore, the progress can demonstrate suitability of 
embracing a UK style of CG standards in Pakistani setting.  
Second, the findings of last column of table 5.1 show that the levels of compliance 
with each CG provision in each of the eleven year are significantly varied. The level of 
compliance and disclosure with PCGI ranges from 4.4% compliance with the CG 
provision of whether the appointment of secretary by audit committee has been disclosed, 
to 82.6% of compliance with the CG provision of whether the director’s detailed 
remuneration has been disclosed in annual reports. 
The lower level of compliance with the CG provision of the appointment of 
secretary by audit committee may be due to the following reasons: (i) audit committees 
may appoint secretary but not disclosing this information in annual reports; (ii) they may 
intentionally avoid to report such information in order to avoid the influence by informal 
rules such as personal relationships; (iii) firms may consider such discloser less important 
or additional information after disclosing the  audit committee members in annual reports. 
The higher level of compliance with the CG provision of director’s detailed remuneration 
may be due to the fact that Pakistani companies ordinance 1984 mandates every firm to 
disclose the director’s detailed remuneration. 
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Table 5.1: The compliance level with the PCCG provisions for the Pakistan (%) 
Pakistani Corporate Governance index (70 Provisions) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
                                 Yearly average of the level of compliance 20.6 23.8 31.2 40.3 47.7 53.9 67.5 73.6 77.6 83.9 85.2 55.0 
 1. Board and Directors 
            
  1 Directors Categorization 55.6 56.9 59.4 65.0 68.1 71.3 78.8 83.1 86.3 95.6 96.9 74.3 
  2 Board Composition (Ratio of Independent Directors) 15.0 15.6 15.6 16.9 16.9 19.4 16.9 19.4 21.3 40.0 52.5 22.7 
  3 Director Representing Minority Shareholders 29.4 30.6 31.9 34.4 39.4 41.3 45.0 50.0 51.3 53.8 57.5 42.2 
  4 Board Classification (Ratio of Non-Executive Directors) 65.6 67.5 68.8 75.0 76.9 81.3 86.9 90.6 95.6 98.1 98.1 82.2 
  5 The Membership  of Directors in Other Boards 46.3 47.5 50.0 56.3 62.5 66.9 75.0 80.6 84.4 85.6 85.0 67.3 
  6 Maximum Directorship in Other Boards of Listed 
Companies 52.5 54.4 56.9 63.8 69.4 73.8 85.0 89.4 92.5 94.4 95.0 75.2 
  7 Non-Executive  Chairman of the Board 38.1 38.8 40.6 45.0 48.1 53.8 59.4 63.8 66.9 70.6 73.1 54.4 
  8 Clear Definition of Respective Role of Chairman and CEO 18.8 18.1 18.8 22.5 24.4 27.5 30.6 34.4 36.3 38.1 40.0 28.1 
  9 CEO Duality Role 31.9 31.9 33.1 37.5 39.4 42.5 45.0 48.8 48.8 51.9 53.1 42.2 
10 Orientation Courses for the Directors  5.6 8.1 11.3 16.3 21.9 26.3 37.5 43.1 46.3 54.4 56.3 29.7 
11 Board Meeting Disclosure  56.9 56.9 61.3 69.4 74.4 80.0 88.8 91.9 96.3 97.5 97.5 79.1 
12 Board Meeting Frequency 50.6 50.6 56.3 63.8 70.6 75.6 85.0 90.0 94.4 96.3 96.3 75.4 
13 National Tax Payer Director 13.8 20.6 30.0 41.9 50.6 58.8 81.3 88.8 93.8 97.5 96.9 61.3 
14 No Defaulter Director in the Board 12.5 19.4 29.4 41.3 50.6 58.8 80.6 88.1 93.1 97.5 97.5 60.8 
15 Directors and their Spouses involvement in Brokerage 
Business 11.3 17.5 26.9 36.9 46.9 54.4 75.0 82.5 87.5 93.1 93.1 56.8 
16 Statement of ethics and Business Practices 10.6 15.6 26.3 37.5 46.9 55.6 75.0 83.8 88.1 93.1 93.8 56.9 
17 Power and duties of BOD 15.0 19.4 29.4 41.9 50.6 59.4 81.3 89.4 94.4 97.5 96.9 61.4 
18 Future outlook 27.5 31.3 40.6 50.6 57.5 66.3 81.9 88.1 90.0 91.3 90.0 65.0 
 2.   Committees & Auditing 
           
 
19 Existence of R&HR Committee 3.8 3.8 6.9 8.1 8.8 12.5 16.3 17.5 23.8 74.4 80.6 23.3 
20 Committee Composition 1.9 2.5 5.0 6.3 6.9 10.6 13.8 15.0 21.9 72.5 79.4 21.4 
21 Committee Meetings held During the Year 1.9 2.5 5.0 5.0 6.3 10.0 11.9 13.8 18.8 67.5 76.3 19.9 
22 Committee Meeting Attended by each Directors 1.9 2.5 3.8 4.4 5.0 10.6 11.9 13.1 18.1 63.8 73.1 18.9 
23 The Names of the Members of the Committees of the Boards 3.1 3.1 5.6 6.9 8.1 11.9 15.0 16.9 22.5 73.8 80.6 22.5 
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 Pakistani Corporate Governance index (70 Provisions) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
24 Existence and Disclosure of  Audit Committee Members  29.4 33.8 41.3 51.9 61.3 67.5 85.6 93.8 96.9 98.8 99.4 69.0 
25 Minimum Members of Audit Committee 20.6 23.8 30.6 43.1 54.4 61.3 81.3 90.0 93.8 96.9 96.9 63.0 
26 Non-Executive Chairman of the Committee 14.4 18.1 26.3 38.1 47.5 55.0 73.1 80.6 85.0 88.8 92.5 56.3 
27 Majority of Non-Executives in Audit Committee 15.0 18.8 29.4 41.9 51.9 58.8 78.1 85.0 90.0 94.4 95.0 59.8 
28 Minimum Meetings of  Audit Committee in a Financial Year 14.4 18.1 27.5 39.4 50.6 56.9 76.3 83.8 88.8 93.1 94.4 58.5 
29 CFO, Internal  and a Rep of External Auditors attendance  16.3 19.4 27.5 36.9 47.5 53.1 72.5 81.3 86.3 88.8 89.4 56.3 
30 Review of  financial statements prior to the approval  13.1 16.3 26.3 36.9 46.9 53.8 73.1 83.1 86.3 88.1 88.1 55.6 
31 Review of Management letter issued by external auditor   5.6 6.3 12.5 16.9 23.1 27.5 40.6 48.8 52.5 55.6 58.8 31.6 
32 Appointment of Secretary by Audit Committee 1.3 0.6 1.9 3.1 3.8 5.0 5.0 5.6 5.6 7.5 9.4 4.4 
 3.      Right Of Shareholder And Annual General Meeting 
           
 
33 Notice of the AGM to the shareholders 18.1 21.3 32.5 41.9 52.5 60.0 80.0 87.5 93.8 96.3 96.3 61.8 
34 Well in Time Notice of AGM 16.3 19.4 30.0 39.4 49.4 57.5 78.8 85.6 93.8 96.3 96.3 60.2 
35 AGM with in a Period of Four Months  16.3 19.4 29.4 40.0 49.4 58.1 78.8 86.9 93.8 96.3 96.3 60.4 
36 AGM in Same Town as Registered Office of the Company  14.4 18.1 28.1 37.5 46.9 55.0 75.6 83.8 89.4 93.8 93.1 57.8 
37  Notice of the Meeting with Specifying the Details 13.8 16.9 27.5 38.1 48.8 57.5 78.8 86.9 93.8 95.6 96.3 59.4 
38 Right of Shareholder to Appoint a Proxy for AGM  13.1 17.5 27.5 39.4 50.0 58.8 79.4 88.1 93.8 95.6 95.6 59.9 
 4.      Transparency And  Disclosures 
           
 
39 Disclosure of Ownership Structure 26.3 28.8 38.1 50.0 58.8 66.9 81.9 90.6 95.6 97.5 97.5 66.5 
40 Directors, CEO and Children’s’ Ownership Disclosure 18.8 19.4 26.9 37.5 45.0 52.5 65.0 72.5 76.3 78.1 78.1 51.8 
41 Shareholding Ten Percent or More Voting Rights 23.8 26.9 37.5 48.1 56.9 66.9 80.6 87.5 89.4 85.6 85.0 62.6 
42 Going Concern Disclosure in Annual Reports 31.3 35.6 45.0 52.5 61.9 69.4 84.4 89.4 91.9 93.8 93.8 68.1 
43 Outstanding Taxes and Other Charges are disclosed  11.9 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 32.5 40.0 43.1 43.1 44.4 45.6 31.9 
44 Presentation of Operations, Cash Flows, Change in Equity 14.4 18.1 25.6 38.1 47.5 54.4 66.3 73.1 75.6 80.0 81.3 52.2 
45 Key Operating and Financial Data of Last Six Years 9.4 13.8 24.4 37.5 48.8 56.9 76.9 86.9 89.4 93.8 93.8 57.4 
46 Significant Deviation from Last Year Operating Results 4.4 5.0 6.9 10.6 15.0 18.1 21.9 23.1 25.0 26.3 27.5 16.7 
47 Trades of Share by Directors and Other Executives 5.6 8.8 9.4 13.1 16.9 22.5 30.0 30.6 31.9 33.1 35.0 21.5 
48 Disclosure of Objectives and Corporate Strategy  12.5 16.9 26.9 40.0 51.3 59.4 78.8 86.9 90.0 95.0 95.0 59.3 
49 Statement on Compliance with the Code of CG 14.4 20.0 31.3 45.0 55.0 63.1 81.9 91.3 94.4 97.5 97.5 62.8 
50 Disclosure of Dividend Policy  38.1 37.5 51.3 64.4 69.4 73.1 86.9 92.5 95.0 98.1 98.1 73.1 
51 Disclosure of Detail of Related Party Transaction 43.1 40.6 51.9 62.5 69.4 73.1 81.9 83.8 88.1 89.4 89.4 70.3 
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 Pakistani Corporate Governance index (70 Provisions) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
52 Director’s Detailed Remuneration Disclosure 65.0 67.5 74.4 79.4 80.6 82.5 87.5 90.0 92.5 94.4 95.0 82.6 
 5.      Internal Control, External Auditor And Risk 
Management             
53 Effectiveness of Internal Control System 19.4 26.3 36.3 50.6 59.4 66.9 81.9 90.6 92.5 96.3 96.3 65.1 
54 Disclosure of Firm Risk in Annual Reports 27.5 32.5 41.9 55.6 62.5 68.8 83.8 91.3 93.8 96.3 96.9 68.2 
55 Risk Management Policies by the BOD 16.3 20.0 30.6 45.6 55.6 65.0 83.8 90.6 93.8 96.9 97.5 63.2 
56 Auditor review of Internal Control System 13.1 18.8 30.0 43.1 54.4 63.1 81.9 90.0 94.4 96.3 97.5 62.0 
57 Auditor Review of Firm Financial Reports 15.0 20.0 31.3 45.6 56.3 63.8 84.4 91.3 95.6 97.5 97.5 63.5 
58 Approval of Firm Financial Reports 19.4 25.0 38.1 52.5 60.0 67.5 85.6 91.9 95.6 98.1 98.1 66.5 
59 Proper Book of Account Maintained  38.8 46.3 52.5 60.6 68.1 72.5 86.9 93.1 96.3 98.1 98.1 73.8 
60 Appropriate Accounting Policies Applied  34.4 42.5 49.4 57.5 66.3 71.3 85.6 92.5 96.3 98.1 98.1 72.0 
61 Financial Statements According to IAS 28.1 31.9 42.5 52.5 63.1 70.6 85.6 92.5 96.3 98.1 98.1 69.0 
62 External Auditor’s Satisfactory Rating by ICAP 21.3 25.6 35.6 48.1 60.0 67.5 81.9 89.4 93.8 95.6 95.6 64.9 
63 Compliance with IFAC Gridlines on Code of ethics  20.6 26.9 35.0 48.1 58.1 64.4 81.3 89.4 94.4 96.3 96.9 64.7 
64 Auditor Duties According to IFAC  15.0 19.4 29.4 44.4 55.0 62.5 81.3 90.0 94.4 96.9 96.9 62.3 
65 Attendance of AGM by external Auditor 9.4 13.8 23.1 33.8 45.6 51.9 70.6 76.9 83.1 85.6 87.5 52.8 
66 Statutory Auditor’s Review of  CG Compliance Statement 10.6 16.9 27.5 42.5 55.0 63.8 83.1 88.8 93.8 96.3 96.3 61.3 
67 Half yearly financial statements with  auditor’s review 14.4 20.0 30.0 44.4 53.1 61.9 81.3 88.1 92.5 95.0 95.0 61.4 
68 Annual audited financial statements within four month  12.5 20.0 29.4 43.8 53.8 61.3 80.0 88.1 95.0 97.5 97.5 61.7 
69 Determination of Compliance with  Statutory Requirements  12.5 16.9 28.1 40.6 49.4 58.1 75.6 85.6 91.9 95.6 96.3 59.1 
70 Monitoring Compliance with Best Practices of CG 1.3 4.4 11.3 18.1 20.6 25.6 32.5 38.1 43.8 46.9 51.9 26.8 
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5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics of PCGI for Sub-Indices 
 The CG provisions which construct the PCGI consists of five sub-indices, that are: 
the board of directors (BOD) with 18 provision,  internal auditing and committees (IDC) 
with 14 provisions,  shareholders right (SR) with 6 provisions,  transparency and disclosure 
(TAD) with 14 provisions, Internal Control, External Auditor and Risk Management (IER) 
with 18 provisions. There is a substantial degree of dispersion in aggregate level of 
compliance based on sub-indices. The main interpretations are précised below. 
First, the sample firms show a higher compliance level with the provisions related 
to the internal control and risk management, right of shareholders and board of directors. 
Specifically, 62.14% of listed firms complied with the provisions related to internal control 
and risk management, 59.92% of listed firms complied with the provisions related to 
shareholder’s rights and 57.49% of listed firms complied with the provisions related to 
board of directors.  However, a greater degree of dispersion have been noticed in internal 
control and risk management (with a minimum value to 26.76% to a maximum of 73.75%) 
and board of director’s (with a minimum value to 22.67% to a maximum of 82.22%) sub-
indices with respect to shareholders’ rights (with a minimum value to 57.78% to a 
maximum of 61.82%) sub index.  
As discussed in Chapter two, the possible explanation of higher level of dispersion 
in level of compliance with the provisions of ‘internal control and risk management’ and 
board of directors’ sub-indices is largely due to the absence of good CG practices prior to 
governance reforms. For instance, as shown in panel B, D and F of Table 5.2, the standard 
deviation of board of directors (18%) and internal control and risk management (10.3%) is 
much higher than the shareholders’ rights (1.32%). Hence, these results lead to the 
conclusion that the introduction of 2002 PCCG has had a positive impact on Pakistani 
firms to engage more CG practices as the overall PCGI score for the period 2003 is 
significantly lower than for the period of 2013. On the other hand, the lower dispersion in 
level of compliance may be due to the nature of provisions of shareholders’ rights which 
have been previously imposed by regulatory bodies, such as SECP to protect shareholders’ 
interests.  
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Table 5.2: Summary of Descriptive Statistics of Determinant of level of compliance with PCGI and sub-indices (%) 
  Y2003 Y2004 Y2005 Y2006 Y2007 Y2008 Y2009 Y2010 Y2011 Y2012 Y2013 ALL 
Panel A  : Pakistani Corporate Governance Index (PCGI) 
 Mean 20.56 23.76 31.17 40.31 47.66 53.88 67.50 73.60 77.57 83.88 85.16 55.00 
 Median 15.00 19.38 29.38 41.88 50.63 58.75 78.75 86.88 90.94 94.38 95.00 60.60 
 T-test .60 .01 -.59 -1.34 -1.67 -1.80* -1.99** -2.05** -2.09** -1.85* -1.83* -1.61 
 Maximum 65.63 67.50 74.38 79.38 80.63 82.50 88.75 93.75 96.88 98.75 99.38 82.61 
 Minimum 1.25 0.63 1.88 3.13 3.75 5.00 5.00 5.63 5.63 7.50 9.38 4.43 
 Std. Dev. 15.37 15.13 15.46 17.25 18.82 19.69 24.20 25.99 26.37 20.95 19.72 18.03 
 Provisions 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00 
Panel B  : Board of Directors 
 Mean 30.94 33.37 38.13 45.31 50.83 56.25 67.15 72.53 75.94 80.35 81.63 57.49 
 Median 28.44 30.94 32.50 41.88 50.63 58.75 76.88 83.44 87.81 93.13 93.44 61.02 
 T-test 2.50** 1.98* 1.02 -0.14 -0.93 -1.26 -2.02* -2.27** -2.36** -2.20** -2.29** -0.96 
 Maximum 65.63 67.50 68.75 75.00 76.88 81.25 88.75 91.88 96.25 98.13 98.13 82.22 
 Minimum 5.63 8.13 11.25 16.25 16.88 19.38 16.88 19.38 21.25 38.13 40.00 22.67 
 Std. Dev. 19.36 18.08 17.00 17.49 17.89 18.54 22.22 23.04 24.14 22.16 20.17 18.00 
 Provisions 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 
Panel C : Committees and Auditing 
 Mean 10.18 12.10 17.81 24.20 30.13 35.31 46.74 52.01 56.43 75.98 79.55 40.04 
 Median 9.38 11.25 19.38 26.88 35.00 40.31 56.56 64.69 68.75 81.25 84.38 43.64 
 T-test -2.96*** -3.68*** -4.42*** -4.92*** -4.76*** -4.88*** -4.43*** -4.27*** -4.29*** -3.46*** -3.02*** -4.5*** 
 Maximum 29.38 33.75 41.25 51.88 61.25 67.50 85.63 93.75 96.88 98.75 99.38 69.03 
 Minimum 1.25 0.63 1.88 3.13 3.75 5.00 5.00 5.63 5.63 7.50 9.38 4.43 
 Std. Dev. 8.68 10.32 13.17 18.23 22.81 24.30 32.64 36.01 35.83 23.87 23.04 21.47 
 Provisions 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 
Panel D: Shareholder Right 
 Mean 15.31 18.75 29.17 39.38 49.48 57.81 78.54 86.46 93.02 95.63 95.63 59.92 
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Table 5.2: Summary of Descriptive Statistics of Determinant of level of compliance with PCGI and sub-indices (%) 
  Y2003 Y2004 Y2005 Y2006 Y2007 Y2008 Y2009 Y2010 Y2011 Y2012 Y2013 ALL 
 Median 15.31 18.75 28.75 39.38 49.38 57.81 78.75 86.88 93.75 95.94 96.25 60.06 
 T-test -.78 -1.20 -1.08 -1.67 -1.37 -1.09 -.14 -.02 .41 .45 .36 -.53 
 Maximum 18.13 21.25 32.50 41.88 52.50 60.00 80.00 88.13 93.75 96.25 96.25 61.82 
 Minimum 13.13 16.88 27.50 37.50 46.88 55.00 75.63 83.75 89.38 93.75 93.13 57.78 
 Std. Dev. 1.89 1.58 1.92 1.53 1.83 1.67 1.51 1.56 1.79 0.97 1.25 1.32 
 Provisions 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
Panel E: Transparency and Disclosures 
 Mean 22.77 25.27 33.53 43.13 50.45 56.52 68.84 74.38 77.01 79.06 79.46 55.49 
 Median 16.56 19.69 29.06 42.50 53.13 61.25 79.69 86.88 89.38 91.56 91.56 60.94 
 T-test .96 .33 .02 -.55 -.93 -1.13 -1.70* -1.86* -2.10** -2.14** -2.25** -1.26 
 Maximum 65.00 67.50 74.38 79.38 80.63 82.50 87.50 92.50 95.63 98.13 98.13 82.61 
 Minimum 4.38 5.00 6.88 10.63 15.00 18.13 21.88 23.13 25.00 26.25 27.50 16.70 
 Std. Dev. 16.90 16.16 17.98 18.99 19.08 19.39 22.00 23.93 24.69 25.14 24.57 19.43 
 Provisions 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 
Panel F: Internal control and risk management 
 Mean 18.30 23.72 33.44 45.97 55.35 62.57 79.27 86.56 90.94 93.40 93.99 62.14 
 Median 15.63 20.00 30.94 45.63 55.94 64.06 81.88 90.00 94.06 96.25 96.88 63.35 
 Maximum 38.75 46.25 52.50 60.63 68.13 72.50 86.88 93.13 96.25 98.13 98.13 73.75 
 Minimum 1.25 4.38 11.25 18.13 20.63 25.63 32.50 38.13 43.75 46.88 51.88 26.76 
 Std. Dev. 9.20 9.98 9.52 9.52 10.31 10.45 12.29 12.62 12.14 11.94 10.79 10.03 
 Provisions 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics of average level of compliance with sub-indices of PCGI from 2003 to 2013. Panel A, B, C, D and E reports the t-test using 
Independent sample t-test of compare means based on Internal control and risk management for the equality of mean values. The asterisk*** denotes the significant level at 
1%, asterisk** denotes the significant level at 5% and asterisk* denotes the significant level of mean difference at 10%. 
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Second, the sample firms show an average compliance level with the provisions 
related to the transparency and disclosure with an overall level of compliance of 55.49% 
for the study period from 2003 to 2013 with a minimum of 16.70% to a maximum of 
82.61% level of compliance. Similar to other sub-indices, transparency and disclosure 
index also show as moderate increase in level of compliance for the period of study with an 
average of 22.77% in 2003 to 55.49% in 2013. Third, sample firms show a lower level of 
compliance with the provisions related to the committees and auditing with an overall level 
of compliance of 40.04% for the study period from 2003 to 2013 with a minimum of 
4.43% to a maximum of 69.03% level of compliance. However, in 2003 the transparency 
and disclosure, was the index with lowest average level of compliance (10.18%) which 
significantly increased to 79.55% till 2013.  
Finally, the overall findings of PCGI in panel A of Table 5.2 show a substantial 
degree of dispersion in level of compliance. The overall mean score ranges from 4.43% to 
82.61%, with an average of 55% complying with 70 CG provisions for the period of 2003 
to 2013. The standard deviation of PCGI is 18.03%, shown that there is a relative 
dispersion in compliance level with the PCGI provisions among the Pakistani listed firms. 
Conclusively, the overall level of compliance for the firms has considerably increased for 
the period from 2003 (20.56%) to 2013 (85.16%). This wide variability and gradual 
increase in level of compliance with CG provisions among the sampled firms is expected 
to result from the following factors.  
First, the high scores of some provisions are influenced by some prior government 
regulations in addition to PCCG, such as Pakistani Companies Ordinance act and Stock 
Exchange listing Rules. For instance, in order to ensure fair remunerations to directors, 
companies’ ordinance requires firms to disclose director’s detailed remuneration. 
Therefore, a significant number of sampled firms comply with the provision of director’s 
detailed remuneration (82.6%).  Second, the lower scores of some provisions may be 
because of absence of better CG standards before the state reforms, such as PCCG. It may 
also be related to the weakness of the Pakistani external CG framework, including SECP 
and KSE, in encouraging firms to engage in good CG practices. Third and as shows in 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, the level of compliance with almost all the provisions gradually 
improves from one year to the next. For instance, the overall level of compliance with 
PCGI from 2003 to 2013 is as follows: 20.56%, 23.76%, 31.17%, 40.31%, 47.66%, 
53.88%, 67.50%, 73.60%, 77.57%, 83.88%, and 85.16%. As it has been reported in the 
literature (e.g., Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2014), this may be due to the fact 
that the firms take time to comply with all CG provisions.  
127 
 
 
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics  of Level of compliance based on industrial group 
Mean Median T-test Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Panel A  : PCGI 55.00 60.09  84.32 4.43 19.90 
Y2003 20.56 15.00 -4.21*** 65.63 1.25 15.37 
Y2004 23.76 19.38 -1.41 67.50 0.63 15.13 
Y2005 31.17 29.38 -0.37 74.38 1.88 15.46 
Y2006 40.31 41.88 4.03*** 79.38 3.13 17.25 
Y2007 47.66 50.63 -0.56 80.63 3.75 18.82 
Y2008 53.88 58.75 1.63 82.50 5.00 19.69 
Y2009 67.50 78.75 4.88*** 88.75 5.00 24.20 
Y2010 73.60 86.88 6.64*** 93.75 5.63 25.99 
Y2011 77.57 90.94 3.02*** 96.88 5.63 26.37 
Y2012 83.88 94.38 3.23*** 98.75 7.50 20.95 
Y2013 85.16 95.00 3.17*** 99.38 9.38 19.72 
Panel B  : Auto 49.59 55.96  80.88 0.00 20.93 
Y2003 8.18 6.90 -9.29*** 58.62 0.00 10.95 
Y2004 10.20 6.90 -7.10*** 58.62 0.00 9.90 
Y2005 18.77 17.24 -4.88*** 75.86 0.00 13.45 
Y2006 29.21 31.03 0.37 75.86 0.00 15.17 
Y2007 45.27 51.72 -1.17 75.86 0.00 19.73 
Y2008 50.59 58.62 0.70 79.31 0.00 21.55 
Y2009 64.48 75.86 3.84*** 86.21 0.00 27.58 
Y2010 73.00 86.21 5.84*** 93.10 0.00 30.94 
Y2011 77.14 91.38 2.65*** 96.55 0.00 31.70 
Y2012 85.52 96.55 3.34*** 96.55 0.00 25.38 
Y2013 83.10 93.10 2.38** 93.10 0.00 23.91 
Panel C : Cement 61.09 70.27  99.24 1.89 28.33 
Y2003 28.75 20.83 -1.11 95.83 0.00 25.95 
Y2004 29.35 22.92 0.42 95.83 0.00 25.82 
Y2005 40.71 41.67 2.26** 100.00 0.00 25.15 
Y2006 49.40 54.17 5.61*** 100.00 0.00 25.80 
Y2007 58.15 66.67 1.86* 100.00 0.00 27.53 
Y2008 61.37 70.83 3.04*** 100.00 0.00 28.81 
Y2009 75.42 95.83 5.53*** 100.00 0.00 34.46 
Y2010 78.27 100.00 6.50*** 100.00 4.17 34.40 
Y2011 78.99 100.00 2.93*** 100.00 4.17 33.34 
Y2012 85.00 100.00 3.17*** 100.00 4.17 26.21 
Y2013 86.55 100.00 3.23*** 100.00 8.33 24.17 
Panel D: Chemical 57.15 63.64  91.41 2.53 22.18 
Y2003 18.97 11.11 -4.30*** 88.89 0.00 19.21 
Y2004 27.30 22.22 -0.15 88.89 0.00 17.89 
Y2005 38.81 38.89 2.12* 88.89 0.00 17.83 
Y2006 48.89 55.56 6.39*** 88.89 5.56 20.01 
Y2007 53.41 61.11 0.91 88.89 5.56 21.35 
Y2008 59.37 66.67 3.09*** 88.89 5.56 20.45 
Y2009 66.98 77.78 4.78*** 94.44 5.56 23.85 
Y2010 74.68 88.89 6.82*** 94.44 5.56 26.53 
Y2011 74.60 88.89 2.32** 94.44 0.00 27.39 
128 
 
 
Continuation: Table 5.3 
 Mean Median T-test Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Y2012 82.14 94.44 2.59** 94.44 0.00 24.75 
Y2013 83.49 94.44 2.43** 94.44 0.00 24.68 
Panel E: Electricity 66.09 75.76  100.00 0.00 29.54 
Y2003 26.67 22.22 -1.56 100.00 0.00 28.21 
Y2004 39.84 33.33 3.17*** 100.00 0.00 26.25 
Y2005 59.68 66.67 6.77*** 100.00 0.00 28.20 
Y2006 67.94 77.78 9.25*** 100.00 0.00 30.94 
Y2007 66.67 77.78 3.54*** 100.00 0.00 30.62 
Y2008 67.30 77.78 4.23*** 100.00 0.00 30.55 
Y2009 77.94 100.00 6.20*** 100.00 0.00 33.12 
Y2010 78.73 100.00 6.91*** 100.00 0.00 32.14 
Y2011 77.94 88.89 2.88*** 100.00 0.00 30.36 
Y2012 81.90 100.00 2.37** 100.00 0.00 28.07 
Y2013 82.38 88.89 2.08** 100.00 0.00 26.45 
Panel F: Food 50.14 52.87  100.00 0.48 27.55 
Y2003 16.77 2.63 -3.96*** 100.00 0.00 28.33 
Y2004 17.29 2.63 -2.57** 100.00 0.00 28.76 
Y2005 23.31 10.53 -2.28** 100.00 0.00 26.82 
Y2006 31.73 28.95 0.96 100.00 0.00 24.96 
Y2007 39.77 36.84 -2.40** 100.00 0.00 23.80 
Y2008 39.77 36.84 -2.07** 100.00 0.00 23.67 
Y2009 64.96 78.95 3.88*** 100.00 0.00 28.42 
Y2010 73.53 89.47 5.75*** 100.00 0.00 32.62 
Y2011 75.11 94.74 2.20** 100.00 0.00 32.90 
Y2012 84.29 100.00 3.00*** 100.00 0.00 26.35 
Y2013 85.04 100.00 2.71*** 100.00 5.26 26.39 
Panel G: Houshold 60.32 65.91  100.00 0.00 26.59 
Y2003 17.14 0.00 -3.76*** 100.00 0.00 29.50 
Y2004 32.68 25.00 1.27 100.00 0.00 26.94 
Y2005 40.18 37.50 2.15** 100.00 0.00 24.44 
Y2006 49.11 50.00 5.78*** 100.00 0.00 24.11 
Y2007 50.71 50.00 0.22 100.00 0.00 23.88 
Y2008 65.18 75.00 4.17*** 100.00 0.00 25.70 
Y2009 73.93 87.50 6.16*** 100.00 0.00 26.56 
Y2010 81.61 100.00 7.89*** 100.00 0.00 29.92 
Y2011 81.96 100.00 3.74*** 100.00 0.00 29.84 
Y2012 85.36 100.00 3.27*** 100.00 0.00 25.97 
Y2013 85.71 100.00 2.93*** 100.00 0.00 25.56 
Panel H: Misc 47.35 51.95  70.13 3.90 17.75 
Y2003 18.16 14.29 -5.51*** 42.86 0.00 11.39 
Y2004 16.94 14.29 -4.55*** 42.86 0.00 8.08 
Y2005 21.12 21.43 -4.42*** 50.00 0.00 9.53 
Y2006 33.27 35.71 1.75* 64.29 0.00 16.04 
Y2007 29.49 28.57 -5.87*** 50.00 0.00 13.75 
Y2008 45.00 50.00 -0.87 64.29 7.14 16.69 
129 
 
 
Continuation: Table 5.3 
 Mean Median T-test Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Y2009 55.61 64.29 1.99** 85.71 7.14 22.25 
Y2010 67.24 78.57 5.14*** 85.71 7.14 25.55 
Y2011 74.18 85.71 2.27** 92.86 7.14 26.54 
Y2012 75.61 85.71 1.06 92.86 7.14 23.53 
Y2013 84.18 92.86 2.77*** 100.00 7.14 21.92 
Panel I: Oil & Gas 53.16 56.29  97.90 0.00 22.25 
Y2003 24.73 19.23 -2.48** 92.31 0.00 20.28 
Y2004 30.44 30.77 0.83 92.31 0.00 19.97 
Y2005 26.81 23.08 -1.65 92.31 0.00 20.07 
Y2006 34.84 30.77 1.98** 100.00 0.00 21.35 
Y2007 46.15 46.15 -0.92 100.00 0.00 21.28 
Y2008 47.03 46.15 -0.25 100.00 0.00 21.46 
Y2009 67.69 76.92 4.93*** 100.00 0.00 24.17 
Y2010 70.55 76.92 5.95*** 100.00 0.00 25.56 
Y2011 74.40 84.62 2.36** 100.00 0.00 25.35 
Y2012 81.10 92.31 2.42** 100.00 0.00 23.05 
Y2013 80.99 92.31 1.91* 100.00 0.00 22.21 
Panel J: Pharma 47.46 54.55  97.40 0.00 22.24 
Y2003 33.06 42.86  85.71 0.00 19.54 
Y2004 27.76 28.57  85.71 0.00 18.18 
Y2005 32.24 28.57  100.00 0.00 18.79 
Y2006 28.16 28.57  100.00 0.00 18.36 
Y2007 49.80 57.14  100.00 0.00 25.48 
Y2008 47.96 57.14  100.00 0.00 23.08 
Y2009 47.96 57.14  100.00 0.00 23.21 
Y2010 46.33 57.14  100.00 0.00 22.48 
Y2011 63.88 71.43  100.00 0.00 27.27 
Y2012 71.22 85.71  100.00 0.00 25.22 
Y2013 73.67 85.71  100.00 0.00 23.03 
Panel K: Textile 49.59 55.96  80.88 0.00 20.93 
Y2003 8.18 6.90 -9.29*** 58.62 0.00 10.95 
Y2004 10.20 6.90 -7.10*** 58.62 0.00 9.90 
Y2005 18.77 17.24 -4.88*** 75.86 0.00 13.45 
Y2006 29.21 31.03 0.37 75.86 0.00 15.17 
Y2007 45.27 51.72 -1.17 75.86 0.00 19.73 
Y2008 50.59 58.62 0.70 79.31 0.00 21.55 
Y2009 64.48 75.86 3.84*** 86.21 0.00 27.58 
Y2010 73.00 86.21 5.84*** 93.10 0.00 30.94 
Y2011 77.14 91.38 2.65*** 96.55 0.00 31.70 
Y2012 85.52 96.55 3.34*** 96.55 0.00 25.38 
Y2013 83.10 93.10 2.38** 93.10 0.00 23.91 
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics of level of compliance with PCGI based on industry type from 2003 to 
2013.  Std. Dev. denotes standard deviation, Auto represents automobile industry and Misc denotes miscellaneous firms 
which are from the industries other than the above mentioned. Notes: Panel A to I and K reports the t-test using 
independent sample t-test of compare means based on pharma industry for the equality of mean values. The asterisk*** 
denotes the significant level at 1%, asterisk** denotes the significant level at 5% and asterisk* denotes the significant 
level of mean difference at 10%.  
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5.1.3 Descriptive statistics of PCGI based on Industrial Group 
It has been suggested in the CG literature that the level of compliance and 
disclosure differ across the industrial groups (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Krafft et al., 
2013; Ntim et al., 2014). Therefore, the current study seeks to determine whether different 
industrial groups can explain the variability in level of CG compliance and disclosure with 
PCGI. The full sample is categorised into ten industries, as provided by DataStream and 
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). These includes: automobile, cement, chemical, electricity, 
food, household, misc, oil and gas, pharma and textile industries. Generally, the statistics 
of panel A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J and K of Table 5.3 suggests that the overall mean 
scores of the PCGI is significantly varied among Pakistani listed firms across firm 
industry. These findings are further explained below.  
Table 5.3 and figure 5.2 show the level of compliance with the PCGI based on 10 
industrial groups across the eleven years from 2003 to 2013. The following three main 
observations can be drawn. First, both Table 5.3 and figure 5.2 show that the firms in 
automobile, cement, chemical, electricity, food, household, misc, oil and gas, pharma and 
textile industries complied with 49.59%, 61.09%, 57.15%, 66.09%, 50.14%, 60.32%, 
47.35%, 53.16%, 47.46%, and 49.59% of PCGI, respectively. It can be observed that the 
firms in cement (61.09%), electricity (66.09%), and household (60.32%) industries tend to 
comply more with the PCGI than those in other industrial groups. Firms in chemical 
(57.15%), food (50.14%), oil and gas (53.16%) industries appears to have an average level 
of compliance with PCGI. On the other hand, the firms in automobile (49.59%), misc 
(47.35%), pharma (47.46%) and textile (49.59%) industrial groups appear to have lower 
level of CG compliance and disclosure with PCGI. These findings are in line with 
Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008), they reported that there is a substantial difference in CG 
disclosure among industries.  
Second, similar to the results of overall PCGI, the level of compliance and 
disclosure in all industrial groups has increased over the sampled period. For instance, as 
shown in Table 5.3, the level of compliance by the sampled firms in automobile and 
engineering, cement, chemical, electricity, food, household, misc, oil and gas, pharma and 
textile are 8.18%, 28.75%,  18.97%, 26.67%, 16.77%, 17.14%, 18.16%, 24.73%, 33.06% 
and 8.18% in 2003, compared with 83.10%, 86.55%, 83.49%, 82.38%, 85.04%, 85.71%, 
84.18%, 80.99%, 73.67% and 83.10% in 2013. This increase in level of compliance over 
time, confirming the suggestions of CG literature that compliance with CG practices takes 
time.  
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Figure 5.2: The levels of CG compliance and disclosure by industrial groups 
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5.1.4 Descriptive statistics of Level of compliance 
As shown in Table 5.4, this subsection presents and discusses the descriptive statistics 
of determinants of level of compliance. It is divided into further three subsections.  Subsection 
5.1.4.1 discusses the summary of descriptive statistics related to the dependent variable. 
Descriptive statistics of independent variables are discussed in Subsection 5.1.4.2, while 
descriptive statistics related to control variables are discussed in Subsection 5.1.4.3.  
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics of Level of compliance Model 
Variables Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum 
Panel A  : Dependent variable 
PCGI 1760 54.230 74.648 33.572 97.183 0.000 
Panel B  : Independent variables 
DOWNP 1760 20.879 9.001 24.811 98.371 0.000 
IOWNP 1760 10.699 5.543 14.674 95.471 0.000 
GOWNP 1760 6.397 1.741 12.564 95.023 0.000 
BOWNP 1760 55.451 55.220 26.727 99.806 0.000 
FOWNP 1760 9.967 0.000 21.624 93.187 0.000 
BIG4 1760 0.551 1.000 0.498 1.000 0.000 
BSZ 1760 8.220 8.000 1.683 17.000 6.000 
BGEN 1760 11.398 0 23.376 1 0 
BNAT 1760 4.2621 0 8.9820 1 0 
Panel C : Control  variables 
LTA 1760 16.017 15.641 2.082 21.304 12.636 
ROE 1760 0.146 0.103 0.225 0.692 -0.212 
SALESG 1760 0.163 0.127 0.388 1.655 -0.728 
LVG 1760 30.605 25.853 30.491 147.877 0.000 
CE 1760 27.877 3.9809 224.87 4203.641 4.03E-05 
Notes: PCGI denotes the Pakistani Corporate Governance Index, DOWNP represents director ownership, IOWNP 
represents institutional ownership, GOWNP represents government ownership, BOWNP represents block ownership, 
FOWNP represents foreign ownership, BIG4 represents the audit firm size, BSZ represents the size of the board of 
directors, BGEN represents board diversity on the basis of Gender, BNAT represents board diversity on the basis of 
Nationality, LTA  represents firm size as log of total assets, ROE represents return on equity as measure of profitability, 
SALESG represents growth opportunities, LVG represents leverage and CE represents capital expenditures to total 
assets.  
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5.1.4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variable (PCGI) 
After a detailed discussion on PCGI in the above subsections and as shown in panel 
A of Table 5.4, this subsection discusses in brief the descriptive statistics for dependent 
variable. The minimum of PCGI  is 0.00  and maximum is 97.18 while the mean score of 
index is 54.23 for 1760 firm year observations. There is a relatively large variation in the 
CG compliance among Pakistani listed firms, as shown by standard deviation of 33.57. The 
findings are in line with the previous CG literature ( e.g, Ntim et al., 2012a; Henry,  2008) 
indicating that CG standards improve over time.  
5.1.4.2 Descriptive Statistics of independent variables  
As shown in panel B of Table 5.4, this subsection discusses the descriptive 
statistics for explanatory variables. A number of observations are listed below. First, the 
mean of director ownership is 20.88%, with a minimum of 0% and maximum of 98%. The 
average of director ownership is relatively high among Pakistani listed firms from both 
developing and devolved countries. For instance, Samaha et al. (2012) reports 9% of 
director ownership in Egyptian firms. Similarly, Henry (2008) report 6% of director 
ownership in Australian firms. Second, the mean of institutional ownership is 10.70% with 
a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 95%, revealing that there is a substantial variation in 
this variable. However this average of institutional ownership is consistent with some of 
the previous studies. For instance, Aggarwal et al. (2011) report an average institutional 
ownership of 8%, 8% and 9% in Greece, Hong Kong and New Zealand, respectively. On 
the other hand, Chung and Zhang (2011) report over 50% of institutional ownership among 
US firms. 
Third, the average government ownership is 6.39% with a minimum of 0 and a 
maximum of 95%, revealing that the Pakistani government relatively holds a high 
percentage of firms’ share and is expected to have an impact on the willingness of firms to 
comply with CG provisions. Fourth, the average of block ownership is 55.45%, with a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 99.80%, revealing a higher level of ownership 
concentration among Pakistani listed firms. The high level of block ownership may suggest 
a low CG compliance and disclosure, as it is expected that market for control may not be 
working well as compared with low concentration of ownership. Fifth, the foreign 
ownership has a mean of 9.97%, with a minimum of 0, and a maximum of 93%, with a 
standard deviation of 21.62%. This may suggest that the presence of foreign ownership can 
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have an important role in improving the CG standards among Pakistani listed firms. This is 
supported by correlation coefficient, showing a positive correlation with PCGI.  
Sixth, an average of 55% of sampled firms uses the services of big audit firms. This 
average is relatively lower than other emerging countries. For instance, Barako et al. 
(2006) find that the 75% of Kenyan firms are audited by the one of the big audited firms. It 
is expected that firms audited by big audit firms, may improve their levels of CG 
compliance and disclosure because of the reputation of audit firms. Seventh, the average of 
board is 8.22%, with a range from 6 to 17. This is in line with PCCG requirements that 
board members should be at least 7. It is also in consistent with the Lipton and Lorsch’s 
(1992) recommendation that board should have between 8 and 9 members in order to be 
efficient.  Further, this average of board size is in line with some of the prior studies. For 
instance, Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) investigating CG compliance and disclosure in 
Malaysia, reports empirical evidence of board average to be 7.97.  
Eighth, gender as a measure of board diversity has an average of 11.40%, 
representing the female directors’ portion in the board among Pakistani listed firms. This 
may suggest that the presence of female board members on firms’ board may improve the 
level of compliance and disclosure among Pakistani listed firms because of diversity in the 
board room. Finally, nationality as a measure of board diversity has an average of 4.26%, 
representing the foreigner directors’ portion in the board among Pakistani listed firms. 
Although the percentage of foreign director is low in board room, there presence on firms’ 
board may help to improve the CG disclosure level in Pakistan because of nationality 
diversity, skills and exposure in the board room.   
5.1.4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables 
As shown in panel C of Table 5.4, the summary descriptive statistics of control 
variables related to the determinants of the level compliance are discussed in this 
subsection. First, firm size measured by the natural log of firms’ total assets range from 12 
to 21, with an average of 16. Second, firm profitability measured by return on equity, range 
from a minimum of -21% to a maximum of 22%, with an overall average of 14.6%. Third, 
firm growth measured by sales growth in sampled firm having an average of 16%, with a 
range from -72% to 38%, showing a high level of variation among the sampled firms. This 
variation in firms’ growth can be repercussions of the global economic recession (2008) 
during the study period (Mangena et al., 2012). Fourth, the average value of leverage is 
30% which is slightly higher than other developing countries. For instance, Al-Nodel and 
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Hussainey (2010) and Barako et al. (2006) find average leverage value of 25% and 27% 
for Saudian and Kenyan firms, respectively.  Finally, the capital expenditure has an 
average value of 27.87% shows an average level of capital expenditure to total assets 
which may have a negative impact on level of CG disclosure and compliance among the 
listed firms.  
 
Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics of Cost of Capital 
 Variables Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum 
Panel A  : Dependent variable 
COC 1760 0.209 0.156 0.276 0.976 -0.470 
COD 1760 0.196 0.072 0.258 0.700 0.000 
COE 1760 0.255 0.212 0.303 0.932 -0.307 
Panel B  : Independent variables 
PCGI 1760 54.230 74.648 33.572 97.183 0.000 
DOWNP 1760 20.879 9.001 24.811 98.371 0.000 
IOWNP 1760 10.699 5.543 14.674 95.471 0.000 
GOWNP 1760 6.397 1.741 12.564 95.023 0.000 
BOWNP 1760 55.451 55.220 26.727 99.806 0.000 
FOWNP 1760 9.967 0.000 21.624 93.187 0.000 
BIG4 1760 0.551 1.000 0.498 1.000 0.000 
BSZ 1760 8.220 8.000 1.683 17.000 6.000 
BGEN 1760 11.398 0 23.376 1 0 
Panel C : Control  variables 
LTA 1760 16.017 15.641 2.082 21.304 12.636 
ROE 1760 0.146 0.103 0.225 0.692 -0.212 
SALESG 1760 0.163 0.127 0.388 1.655 -0.728 
LVG 1760 30.605 25.853 30.491 147.877 0.000 
β 1760 0.590 0.567 0.564 2.106 -0.529 
Notes: COC denotes the Cost of Capital, COD denotes the Cost of Debt, COE denotes the Cost of Equity, PCGI 
denotes the Pakistani Corporate Governance Index, DOWNP represents director ownership, IOWNP represents 
institutional ownership, GOWNP represents government ownership, BOWNP represents block ownership, FOWNP 
represents foreign ownership, BIG4 represents the audit firm size, BSZ represents the size of the board of directors, 
BGEN represents board diversity on the basis of Gender, BNAT represents board diversity on the basis of Nationality, 
LTA  represents firm size as log of total assets, ROE represents return on equity as measure of profitability, SALESG 
represents growth opportunities, LVG represents leverage and β represents Beta, a measure of risk. 
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5.1.5 Descriptive statistics of CG and Cost of Capital 
As shown in Table 5.5, this subsection presents and discusses the descriptive statistics 
of CG and COC. The summary of descriptive statistics related to the dependent variables is 
prsented in subsection 5.1.5.1. Descriptive statistics of independent variables are discussed in 
Subsection 5.1.5.2, while descriptive statistics related to control variables are discussed in 
Subsection 5.1.5.3.  
5.1.5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables 
As shown in panel A of Table 5.5, this subsection discusses the descriptive 
statistics for dependent variables; namely weighted average cost of capital (COC), cost of 
debt (COD) and cost of equity (COE). COC has an average of 20.9% for the 1760 firm 
year observations. There is a relatively large variation in the COC among Pakistani listed 
firms, as shown by standard deviation of 27.6%. Additionally, COD has a lower average 
than the COC with 19.6% while COE has a relatively high average than both COD and 
COC with 25.5% for the sampled firms over time.  
5.1.5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables  
As shown in panel B of Table 5.4, this subsection discusses the descriptive 
statistics for explanatory variables. A number of observations are listed below. First, the 
minimum of PCGI is 0.00 and the maximum is 97.18, while the mean of index is 54.23 for 
1760 firm year observations. It considered relatively large disparity with respect to CG 
disclosure among Pakistani listed firms, as shown by standard deviation of 33.57. This is 
consistent with the prior CG literature (eg., Henry, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012a) indicating that 
CG standards improves over time. Hence, it may help to decrease the firms’ COC and 
improve the value. Second, the mean of director ownership is 20.88%, with a minimum of 
0% and maximum of 98%. The average of director ownership is relatively high among 
Pakistani listed firms from both developing and devolved countries. For instance, Samaha 
et al. (2012) reports 9% of director ownership in Egyptian firms. Similarly, Henry (2008) 
report 6% of director ownership in Australian firms.  
Third, the mean of institutional ownership is 10.70% with a minimum of 0 and a 
maximum of 95%, revealing that there is a substantial variation in this variable. However 
this average of institutional ownership is consistent with some of the previous studies. For 
instance, Aggarwal et al. (2011) report an average institutional ownership of 8%, 8% and 
9% in Greece, Hong Kong and New Zealand, respectively. On the other hand, Chung and 
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Zhang (2011) report over 50% of institutional ownership among US firms. Fourth, the 
average government ownership is 6.39% with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 95%, 
revealing that the Pakistani government relatively holds a high percentage of firms’ share 
and is expected to have an impact on the firms’ cost of borrowing.  
Fifth, the average of block ownership is 55.45%, with a minimum of 0 and a 
maximum of 99.80%, revealing a higher level of ownership concentration among Pakistani 
listed firms. The high level of block ownership may bring a positive change in firms’ COC. 
Sixth, the foreign ownership has a mean of 9.97%, with a minimum of 0, and a maximum of 
93%, with a standard deviation of 21.62%. This may suggest that the presence of foreign 
ownership can have an important role in decision of firms’ borrowing and on its cost among 
Pakistani listed firms. Seventh, an average of 55% of sampled firms uses the services of big 
audit firms. This average is relatively lower than other emerging countries. For instance, 
Barako et al. (2006) find that the 75% of Kenyan firms are audited by the one of the big 
audited firms. It is expected that firms audited by big audit firms, may decrease the firms’ cost 
of borrowing because of the reputation of audit firms.  
Eighth, the average of board is 8.22%, with a range from 6 to 17. It is in line with 
PCCG requirements that board members should be at least 7. It is also in line with the Lipton 
and Lorsch’s (1992) recommendation that board should have between 8 and 9 members in 
order to be efficient.  Further, this average of board size is in line with some of the prior 
studies. For instance, Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) investigating CG compliance and disclosure in 
Malaysia, reports empirical evidence of board average to be 7.97. Finally, gender as a measure 
of board diversity has an average of 11.40%, representing the female directors’ portion in the 
board among Pakistani listed firms. Although the percentage of women in board is lower as 
compared to men, there presence on the firms’ board may have an impact on firms COC 
among Pakistani listed firms because of diversity in the board room.  
5.1.5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables 
As shown in panel C of Table 5.5, the summary descriptive statistics of control 
variables related to the determinants of the level of disclosure and compliance are 
discussed in this subsection. First, firm size measured by the natural log of firms’ total 
assets range from 12 to 21, with an average of 16. Second, firm profitability measured by 
return on equity, range from a minimum of -21% to a maximum of 22%, with an overall 
average of 14.6%. Third, firm growth measured by sales growth in sampled firm having an 
average of 16%, with a range from -72% to 38%, showing a high level of variation among 
the sampled firms. This variation in firms’ growth can be repercussions of the global 
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economic recession (2008) during the study period (Mangena et al., 2012). Fourth, the 
average value of leverage is 30% which is slightly higher than other developing countries. 
For instance, Al-Nodel and Hussainey (2010) and Barako et al. (2006) find average 
leverage value of 25% and 27% for Saudian and Kenyan firms, respectively. Finally, the 
beta has an average value of .59 shows a lower level of systematic risk which may have a 
positive impact on sampled firms’ COC among the listed firms. 
5.2 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter discussed the descriptive statistics of variables employed in this study. 
The variables are used in examining the nexus among the level of CG disclosure, factor 
influencing the level of CG disclosure and firms’ COC. Particularly, this chapter meant to 
attain three main objectives. First, it presented a detailed discussion of the descriptive 
statistics of the PCGI. Second, it investigated whether the introduction of the 2002 PCCG 
has helped in improving the level of CG compliance and disclosure. Third, this chapter 
presented the descriptive statistics of the CG mechanisms, financial proxies, and control 
variables used in the study. 
 Therefore, this chapter was divided into three sections. The descriptive statistics of 
PCGI are discussed in subsection one. The minimum value of  PCGI is 0.00 and maximum 
is 97.18, while mean of index is 55% for the 1760 firm-year observations over eleven 
years. Further, the reported findings suggest that the mean score of PCGI has improved 
from 20.6% in 2003 to 85.2% in 2013 with an overall increase of 64.6% in eleven years. 
This suggests that the introduction of the PCCG in 2002 has improved CG standards 
among Pakistani listed firms. The second subsection provided a summary of descriptive 
statistics of variables used in factor influencing level of compliance while third subsection 
discussed the descriptive statistics of CG and COC related variables.  
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 CHAPTER 6  
6 EMPRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the OLS assumptions, presents the empirical findings and 
sheds light on the third and fourth main research questions investigated in this thesis. 
Specifically, this chapter seeks to achieve the following three main objectives. First and as 
indicated in chapter four subsections 4.3.1, the OLS assumptions must be met before 
performing the main analysis. Therefore, this chapter discuss a number of statistical tests 
that have been conducted to address the OLS assumptions before discussing empirical 
findings. Second, it presents the findings of the determinants of level of CG compliance 
(the third research question). Thirdly, this chapter presents empirical findings obtained 
from analysis related to impact of CG on Cost of Capital (the fourth main research 
question).  
Therefore, the following section is organised in five sections. Section 6.1 discusses 
the OLS assumptions. Section 6.2 presents and discusses the empirical findings of 
determinants of CG disclosure. Subsection 6.3 presents and discusses the findings of the 
CG and Cost of Capital (COC) while subsection 6.4 summarises the chapter. 
6.1 ORDINARY LEAST SQUARE (OLS) ASSUMPTIONS 
As explained in subsection 4.3.1, the OLS assumptions must be met in order to ensure 
that OLS is the best suitable estimation model to perform analysis. Therefore, this section 
performs a number of procedures and statistical tests to examine the OLS assumptions, 
including stationarity, autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, linearity, multicollinearity, and 
normality.  
Specifically, subsection 6.1.1 discussed Breush-Godfrey test results to detect the issue 
of autocorrelation. Subsection 6.1.2 presents the White general test results to investigate 
for the presence of heteroscedasticity. Subsection 6.1.3 presents Augmented Dickey-fuller 
test to ensure that whether series have unit roots or not. Subsection 6.1.4 presents 
Correlation coefficient, Tolerance statistics (TOL) and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
results to address the issue of multicollinearity. Subsection 6.1.5 examines the normality 
while Subsection 6.1.6 presents a summary of all the above tests.  
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Table 6.1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic: Level of Compliance Model 
Variables Intercept and Trend 
PCGI 
-7.830379*** 
DOWNP 
-9.088151*** 
IOWNP 
-13.2249*** 
GOWNP 
-10.50811*** 
BOWNP 
-9.481476*** 
FOWNP 
-7.696139*** 
BIG4 
-9.509141*** 
BSZ 
-10.73628*** 
BGEN 
-12.41666*** 
BNAT 
-7.253226*** 
LTA 
-10.72749*** 
ROE 
-15.17192*** 
SALESG 
-14.74593*** 
LVG 
-12.74636*** 
CE 
-13.66088*** 
Notes: PCGI denotes the Pakistani Corporate Governance Index, DOWNP represents director ownership, IOWNP 
represents institutional ownership, GOWNP represents government ownership, BOWNP represents block ownership, 
FOWNP represents foreign ownership, BIG4 represents the audit firm size, BSZ represents the size of the board of 
directors, BGEN represents board diversity on the basis of Gender, BNAT represents board diversity on the basis of 
nationality, LTA  represents firm size as log of total assets, ROE represents return on equity as measure of 
profitability, SALESG represents growth opportunities, LVG represents leverage and CE represents capital 
expenditures. The asterisk*** denotes the significant level at 1%, asterisk** denotes the significant level at 5% and 
asterisk* denotes the significant level at 10%. 
6.1.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic 
Before applying any test, the researcher has to make sure weather series are 
stationary25or not (Cizek et al., 2005). Brooks (2007) argue that it is important to know as 
non-stationary data may result in spurious findings; stationarity can affect series properties 
and behaviour. Therefore, the current study performs Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root 
test to check the stationarity of each variable used in the study. The results of ADF test 
regarding the level of compliance model are presented in Table 6.1 while the test results 
regarding CG and COC are presented in Table 6.2. The null hypothesis of the unit root test 
is “the series is non stationary”. As results show in Table 6.1 and 6.2, that all series of all 
variables in both models are stationary as null hypothesis of unit root is rejected at 1% 
level of significance.   
 
 
                                                 
25Brooks (2007, pp.318) defined stationary series as “one with a constant mean, constant variance and 
constant autocovariances for each given lag”. 
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Table 6.2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic: CG and COC Model 
Variables Intercept and Trend 
PCGI -7.830379*** 
DOWNP -9.95537*** 
IOWNP -10.88153*** 
GOWNP -9.48334*** 
BOWNP -9.481476*** 
FOWNP -8.337197*** 
BIG4 -9.509141*** 
BSZ -10.98531*** 
BGEN -12.41666*** 
BNAT -7.253226*** 
LTA -10.72749*** 
ROE -13.49742*** 
SALESG -45.74593*** 
LVG -13.2795*** 
CE -15.70336*** 
β -14.51896*** 
Notes: PCGI denotes the Pakistani Corporate Governance Index, DOWNP represents director ownership, IOWNP 
represents institutional ownership, GOWNP represents government ownership, BOWNP represents block ownership, 
FOWNP represents foreign ownership, BIG4 represents the audit firm size, BSZ represents the size of the board of 
directors, BGEN represents board diversity on the basis of Gender, BNAT represents board diversity on the basis of 
Nationality, LTA  represents firm size as log of total assets, ROE represents return on equity as measure of 
profitability, SALESG represents growth opportunities, LVG represents leverage, CE represents capital expenditures 
and β represents the systematic risk. The asterisk*** denotes the significant level at 1%, asterisk** denotes the 
significant level at 5% and asterisk* denotes the significant level at 10%. 
 
 
6.1.2 Breush-Godfrey test results to detect the issue of autocorrelation  
In addition to stationarity test, this study carried out a number of statistical 
procedures to address the OLS assumptions. Although serial correlation is a problem of 
time series data, the current study performed Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test 
to find out weather data has a problem of autocorrelation. In this regard, Brooks (2007) 
argued that the issue of serial correlation may violate the assumption of OLS as standard 
error estimates can be biased downward with respect to the true standard errors.  
Table 6.3: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: Level of Compliance Model 
F-statistic 572.2646***    Prob. F(2,1724) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 702.2314***    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0000 
The asterisk*** denotes the significant level at 1%, asterisk** denotes the significant level at 5% and asterisk* denotes 
the significant level at 10%. 
 
The results of Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test regarding factor 
influencing level of compliance model are presented in Table 6.3 while the test results 
regarding CG and COC are presented in Table 6.4. The null hypothesis of a Breusch-
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Godfrey Autocorrelation LM test is that series has no serial correlation. The F-statistics 
and Chi-Square values presented in Table 6.3 and 6.4 indicates the presence of 
autocorrelation as the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected at the level of 1% 
in both models.  
 
Table 6.4: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: CG and COC Model 
F-statistic 16.65574***    Prob. F(2,1721) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 33.41949***    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0000 
The asterisk*** denotes the significant level at 1%, asterisk** denotes the significant level at 5% and asterisk* denotes 
the significant level at 10%. 
 
6.1.3 White general test results about the presence of heteroscedasticity 
The results of heteroscedasticity (White) test regarding level of compliance model 
are presented in Table 6.5 while the test results regarding CG and COC model are 
presented in Table 6.6. The null hypothesis of white test is that “model has no 
heteroscedasticity”.  
 
Table 6.5: Heteroscedasticity (White)Test: Level of Compliance  
F-statistic 2.249772***    Prob. F(489,1270) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 816.9327***    Prob. Chi-Square(489) 0.0000 
The asterisk*** denotes the significant level at 1%, asterisk** denotes the significant level at 5% and asterisk* denotes 
the significant level at 10%. 
 
The F-statistics and Chi-Square values presented in Table 6.5 and 6.6 show that the model 
is heteroskedastic as the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity is rejected at the 1% level 
in both, factor influencing level of compliance model as well as in CG and COC models.  
 
Table 6.6: Heteroscedasticity (White)Test: CG and COC  
F-statistic 3.096811    Prob. F(597,1162) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 1080.738    Prob. Chi-Square(597) 0.0000 
The asterisk*** denotes the significant level at 1%, asterisk** denotes the significant level at 5% and asterisk* denotes 
the significant level at 10%. 
 
6.1.4 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance statistics test results 
Multicollinearity is another problem of data which needs to be addressed before 
using OLS as the main analysis. Therefore, it has been tested whether the independent 
variables are highly correlated or not. 
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 Table 6.7: VIF and TOL tests of Multicollinearity: Level of Compliance Model 
Variable VIF TOL 
DOWNP  1.725345 0.579594 
IOWNP  1.151600 0.868357 
GOWNP  1.294599 0.772440 
BOWNP  1.169994 0.854705 
FOWNP  1.474339 0.678270 
BIG4  1.579938 0.568525 
BSZ  1.309453 0.763735 
BGEN  1.229473 0.813357 
BNAT  1.692271 0.590922 
LTA  1.981672 0.504624 
ROE  1.110816 0.900239 
SALESG  1.134062 0.881786 
LVG  1.287387 0.776767 
CE  1.702091 0.587513 
Notes: PCGI denotes the Pakistani Corporate Governance Index, DOWNP represents director ownership, IOWNP 
represents institutional ownership, GOWNP represents government ownership, BOWNP represents block ownership, 
FOWNP represents foreign ownership, BIG4 represents the audit firm size, BSZ represents the size of the board of 
directors, BGEN represents board diversity on the basis of Gender, BNAT represents board diversity on the basis of 
Nationality, LTA  represents firm size as log of total assets, ROE represents return on equity as measure of 
profitability, SALESG represents growth opportunities, LVG represents leverage and CE represents capital 
expenditures. The asterisk*** denotes the significant level at 1%, asterisk** denotes the significant level at 5% and 
asterisk* denotes the significant level at 10%. 
 
There are a number of statistical procedures which have been suggested and used in 
the literature; namely Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), Tolerance statistics (TOL), 
Spearman’s non-parametric coefficient and Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients.  
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Table 6.8: VIF and TOL tests of Multicollinearity: CG and COC Model 
Variable VIF TOL 
PCGI 2.173552 0.460076 
DOWNP 1.865372 0.536086 
IOWNP 1.705482 0.586345 
GOWNP 1.88512 0.53047 
BOWNP 2.250901 0.444267 
FOWNP 2.134915 0.468403 
BIG4 1.967211 0.508334 
BSZ 1.56979 0.637028 
BGEN 1.295119 0.77213 
BNAT 1.841184 0.543129 
LTA 3.141247 0.318345 
ROE 1.2339 0.810438 
SALESG 1.450928 0.689214 
LVG 1.485586 0.673135 
CE 2.240649 0.446299 
β 1.471602 0.679532 
Notes: PCGI denotes the Pakistani Corporate Governance Index, DOWNP represents director ownership, IOWNP 
represents institutional ownership, GOWNP represents government ownership, BOWNP represents block ownership, 
FOWNP represents foreign ownership, BIG4 represents the audit firm size, BSZ represents the size of the board of 
directors, BGEN represents board diversity on the basis of Gender, BNAT represents board diversity on the basis of 
Nationality, LTA  represents firm size as log of total assets, ROE represents return on equity as measure of 
profitability, SALESG represents growth opportunities, LVG represents leverage, CE represents capital expenditures 
and β represents the systematic risk. The asterisk*** denotes the significant level at 1%, asterisk** denotes the 
significant level at 5% and asterisk* denotes the significant level at 10%. 
 
Correlation matrix, VIF and TOL tests have been used in this study to investigate 
that either variables have a problem of multicollinearity. It can be a serious problem if the 
correlation coefficient between two variables is greater than 80%, VIF exceeds ten and 
TOL is near to zero (Gujrati, 2003). For determinants of factors model, Table 6.7 shows 
that the minimum value of TOL is .50 and maximum value of VIF is 1.98, suggesting no 
problem of multicollinearity among variables. Similarly, Table 6.9 indicating the highest 
correlation coefficient between LTA and CE is .604, suggesting no serious problem of 
multicollinearity. Hence, there is no major violation of the OLS assumptions due to 
multicollinearity.  
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Table 6.9: Correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables: Level of Compliance Model  
  PCGI DOWNP IOWNP GOWNP BOWNP FOWNP BIG4 BSZ BGEN BNAT LTA ROE SALESG LVG CE 
PCGI 1               
DOWNP -0.007 1              
IOWNP 0.023 -.198** 1             
GOWNP 0.017 -.197** 0.041 1            
BOWNP .067** .110** -0.021 -.157** 1           
FOWNP -0.003 -.289** 0.007 -0.036 .127** 1          
BIG4 .062** -.370** .049* .146** -0.029 .254** 1         
BSZ 0.023 -.251** .122** .201** -.106** -0.015 .279** 1        
BGEN 0.001 .289** -.094** -.122** .050* -.092** -.152** -.097** 1       
BNAT 0.017 -.440** .101** -0.038 .122** .428** .390** .121** -.185** 1      
LTA .161** -0.046 .056* .074** 0 -.085** .054* .083** -.130** .066** 1     
ROE -.101** .122** 0.025 -0.016 -0.007 0.006 -.114** -.061** -0.019 -.074** -.195** 1    
SALESG 0.031 .058* -0.016 -0.013 0.014 -0.012 -0.028 -0.001 0.01 -0.007 .101** .077** 1   
LVG 0.017 .228** 0.001 -.131** .057* -.207** -.203** -.181** .057* -.133** -0.037 -.050* 0.015 1  
CE -0.003 .066** .048* .063** -0.041 -.100** 0.003 .089** -.082** 0.026 .604** -.093** .090** .056* 1 
Notes: PCGI denotes the Pakistani Corporate Governance Index, DOWNP represents director ownership, IOWNP represents institutional ownership, GOWNP represents government ownership, BOWNP represents 
block ownership, FOWNP represents foreign ownership, BIG4 represents the audit firm size, BSZ represents the size of the board of directors, BGEN represents board diversity on the basis of Gender, BNAT represents 
board diversity on the basis of Nationality, LTA  represents firm size as log of total assets, ROE represents return on equity as measure of profitability, SALESG represents growth opportunities, LVG represents 
leverage and CE represents capital expenditures. The asterisk*** denotes the significant level at 1%, asterisk** denotes the significant level at 5% and asterisk* denotes the significant level at 10%. 
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Table 6.10: Correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables: CG and COC Model  
  COC PCGI 
DOWN
P 
IOWN
P 
GOWN
P 
BOWN
P 
FOWN
P BIG4 BSZ 
BGE
N BNAT LTA ROE SALESG LVG β 
COC 1.000                               
PCGI -0.13** 1.000                             
DOWNP -0.015 -0.010 1.000                           
IOWNP -0.013 0.027 -0.163** 1.000                         
GOWNP 0.015 0.011 -0.194** 0.277** 1.000                       
BOWNP -0.08** -0.08** -0.027 0.531** 0.336** 1.000                     
FOWNP 0.079 -0.012 -0.265** 0.254** 0.264** 0.464** 1.000                   
BIG4 0.046 0.062** -0.373** 0.092* 0.149** 0.066 0.248** 1.000                 
BSZ 0.003 0.025 -0.251** 0.232** 0.184** 0.087** -0.006 0.278** 1.000               
BGEN -0.009 0.001 0.275** -0.018 -0.077 0.081* -0.022 -0.15** -0.09** 1.000             
BNAT 0.028 0.017 -0.435** 0.165** -0.002 0.169** 0.408** 0.390** 0.122* -0.18** 1.000           
LTA -0.120** 0.161** -0.036 0.108* 0.071** 0.076 -0.054 0.054* 0.086** -0.13** 0.066** 1.000         
ROE -0.039 -0.048* 0.171** 0.006 -0.076** 0.012 -0.083 -0.18** -0.07** 0.06** -0.139** -0.115** 1.000       
SALESG -0.042 0.031 0.051** -0.017 -0.017 -0.023 -0.033 -0.028 -0.002 0.010 -0.007 0.101** -0.004 1.000     
LVG -0.153** -0.015 0.200** -0.034 -0.089** -0.014 -0.139** -0.18** -0.14** 0.09** -0.128** -0.091** 0.129** -0.003 1.000   
β 0.320** 0.072* -0.067* -0.028 -0.001 0.010 -0.024 0.061* 0.014 0.005 0.033 0.089** 0.019 -0.021 -0.035 1.000 
Notes: PCGI denotes the Pakistani Corporate Governance Index, DOWNP represents director ownership, IOWNP represents institutional ownership, GOWNP represents government ownership, BOWNP represents 
block ownership, FOWNP represents foreign ownership, BIG4 represents the audit firm size, BSZ represents the size of the board of directors, BGEN represents board diversity on the basis of Gender, BNAT 
represents board diversity on the basis of Nationality, LTA  represents firm size as log of total assets, ROE represents return on equity as measure of profitability, SALESG represents growth opportunities, LVG 
represents leverage, CE represents capital expenditures and β represents the systematic risk. The asterisk*** denotes the significant level at 1%, asterisk** denotes the significant level at 5% and asterisk* denotes the 
significant level at 10%. 
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For CG and COC, Table 6.8 shows that the minimum value of TOL is .318 and 
maximum value of VIF is 3.141, suggesting no problem of multicollinearity among the 
variables. Similarly, Table 6.10 shows that the highest correlation coefficient between 
IOWNP and BOWNP is .531, suggesting no serious problem of multicollinearity. Hence, 
there is no major violation of the OLS assumptions due to multicollinearity.  
6.1.5 Normality Test 
Finally, it has been suggested that the data has to be normal distributed in order to 
apply the OLS.  Therefore, the current study uses skewness and kurtosis statistics to test the 
normality assumption. In this regard, the critical values for accepting skewness and kurtosis 
statistics for normal data are three and zero, respectively (Gujarati, 2003). The statistics 
(results are not reported here) show that the variables depart from the normal distribution in 
some cases and therefore, the study accepts the null hypothesis of non-normality of data.  
6.1.6 Summary  
The current study has attempted to test the OLS assumptions before using it in 
regression analysis. As shown above, data is non stationary, have serial correlation and no 
problem of multicollinearity. However, the result shows that data have a problem of non-
normality and heteroscedasticity.  In this regard, current study has attempted to minimise 
non-normalities in the variables by using different kinds of transformations such as square 
root, rank and natural log. The distributions of transformed variables could not generate good 
skewness and kurtosis statistics, showing that the actual variables are better normally 
distributed than the transformed variables.  
As the behaviour of OLS has been well researched in multiple circumstances, Brooks 
(2007) argue that it is better to stick with the OLS estimation rather than using another method 
that does not require a normality assumption. Further, he indicates that various forms of 
heteroscedasticity may lead to non-normality in financial data. It can be argued that the effect 
of non-normality is expected to be less severe as the White test has been used in the current 
study to correct for heteroscedasticity. In addition to White test, Brooks (2007) also suggest 
that in case of a sufficiently large sample as is being used in this study, the violation of 
normality assumption is expected to be virtually inconsequential. Therefore, after employing 
all the above tests and procedures, it is concluded that the OLS is the appropriate statistical 
estimation to perform the study’s main analyses.  
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6.2 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: DETERMINANTS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE  
Following the discussion of the descriptive statistical summaries and Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) assumptions in Chapter 5, this subsection presents the findings of CG 
compliance and disclosure for Pakistani listed firms. In particular, Table 6.12 reports the 
OLS results. The F-Stat is statistically significant at 1% level for ownership, board 
characteristics and control variables. This means that the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between these variables and the PCGI is rejected. The adjusted R2 is 0.49, 
indicating that 49% of variability in the PCGI is jointly explained by these variables. 
Overall, the analysis of the explanatory variables suggests that, board size, government, 
institutional, foreign and block ownership have significant relationships with the PCGI. In 
contrast, director ownership, audit firm size, gender and nationality diversity in the board 
have no statistical significance with the PCGI.  
Table 6.11 presents the summary of hypotheses on the factors that influence the level 
of CG compliance.  Table 6.12 presents the findings of multivariate regression showing the 
overall impact of nine independent variables including the five ownership structures 
investigated in the study and four audit firms/board characteristics on PCGI. Generally, the 
findings of a positive and significant relationship between institutional, government and 
foreign ownership with CG compliance and disclosure are in line with formulated 
hypotheses, while a negative nexus between board size and block ownership with CG 
compliance and disclosure are also consistent with formulated hypotheses and prior 
empirical literature. In contrast, this study report that audit firm size and board diversity on 
the basis of gender with PCGI show no significant relationship.  
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6.2.1 Empirical Findings of Explanatory Variables 
In this subsection, the empirical findings of explanatory variables including 
ownership variables and audit/board characteristics are discussed in relation with the 
formulated hypotheses and prior CG literature.   
6.2.1.1 Empirical Findings of Ownership Variables  
Panel A of Table 6.12 presents the findings of the determinants of CG disclosure. 
First, the coefficient on director ownership is positive and statistically insignificant in 
relation to level of CG compliance and disclosure. From agency theory viewpoint, 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) argue that the board of directors are expected to maximise 
their wealth using insider information merely for self-serving interest, and not essentially 
for the interests of the firm. This results in poor CG practices and low level of CG 
compliance and disclosure. On the other hand, stewardship theory suggests that the board 
of directors’ interests are in line with external shareholders (Davis et al., 1997). Thus, 
Samaha et al. (2012) suggests that the board of directors are expected to improve CG 
standards for the better competitive position of their firms.  
 
Table 6.11:  Summary of hypothesis and Findings: Factors Influencing level of  Compliance 
Dependent Variable: Pakistani Corporate Governance Index (PCGI) 
CG mechanisms 
H. No H. Sign Sign of 
Result 
Statistical 
Significance 
of Result 
Conclusion (H.) 
Director ownership 1 - + Insignificant Do not reject 
Institutional ownership 2 + + 
Significant 
(1%) Reject 
Government ownership 3 + + 
Significant      
(1%) Reject 
Block ownership 4 - - 
Significant 
(1%) Reject 
Foreign ownership 5 + + Significant (1%) Reject 
Audit firm size 6 + + Insignificant Do not reject 
Board size 7 
 
+/- 
 
- 
 
Significant 
(5%) Reject 
Board diversity on the basis 
of gender 8 + - Insignificant Do not reject 
Board diversity on the basis 
of nationality 9 + + Insignificant Do not reject 
Note: Column 1 presents the nine variables that are represented the nine tested hypotheses. Columns 2 to 6 
present information related to hypotheses one to nine with regard to the PCGI. H stands for hypothesis.  
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Table 6.12: The OLS regression findings of CG Compliance Determinants 
Dependent Variable: PCGI  
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
Panel A: CG variables  
DOWNP - 0.035 0.028 1.252 
IOWNP + 0.095*** 0.023 4.099 
GOWNP + 0.298*** 0.040 7.484 
BOWNP - -0.02*** 0.006 -3.230 
FOWNP + 0.075*** 0.023 3.276 
BIG4 + 0.857 0.952 0.900 
BSZ + -0.463** 0.207 -2.237 
BGEN  + -0.588 1.290 -0.456 
BNAT + 0.056 0.815 0.068 
Panel B: Control  variables   
LTA   1.523*** 0.266 5.716 
ROE   -3.59*** 1.298 -2.767 
SALESG   0.865 1.632 0.530 
LVG   0.009 0.013 0.695 
CE   0.000*** 0.000 -3.305 
CEMENT   6.350*** 1.966 3.230 
CHEMICAL   3.352 2.114 1.585 
ELECTRICITY   8.719** 3.567 2.444 
FOOD   -4.86*** 1.032 -4.712 
HOUSHOLD   4.751** 2.063 2.302 
MISC   -8.37*** 0.656 -12.751 
OIL___GAS   -8.19*** 1.110 -7.379 
PHARMA   -9.448** 3.702 -2.552 
TEXTILE   -4.224** 2.064 -2.046 
Y_02_DUM   2.525*** 0.713 3.544 
Y_03_DUM   10.021*** 0.548 18.288 
Y_04_DUM   18.868*** 0.766 24.639 
Y_05_DUM   26.051*** 0.487 53.537 
Y_06_DUM   31.951*** 0.685 46.645 
Y_07_DUM   45.275*** 0.589 76.805 
Y_08_DUM   51.421*** 0.587 87.622 
Y_09_DUM   55.255*** 0.706 78.276 
Y_10_DUM   61.663*** 0.585 105.440 
Y_11_DUM   63.393*** 0.519 122.045 
Constant   -0.891 5.058 -0.176 
Adjusted R-square 0.486 Sample: 2003 2013  
F-statistic 51.412 Cross-sections included: 160  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 Total panel (balanced) observations: 1760  
Notes: Variables are defined as follows. Pakistani Corporate Governance Index (PCGI), director ownership 
(DOWNP), institutional ownership (IOWNP), government ownership (GOWNP), block ownership (BOWNP), 
foreign ownership (FOWNP), audit firm size (BIG4), size of the board of directors (BSZ), board diversity on the 
basis of Gender (BGEN), board diversity on the basis of Nationality (NTL), firm size as log of total assets (LTA), 
profitability (ROE), growth opportunities (SALESG), leverage (LVG) and capital expenditures (CE). Parameter 
estimates are obtained by OLS estimation (Panel Least Squares). Year 2003 and AUTO industry has been 
excluded from the analysis in order to avoid dummy variable trap.  The asterisks *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 
5% and 1% level of significance respectively.  
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Second, the coefficient on institutional ownership is positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level in relation to level of CG compliance and disclosure. This finding 
shows that Pakistani firms with higher level of institutional ownerships are likely to 
comply with more CG standards than those with less or no institutional ownership. From 
agency theory viewpoint, Aggarwal et al. (2011) suggests that the presence of institutional 
ownership ensures some degree of accountability and this potentially influence firms to 
adopt better CG practices, either directly by influencing managements by using their 
voting rights or indirectly by their decisions to buy or threaten to sell their shares. 
Similarly, this finding is consistent with the prediction that institutional investors demand 
for high level of CG compliance and disclosure in order to spend less time in monitoring 
managers (Barako et al. 2006a). Additionally, this positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and level of CG compliance is consistent with the expectation that 
institutional investors are less likely to invest in firms with lower level of CG compliance 
and disclosure due to high monitoring cost (Bushee et al., 2010). This finding of positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and level of CG compliance and disclosure is 
consistent with CG literature (Barako et al., 2006a; Laidroo, 2009; Bushee et al., 2010; 
Chung and Zhang, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a).  
Third, the coefficient on government ownership is positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level, suggesting that there is a positive relationship between the 
government ownership and level of CG compliance and disclosure. This finding shows that 
Pakistani firms with higher level of government ownerships are likely to comply with more 
CG regulations than those firms with less or no government ownership. The agency theory 
literature suggests that the firms with government ownership are expected to disclose more 
CG information since there is less divergence between shareholders and government 
interest. Further, this is consistent with the view that the government being a shareholder 
considers itself accountable to society and thus, is expected to put pressure on firms to 
disclose more CG information (Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). This positive effect of 
government ownership suggests that the government ownership serves as an alternative 
CG mechanism which motivates firms to disclose more CG information. Empirically, this 
finding is in line with the CG literature of developing countries. For instance, Conyon and 
He (2011) and Ntim et al. (2012a) report positive and significant relationship between 
government ownership and level of CG compliance and disclosure in China and South 
Africa, respectively.  
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Fourth, unlike the institutional and government ownerships, the coefficient between 
block ownership and firm-level of CG compliance is negative and statistically significant 
at 1% level. This finding shows that Pakistani firms with higher level of block ownerships 
are expected to have less compliance with CG provisions than those with lower block 
ownership. This negative association between CG disclosure level and block ownership is 
consistent with theoretical prediction.  In this regard, block shareholders may influence the 
management to disclose less CG information as their interest may not necessarily align 
with minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Laidroo, 2009). 
This issue is more evident in the emerging markets such as Pakistan due to the weak legal 
system in protecting minority shareholders. In this regard, the Companies ordinance (1984, 
XL VII) states that “the minimum threshold for seeking a remedy from the court against 
mismanagement and oppression requires that at least twenty percent of the shareholders 
initiate a compliant. Shareholders representing at least ten percent but less than twenty 
percent of the company’s shares can apply to the SECP to appoint an inspector to 
investigate the company’s affairs. Because neither the Companies ordinance nor the Code 
recognizes shareholders who represent less than ten percent of the company’s share (the 
minority shareholder), no analogous provision exists for these shareholders”. Similarly, 
Allegrini and Greco (2013) argued that in the absence of strong external CG mechanisms, 
firms’ management tend to work for the interest of large shareholders to the detriment of 
minority shareholders.  
Further, this finding supports the expectation that block holders do not want to 
disclose more CG information as it may affect their ability to expropriate minority 
shareholders. This is expected to be the case in emerging countries where the conflict of 
interest is likely to be between minority shareholders and block holders rather than 
between shareholders and managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Aleves, 2012). 
Empirically, this finding is consistent with several studies on emerging economies 
(Alsaeed, 2006; Laidro, 2009; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011).  For instance, Alsaeed (2006) 
report the level of CG compliance and block ownership are negatively associated in Saudi 
Arabian firms.  
Finally, the coefficient on foreign ownership is positive and statistically significant at 
1% level in relation to CG compliance and disclosure. This finding shows that Pakistani 
firms with higher level of foreign investors are likely to provide additional CG information 
than those with less or with no foreign investors. Theoretically, this positive relationship 
between foreign ownership and firm-level of CG compliance and disclosure is consistent 
with information asymmetry and imperfect information issues. Due to language and 
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distance obstacles, foreign investors may require more disclosures in order to reduce 
asymmetric information. This in turn motivates firms to comply with CG standards that 
improves transparency and makes it attractive for foreign investors (Huafang and Jianguo, 
2007). This is consistent with the viewpoint that foreign investors usually prefer not to 
invest in the countries with poor CG disclosure requirements (Leuz et al., 2010).  
Empirically, the finding of this positive relationship between foreign ownership and firm-
level of CG disclosure is consistent with prior emerging market literature (e.g., Barako et 
al., 2006; Manegena and Tauringana, 2007). 
 
6.2.1.2 Empirical Findings of audit firm/board characteristics  
In addition to ownership variables, the current study investigates the impact of audit 
firm size and board characteristics, such as board size and board diversity on the level of 
compliance and disclosure among Pakistani listed firms.  
First, the coefficient on audit firm size is positive but statistically insignificant, 
indicating that there is no significant relationship between audit firm size and firm-level of 
CG compliance and disclosure. From agency theory and stakeholder theory perspective, 
external auditors can influence the quality and level of CG disclosure (Barako et al., 2006). 
This influential power of external auditors may depend on audit firm’s characteristics (e.g., 
fee, tenure and size). It has been reported that large audit firms (big four) have better 
auditing standards (Alsaeed, 2006), as such firms are expected to have highly trained, 
qualified, and experienced auditors (Barako et al., 2006). However, in Pakistani context, 
the finding shows no significant relationship between audit firm size and level of CG 
compliance and disclosure. This can be due to the other factors that may negate auditors 
influence. For example, ownership concentration dominated by family shareholding and 
informal rules that impact on auditing firms making them less influential in getting  the CG 
standards approved in the Pakistani listed firms. Particularly, managers may be 
significantly influenced by these informal rules; local customs, tribalism and family are 
more priority than formal rules and CG mechanism (Metcalfe, 2007; Boytsun et al., 2011). 
Empirically, this finding is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et al., 
2006a; Aly et al., 2010).  
Second, the coefficient on board size is negative and statistically significant at 5% 
level. This indicates that small boards tend to increase the level of CG compliance and 
disclosure more than larger boards for Pakistani firms. Theoretically, Jensen (1993) argues 
that larger board is less effective than smaller board in mitigating agency conflicts. For 
instance, Yermack (1996) suggests that a large number of directors can lead to poor co-
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ordination and communication among directors, which may allow a Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) to dominate the board which can adversely affect the accountability of 
management and directors (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Arguably, this may 
weaken the power of the board to monitor managers and can result in a negative impact on 
CG disclosure. Therefore, boards with small number of members are likely to impact 
positively on firms’ CG compliance and disclosure due to better co-ordination and 
communication among directors than large boards (Yermack, 1996). Empirically, this 
finding is in contrast to some other studies that indicate positive association (Kent and 
Stewart, 2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ntim et al; 2012a; Allegrini and Greco, 2013), but 
it is consistent with other studies (e.g., Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 
2006). However, this negative relationship in Pakistani context may be due to the large size 
of board (minimum of seven members are required by 2002 PCCG) imposed by PCCG 
which may not suite every firm.  
Finally, the gender and nationality diversity in board indicate no significant 
association with CG compliance level. These results indicate that the presence of female 
and foreign directors on firms’ board do not impact on Pakistani listed firms to offer more 
CG information. Theoretically, these findings are contrary to the prediction that having 
directors with distinctive values due to gender and cultural differences may improve level 
of CG disclosure. However, these results are in line with empirical findings by Adelopo 
(2011) that foreign directors among Nigerian firms do not influence boards to increase CG 
compliance and disclosure.  
6.2.2 Empirical Findings of Control Variables 
A number of control variables have been included in the analysis to minimize the 
impact of omitted variables problem that could lead to potential endogeneity. Following 
the CG literature (e.g., Upadhyay et al., 2014; Ntim et al., 2014; Mangena et al., 2012), 
firm size (LTA), profitability (ROE), firm growth (SALESG), leverage (LVG) and capital 
expenditure to total assets (CETA) were included as control variables in addition to 
industries and year dummies. Panel B of Table 6.12 presents the empirical findings of 
these variables.  
First, the coefficient on size and capital expenditure is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that larger firms are likely to disclose more CG 
information than medium or smaller Pakistani listed firms.  This finding is consistent with 
prior CG literature (e.g., Allegerini and Greco, 2013; Samaha et al., 2012; Elzahar and 
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Hussainey, 2012). Similarly, firms with higher capital expenditures disclose more CG 
information than firms with lower or no capital expenditures. 
Second, the results reported in Table 6.12 shows statistically insignificant relationship 
between firm growth and leverage with firm level CG compliance and disclosure. The 
coefficient on sales growth is positive but insignificant, suggesting that firms with more 
growth and investment opportunities do not improve the CG standards. This finding is in line 
with prior CG literature (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a). Similarly, the coefficient on leverage is 
positive, but statistically insignificant with PCGI, indicating that the level of firms’ leverage 
have no impact on level of CG compliance and disclosure. This insignificant relationship is 
consistent with previous CG literature (e.g., Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; 
Allegrini and Greco, 2013).  
Third, Panel B of Table 6.12 shows a significant and negative relationship between 
firms’ profitability and level of CG compliance and disclosure. This may be due to the 
possibility that profitable firms may not provide additional information because less 
information permits them to avoid some legal costs (e.g., Tax) and protect their 
competitiveness (Prencipe, 2004; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007).  
Finally, as shown in Panel B of Table 6.12, all year dummies and most of the 
industries dummies are statistically significant with the level of compliance and disclosure. In 
particular, all year dummies have a positive and statistically significant relationship at 1% level 
with compliance and disclosure. This finding is in line with descriptive statistics indicated in 
chapter 5 and CG literature (Chalevas, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a), which find that the level of 
compliance and disclosure with CG standards improves over time. On the other hand, the 
relationship between level of compliance and CG standards differs across the industries. For 
instance, this it is positive and significant in chemical, electricity and household industries 
while negative and significant in food, misc, oil and gas, pharmaceutical and textile industries. 
However, this relationship is positive but insignificant in chemical industry. These findings are 
also consistent with prior CG literature (e.g., Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a) that the level of compliance and disclosure with CG 
standards differ across the industries.  
 
6.3 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND COST OF CAPITAL  
This subsection presents and discusses the findings of ownership structures, 
board/audit characteristics and their impact on Cost of Capital (COC). The study aims to 
answer its fourth main research question which is whether better governed firms (high 
level of compliance and disclosure with CG standards) tend to have lower COC than those 
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of poorly governed counterparts (lower level of compliance and disclosure with CG 
standards).  The Weighted Average Cost of Capital (COC) is used as dependent variable in 
this study. The nine independent variables include the researcher self-constructed Pakistani 
Corporate Governance Index (PCGI) as a proxy of CG standards,  five ownership 
structures and three audit firms/board characteristics.  
Table 6.13 presents the summary of hypotheses related to the regression analysis of 
the relationship between CG standards and COC.  The results of multivariate regression 
showing the overall impact of nine independent variables including PCGI, five ownership 
structures and three audit firms/board characteristics on firms’ COC are presented in Table 
6.14. Generally, the findings of a negative and significant relationship between PCGI and 
block ownership with firms’ COC are in line with formulated hypotheses while a positive 
and significant relationship between director ownership and firms’ COC is consistent with 
the hypotheses. Contrary to the formulated hypotheses, foreign ownership and board 
gender diversity are positively associated with firm-level COC. Additionally, this study 
report no significant nexus between Institutional ownership, government ownership, audit 
firm size and board size with COC. 
Table 6.14 presents the findings of multivariate regression showing the overall 
impact of nine independent variables including PCGI, five ownership structures and three 
audit firms/board characteristics on firms’ COC. The reported F-statistic is 60.19 and is 
statistically significant at 1% level suggesting that the model is appropriate and that all the 
parameters are jointly significant. The adjusted R-square is 0.54 suggesting that about 54% 
of variability in the firms’ COC is explained by these nine CG variables.  
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6.3.1 Empirical Findings of Explanatory Variables 
Panel A of Table 6.14 presents the empirical findings of explanatory variables 
including PCGI, ownership variables and audit/board characteristics in relation to firms’ 
COC among Pakistani listed firms. In this subsection, these findings are discussed in 
relation with the formulated hypotheses and prior CG literature.   
6.3.1.1 Empirical Findings of PCGI  
In this study, the impact of the level of CG compliance and its relationship with 
COC for Pakistani listed firms has been investigated. As reported in Panel A of Table 6.14, 
the coefficient on PCGI is negative and statistically significant at 5% level, suggesting that 
firms with high level of CG standards have a lower COC. Despite limited number of studies 
on the relationship between CG and COC, prior studies provide empirical evidence of 
negative relationship between firm-level CG and firms’ COC (e.g., Blom and Schauten, 
2008; Chen et al., 2009; Bozec and Bozec, 2011), which is consistent with the finding of 
this study. For instance, Bozec and Bozec (2011) report empirical evidence that Canadian 
firms Cost of Debt (COD) and Cost of Equity (COE) decreases as the quality of CG 
practices increases.  
 Table 6.13:   Summary of hypothesis and Findings: Corporate Governance and Cost of Capital  
Dependent Variable: Cost of Capital  
CG mechanisms 
H. 
No 
H. 
Sign 
Sign of 
Result 
Statistical 
Significance of 
Result 
Conclusion (H.) 
PCGI 1 - - Significant (5%) Reject 
Director ownership 2 + + Significant (5%) Reject 
Institutional ownership 3 - + Insignificant Do not reject 
Government ownership 4 - + Insignificant Do not reject 
Block ownership 5 +/- - Significant (1%) Reject 
Foreign ownership 6 - + Significant (1%) Reject 
Audit firm size 7 - - Insignificant Do not reject 
Board size 8 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
Insignificant Do not reject 
Board diversity on the basis 
of gender 9 - + Significant (5%) Reject 
Note: Column 1 presents the nine variables that are represented the ten tested hypotheses. Columns 3 to 6 present 
information relating to hypotheses one to nine with regard to the Pakistani corporate governance index.  
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Table 6.14: The OLS regression of CG and COC 
Dependent Variable: COC 
Independent Variables Expected Sign Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
  Panel A: CG variables  
PCGI - -0.00026** 0.000108 -2.36741 
DOWNP + 0.000448** 0.000189 2.378413 
IOWNP - 0.00011 0.000113 0.96854 
GOWNP - 0.000242 0.000219 1.10389 
BOWNP +/- -0.00017*** 4.87E-05 -3.3948 
FOWNP - 0.000782*** 0.000161 4.871608 
BIG4 - -0.00039 0.00646 -0.0599 
BSZ - 0.002998 0.001825 1.642575 
BGEN  - 0.011861** 0.005159 2.29886 
Panel B: Control variables  
LTA   -0.01866*** 0.004099 -4.5532 
ROE   -0.00052* 0.000284 -1.83358 
SALESG   -0.00168 0.005707 -0.29502 
LVG   -0.0007*** 0.000166 -4.23521 
Β   0.152732** 0.06078 2.512878 
CEMENT   0.010105 0.016853 0.599615 
CHEMICAL   0.004724 0.012783 0.369522 
ELECTRICITY   0.024752** 0.010845 2.282339 
FOOD   0.033699** 0.013581 2.481303 
HOUSHOLD   0.039404** 0.015635 2.520262 
MISC   0.016622 0.013944 1.192062 
OIL___GAS   0.037005** 0.014953 2.474791 
PHARMA   -0.01242 0.019023 -0.65297 
TEXTILE   0.024341* 0.012686 1.918665 
Y_02_DUM   0.050828*** 0.002613 19.45041 
Y_03_DUM   -0.10767*** 0.009801 -10.9856 
Y_04_DUM   -0.09469*** 0.010857 -8.72147 
Y_05_DUM   -0.18459*** 0.0135 -13.6736 
Y_06_DUM   -0.13895*** 0.012447 -11.1632 
Y_07_DUM   -0.32238*** 0.013284 -24.2681 
Y_08_DUM   0.067629*** 0.011717 5.772046 
Y_09_DUM   -0.12128*** 0.006191 -19.5911 
Y_10_DUM   -0.266*** 0.007264 -36.6202 
Y_11_DUM   -0.05064*** 0.007647 -6.62228 
Constant   0.493347*** 0.037561 13.13452 
Adjusted R-square   0.540825 Sample: 2003 2013 
F-statistic   60.19378 Cross-sections included: 160 
Prob(F-statistic)   0.00000 Total panel (balanced) observations: 1760 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows. Cost of Capital (COC), Pakistani Corporate Governance Index (PCGI), 
director ownership (DOWNP), institutional ownership (IOWNP), government ownership (GOWNP), block ownership 
(BOWNP), foreign ownership (FOWNP), audit firm size (BIG4), size of the board of directors (BSZ), board diversity 
on the basis of Gender (BGEN), firm size as log of total assets (LTA), profitability (ROE), growth opportunities 
(SALESG), leverage (LVG) and systematic risk (β). Parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation (Panel 
Least Squares). Year 2003 and AUTO industry has been excluded from the analysis in order to avoid dummy 
variable trap.  The asterisks *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
 
6.3.1.2 Empirical Findings of ownership variables 
Panel A of Table 6.14 presents the findings of the influence of ownership variables 
on firms’ COC.  First, the coefficient on director ownership is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that firms with high level of director ownership have a higher COC. 
Theoretically, this positive relationship between director ownership and COC is consistent 
with the prediction of agency theory. It has been argued that a higher level of director 
159 
 
ownership may worsen agency problems (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). In similar vein, it has 
been suggested that higher director shareholdings may make a firm more vulnerable to 
collusion between directors and firm management (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Konijin 
et al., 2011). In this regard, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) argue that one of the three 
ways by which multiple blockholders can influence firm value is that, they can use their 
power to form a coalition to expropriate value at the expense of other shareholders. 
Empirically, the relationship between director ownership and COC has not been 
documented yet in the best of researcher’s knowledge. However, the impact of director 
ownership has been investigated on firm performance and negative relationship has been 
reported in literature (see Basu, et al., 2016) which is consistent to the findings of this 
study.  
Second, the coefficient on institutional ownership on COC is positive and 
statistically insignificant, meaning that the percentage of institutional ownership has no 
explanatory power in explaining the variation in firm level COC. This is contrary to the 
formulated hypothesis in this study which postulates that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between institutional ownership and COC. Theoretically, the relationship 
between institutional ownership and COC being negative can be good as monitoring can be 
beneficial in reducing the conflicts of interest between investors and directors (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Solomon, 2010). However, the current study does not lend empirical 
support to the CG literature as studies (e.g., Bhoraj and Sengupta, 2003; Piot and 
Missonier-Piera, 2009) document a negative relationship between institutional ownership 
and firm level COC.  
Third, the coefficient on government ownership is positive and statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that there is no statistically significant association between the 
government ownership and firms’ COC. This finding shows that the level of government 
ownership has no explanatory power in explaining the variation in firm level COC. 
Theoretically, this positive relationship between COC and government ownership is in line 
with the prediction of agency theory.  It is argued that higher government ownership may 
cause agency problem where government ownership may lead to intervention in firms’ 
operations which may result in poor CG practices (Konijn et al., 2011). For instance, 
government may appoint CEO and directors regardless of experience and qualification 
(Cornett et al., 2010; Tsamenyi et al., 2007).  
Fourth, unlike the institutional and government ownership, the coefficient on block 
ownership is statistically significant at 1% and negative proposing that there is relationship 
between the block ownership and firm-level COC. This shows that Pakistani firms with 
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higher level of block ownership have lower COC than those firms with lower percentage of 
block ownership. This is consistent with the prediction of agency theory in which the 
dominance of majority shareholders in publically traded firms demonstrates that minority 
shareholders have the risk of expropriation. Bozec et al. (2014) argues that minority 
shareholders can accept such risk as long as they are compensated. Empirically, this 
finding is in line with previous literature (e.g., Pham et al., 2007) that provides empirical 
evidence of negative relationship between ownership concentrations on firm-level 
weighted average COC. 
Finally, the coefficient on foreign ownership is positive and statistically significant at 
1% level, indicating that there is statistically significant and positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and firm-level COC. This finding shows that Pakistani firms with higher 
level of foreign investors have higher COC than those with less or no foreign investors. 
Theoretically, this positive relationship between foreign ownership and COC is consistent 
with the prediction of information asymmetry. This issue is relatively higher among 
foreign investors because of language and distance obstacles (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007) 
which may leads to higher COC. Empirically, the finding of this positive relationship 
between foreign ownership with firm-level COC is in line with prior literature (e.g., 
Boubakri and Saffar, 2016). 
6.3.1.3 Empirical Findings of audit firm/board characteristics  
In addition to CG index and ownership variables, the current study also investigates 
the impact of audit firm size and board characteristics, such as board size and board 
diversity on firms’ COC. First, the coefficient on audit firm size is negative but statistically 
insignificant, indicating that there is no significant relationship between audit firm-size 
with firm-level COC. Therefore, audit firm size shows no significant impact on firms’ 
COC. Theoretically, external auditors have been suggested as one of the most effective CG 
mechanisms for reducing agency cost by reducing conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). 
Similarly, the quality of external auditor is an important issue which can reduce 
information asymmetry and this is significantly determined by audit firm size (DeAngelo, 
1981). Arguably, firms audited by big audit firms are expected to have less problem with 
information asymmetry as such firms can be influenced by the big audit firms to disclose 
more information. This will result in increased confidence in the firm’s CG by outside 
investors, which in turn, is expected to decrease the firms’ COC. The reported results in the 
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current study do not lend evidence to the literature (e.g., Pittman and Fortin, 2004) of 
negative and significant relationship between audit firm size and COC.  
Second, the coefficient on board size is positive and statistically insignificant, 
indicating that there is no significant relationship between board size and firm-level COC. 
This indicates that size of board has no explanatory power in explaining the variations in 
firm level COC. Theoretically, this positive relationship between board size and COC is 
consistent with the prediction of agency theory. Board of directors is considered as one of 
the most effective CG mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). 
Specifically, agency theory argues that a larger board may increase managerial costs that 
adversely affect the firm value (Yawson, 2006) and, thus, may increase cost of funding. 
The current study does not support the literature (e.g., Bozec and Bozec, 2011; Shah and 
Butt, 2009) that document a negative and significant relationship between board size and 
firm-level COC.  
Finally, the coefficient on board diversity on the basis of gender is positive and 
statistically significant at 5% level, indicating that there is statistically significant and 
positive relationship between the percentage of female board members and firm-level 
COC. This finding shows that Pakistani firms with higher level of female board members 
have a higher COC than those with less or no female board members. Theoretically, 
several studies have examined the impact of board-gender diversity on different issues and 
find that board diversity have influence on firms’ boards (Huse and Solberg, 2006; Admas 
and Ferreire, 2009; Peni and Vahamaa, 2010; Cater et al., 2010). For instance, Admas and 
Ferreire (2009) argue that boards with more female members can lead to a greater 
participation in directors’ decision making. However, this positive connection between 
board-gender diversity and COC finding does not lend empirical support to the literature. 
This may be due to less participation of female directors in firms’ boards for Pakistani 
listed firms. 
6.3.2 Empirical Findings of Control Variables 
A number of control variables have been used in the analysis to diminish the impact 
of potential endogeneity and omitted variables problem. Panel B of Table 6.14 presents the 
empirical findings of these variables.  
First, the analysis found a significant and positive relationship between beta and capital 
expenditure with firm level COC as reported in Table 6.14. The coefficient on beta is positive 
and significant at 5% level, suggesting that firms with higher systematic risk are likely to have 
higher COC than those with lower systematic risk. This positive and significant relationship 
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between firm beta and firm level COC is consistent with prior CG literature (e.g., Zhu, 2009; 
Pham et al., 2012). Similarly, the coefficient on capital expenditure is positive and significant 
at 5% level of significance, indicating that the firms with higher capital expenditures have 
higher COC than firms with lower or no capital expenditures. 
Second, Panel B of Table 6.14 reports a significant and negative relationship between 
firm size, profitability and leverage with firms’ COC. In Particular, the coefficient on firm size 
is negative and significant at 1% level of significance, suggesting that the larger firms are 
likely to have lower COC than smaller Pakistani listed firms. This negative and significant 
relationship between firm size with firms’ COC is consistent with prior CG literature (e.g., 
Zhu, 2009; Bozec and Bozec, 2010; Zhu, 2012; Pham et al., 2012). Similarly, findings show 
a significant and negative relationship between sampled firms profitability and COC. This 
significant relationship is consistent with prior CG literature (e.g., Zhu, 2009; Zhu, 2012). The 
reported results also show a significant and negative relationship between leverage and firms’ 
COC. This significant relationship is consistent with prior CG literature (e.g., Zhu, 2009; Zhu, 
2012). 
Third, the study shows statistically insignificant relationship between firm growth and 
book to market value with firm level COC.  Specifically, the coefficient on sales growth is 
negative but insignificant, suggesting that firms with more growth and investment 
opportunities do not impact the firms’ COC. This finding is consistent with prior CG literature 
(e.g., Zhu, 2009). Similarly, the coefficient on book to market value is negative but statistically 
insignificant with firms’ COC, indicating that the level of firms’ book to market value have no 
impact on firms’ COC. Finally, the findings show that all of the year dummies and most of the 
industries dummies are statistically significant with the firms’ COC. In particular, all year 
dummies, except 2004 and 2008, have a negative and significant relationship at 1% level of 
significance with firms’ COC whereas 2004 and 2008 are also significant but have a positive 
relationship with firms’ COC. The relationship between the level of compliance and COC 
differs across the industries. For instance, this relationship is positive and significant for, 
electricity, food, household, oil and gas, and textile industries while insignificant for cement, 
chemical, miscellaneous and pharmaceutical industries. These findings are also consistent with 
prior CG literature (e.g., Zhu, 2009; Pham et al., 2012).  
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6.4 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter discussed OLS assumptions and reported empirical findings of the 
study. Particularly, it aimed to attain three key objectives. First, it analysed the OLS 
assumptions by applying several statistical tests, including, Breush-Godfrey test to detect 
the issue of autocorrelation; White general test to investigate for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity; Augmented Dickey-fuller test to ensure that whether series have unit 
roots or not; Correlation coefficient, TOL and VIF to address the issue of multicollinearity. 
The findings of tests showed that there is no serious violation of OLS assumptions in data. 
Therefore, after employing all the above tests and procedures, it is concluded that the OLS is 
the appropriate statistical estimation to perform the study’s main analyses.  
Second, it presented and discussed the findings obtained from the OLS estimation 
technique used to assess the determinants of the level of CG compliance and disclosure. 
Specifically, it examined the nexus between the nine CG mechanisms and the PCGI. 
Overall, the analysis of the explanatory variables suggests that, board size, government, 
institutional, foreign and block ownership have significant relationships with the PCGI. In 
contrast, director ownership, audit firm size, board gender and nationality diversity have no 
statistical significance with the PCGI.  
Thirdly, this chapter presented and discussed the empirical findings obtained from the 
OLS estimation technique related to the impact of CG on COC. Generally, the findings of 
a negative and significant relationship between PCGI and block ownership with firms’ 
COC are in line with formulated hypotheses while a positive and significant relationship 
between director ownership and firms’ COC is consistent with the hypotheses. Contrary to 
the formulated hypotheses, foreign ownership and gender diversity are positively and 
statistically significant with firm-level COC. 
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7 ROBUSTNESS IN FINDINGS AND 
ENDOGENEITY 
This chapter presents and discusses the findings of a number of robustness analyses. 
The main objective of this chapter is to check the extent to which the findings obtained in 
chapter 6 are sensitive or robust to alternative estimations and models. Specifically, this 
chapter seeks to achieve the following four objectives. First, whether the main findings are 
robust to the weighted Corporate Governance (CG) index. Second, whether the main 
findings are robust to the alternative measures of Cost of Capital (COC). Third, whether 
the main findings are robust to the unobserved firm-specific characteristics. Fourth, 
whether the main findings obtained by OLS, are sensitive to  fixed or random effects and 
finally, whether the main findings are robust with regards to endogeneity problems.  
7.1 ROBUSTNESS TESTS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
COMPLIANCE AND DISCLOSURE  
The main findings which have been previously reported in Table 6.12 and robustness 
results are reported in same table in order to facilitate the comparison between main 
findings and robustness findings. These analyses show that the main findings are robust 
except minor sensitivities in the magnitude of coefficient and significance level. Detailed 
discussion on these findings is presented below.  
7.1.1 Results Based on an Alternative Corporate Governance Proxy 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Subsection 4.2.1.3, the CG index that is used in the 
current study to measure CG compliance and disclosure among Pakistani listed firms 
consists of 70 CG provisions divided into five sub-indices, which are equally weighted, but 
the number of CG provisions are different in the five sub-indices and leads to different 
weights being assigned to each sub index. The PCGI assigns a weight of 25%, 20%, 8.5%, 
20%, and 25% for five sub-indices: board of directors, internal auditing and committees, 
shareholders’ right, transparency and disclosure, and internal control, external auditor and 
risk management, respectively. Therefore, to test whether the main findings are sensitive to 
the weighting of five sub-indices, following the CG literature (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a ; 
Beiner et al., 2006), a weighted Pakistani CG Index (WPCGI) is constructed by assigning 
20% weight to each sub index of PCGI. The PCGI in equation (1) is replaced by the 
WPCGI and the findings are presented in Table 7.1.   
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Table 7.1: Results Based on Weighted CG Index 
Dependent Variable: PCGI/WPCGI 
Un weighted Index Weighted Index 
Independent 
Variable  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
  Panel A: CG variables 
DOWNP - 0.0352 1.252 0.0366 1.2190 
IOWNP + 0.0955*** 4.099 0.1015*** 3.8597 
GOWNP - 0.2989*** 7.484 0.3033*** 7.0718 
BOWNP - -0.0189*** -3.230 -0.0180*** -2.9184 
FOWNP + 0.0759*** 3.276 0.0797*** 3.2328 
BIG4 + 0.8569 0.900 1.0353 1.0930 
BSZ + -0.4628** -2.237 -0.5050** -2.2589 
BGEN  + -0.5878 -0.456 -0.7844 -0.5889 
NTL + 0.0557 0.068 -0.4999 -0.5264 
Panel B: Control variables 
LTA 
 
1.5234*** 5.716 1.4812**** 5.5318 
ROE 
 
-3.5925*** -2.767 -3.9595*** -2.9200 
SALESG 
 
0.8651 0.530 0.8098 0.4885 
LVG 
 
0.0092 0.695 0.0092 0.6719 
CE 
 
0.0000*** -3.305 0.0000*** -3.1565 
CEMENT 
 
6.3499*** 3.230 5.9949*** 2.8591 
CHEMICAL 
 
3.3518 1.585 2.9167 1.2459 
ELECTRICITY 
 
8.7193** 2.444 8.1854** 2.1352 
FOOD 
 
-4.8611*** -4.712 -6.6665*** -4.7261 
HOUSHOLD 
 
4.7509** 2.302 4.5877** 2.0009 
MISC 
 
-8.3676*** -12.751 -8.7784*** -11.1712 
OIL___GAS 
 
-8.1924*** -7.379 -8.9282*** -7.3051 
PHARMA 
 
-9.4477** -2.552 -10.0500*** -2.7324 
TEXTILE 
 
-4.2243** -2.046 -4.0393* -1.7920 
Y_02_DUM 
 
2.5254*** 3.544 2.5511*** 3.5347 
Y_03_DUM 
 
10.0207*** 18.288 10.5178*** 18.9859 
Y_04_DUM 
 
18.8683*** 24.639 19.5607*** 25.2680 
Y_05_DUM 
 
26.0512*** 53.537 27.1404*** 54.9225 
Y_06_DUM 
 
31.9506*** 46.645 33.3578*** 47.8428 
Y_07_DUM 
 
45.2754*** 76.805 47.6675*** 79.4918 
Y_08_DUM 
 
51.4214*** 87.622 54.0755*** 91.1900 
Y_09_DUM 
 
55.2553*** 78.276 58.2822*** 81.6769 
Y_10_DUM 
 
61.6627*** 105.440 64.6824*** 109.9600 
Y_11_DUM 
 
63.3932*** 122.045 66.3444*** 128.1035 
Constant 
 
-0.8912 -0.176 -0.2729 -0.0539 
Adjusted R-square 0.486065 0.483753 
F-statistic 51.41241*** 50.94792*** 
Balanced panel observations 1760 1760 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows. Weighted Pakistani Corporate Governance Index (WPCGI), 
Pakistani Corporate Governance Index (PCGI), director ownership (DOWNP), institutional ownership 
(IOWNP), government ownership (GOWNP), block ownership (BOWNP), foreign ownership (FOWNP), 
audit firm size (BIG4), size of the board of directors (BSZ), board diversity on the basis of gender (BGEN), 
board diversity on the basis of nationality (NTL), firm size as log of total assets (LTA), profitability (ROE), 
growth opportunities (SALESG), leverage (LVG)and capital expenditures (CE). Parameter estimates are 
obtained by OLS estimation (Panel Least Squares). Year 2003 and AUTO industry has been excluded 
from the analysis in order to avoid dummy variable trap.  The asterisks *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level of significance respectively. 
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Table 7.1 reports the main findings using PCGI in columns 3 and 4 and robust 
findings using weighted CG index presents in Columns 5 and 6 in the same table. Adjusted 
R-square is 0.486065 for Un-weighted Index and 0.483753 for Weighted Index which 
shows that adjusted R-square in both analyses is about 48%. This suggests that the 
variability in either PCGI or WPCGI is not sensitive to weighting system employed in the 
index construction. Similarly, the F-statistic is 51.41241*** for Un-weighted Index and 
50.94792*** for Weighted Index with both being statistically significant at 1% level. 
Generally, the findings of both analyses are similar as both predict similar sign of 
coefficient, magnitude of coefficient and level of significance either with PCGI or WPCGI. 
These findings are discussed in the following subsections, with particular focus on the 
main sensitivities of this analysis.    
7.1.1.1 Empirical Findings of Ownership and audit firm size/board Variables 
Table 7.1 presents the impact of audit/board characteristics and ownership variables 
on PCGI and WPCGI. As presented in column 5 and 6 of Table 7.1, results based on 
weighted index find a positive and significant relationship between institutional ownership, 
government ownership and foreign ownership with WPCGI. These findings show that the 
main results are robust with alternative CG Proxy. Similarly, a negative and significant 
relationship between block ownership and board size with WPCGI is consistent with the 
main analysis with respect to the coefficient and significance level. Further, the findings of 
director ownership, audit firm size, board diversity on the basis of gender and board 
diversity on the basis of nationality are in line with those reported in the main test.  
7.1.1.2 Empirical Findings of Control Variables 
As reported in Panel B of Table 7.1, irrespective of observable minor differences in 
the magnitude of the coefficients, significance level and the direction of coefficients in 
weighted CG index, the findings remain essentially the same with the use of un-weighted 
CG index. First, results based on the use of weighted CG index show a 1% statistical 
significance and positive relationship between firm size and capital expenditure with firm level 
CG compliance and disclosure.  This is consistent with results based on the unweighted index. 
Second, the use of weighted CG index report significant and negative relationship between 
firms’ profitability and the level of CG compliance which is in line with the original finding. 
Finally, the use of weighted CG index shows statistically insignificant relationship between 
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firm growth and leverage with firm-level CG compliance, suggesting that the main findings are 
robust with alternative CG proxy.  
  
7.1.2 Results Based on Lagged Structure 
As discussed in Subsection 4.3.2.1of Chapter 4, endogeneity is a statistical problem 
that can arise from measurement errors, simultaneity and omitted variables (Wooldridge, 
2009; Lacker and Rusticus, 2010). The presence of such problem may question the validity 
of any empirical findings (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). This study therefore investigates 
the extent to which the results reported in Table 6.12 are influenced by endogeneity 
problems. Thus, following prior studies’ procedures (e.g., Larcker and Rustics, 2010; Ntim 
et al., 2013), all independent and control variables used in investigating the factors 
influencing the level of CG compliance are lagged by one period as indicated in equation 
below.  
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      (28) 
Except for the one year lag of explanatory and control variables, all variables are similar as 
explained in equation 1 of subsection 4.2.2.4 of chapter 4. 
The findings of Un-lagged structure analysis (main findings) and lagged structure 
analysis (robust analysis) are presented in Table 7.2 simultaneously in order to compare the 
findings. Columns 3 and 4 report findings based on unlagged variables and Columns 5 and 
6 report robust findings using lagged variables. Adjusted R-square is 0.486065 for Un-
lagged structure and 0.482606 for lagged structure which are roughly similar. Similarly, F-
statistic is 51.41241 for Un-lagged structure and 50.71913 for lagged structure and both 
are statistically significant at 1% level. The results suggest that both analyses are 
appropriate and all the parameters in analysis are jointly significant. Generally, the 
reported results for both analyses are similar in terms of the sign and magnitude of 
coefficient as well as the level of statistical significance.  
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Table 7.2: Results Based on  Lagged Structure  
Dependent Variable: PCGI 
Un-Lagged Structure      Lagged Structure 
Independent 
Variable  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Panel A: CG variables 
DOWNP - 0.0352 1.252 0.004703 0.161632 
IOWNP + 0.0955*** 4.099 0.054491** 1.97334 
GOWNP - 0.2989*** 7.484 0.228089*** 4.661064 
BOWNP - -0.0189*** -3.230 -0.04307*** -3.61292 
FOWNP + 0.0759*** 3.276 0.050333* 1.7295 
BIG4 + 0.8569 0.900 0.882857 0.605422 
BSZ + -0.4628** -2.237 -0.6771* -1.73113 
BGEN  + -0.5878 -0.456 -0.74045 -0.53753 
BNAT + 0.0557 0.068 -0.33967 -0.21146 
 Panel B: Control variables 
LTA 
 
1.5234*** 5.716 1.154447** 3.229553 
ROE 
 
-3.5925*** -2.767 -0.00619 -0.14132 
SALESG 
 
0.8651 0.530 0.692036 0.439401 
LVG 
 
0.0092 0.695 -0.00722 -0.65083 
CE 
 
0.0000*** -3.305 -9.88E-08** -2.46933 
CEMENT 
 
6.3499*** 3.230 6.820391*** 2.809519 
CHEMICAL 
 
3.3518 1.585 3.224976 1.257529 
ELECTRICITY 
 
8.7193** 2.444 8.462928*** 2.780292 
FOOD 
 
-4.8611*** -4.712 -4.619* -1.87244 
HOUSHOLD 
 
4.7509** 2.302 4.579879 1.461588 
MISC 
 
-8.3676*** -12.751 -9.5873*** -3.58249 
OIL___GAS 
 
-8.1924*** -7.379 -6.94446** -2.37025 
PHARMA 
 
-9.4477** -2.552 -10.0838*** -2.99378 
TEXTILE 
 
-4.2243** -2.046 -4.45567* -1.82242 
Y_02_DUM 
 
2.5254*** 3.544 2.70033 0.970183 
Y_03_DUM 
 
10.0207*** 18.288 10.23907*** 3.721963 
Y_04_DUM 
 
18.8683*** 24.639 19.04049*** 6.806758 
Y_05_DUM 
 
26.0512*** 53.537 26.31768*** 9.618791 
Y_06_DUM 
 
31.9506*** 46.645 32.42412*** 11.70637 
Y_07_DUM 
 
45.2754*** 76.805 45.71179*** 16.61305 
Y_08_DUM 
 
51.4214*** 87.622 51.93651*** 18.8375 
Y_09_DUM 
 
55.2553*** 78.276 55.69367*** 20.03011 
Y_10_DUM 
 
61.6627*** 105.440 62.02597*** 22.45534 
Y_11_DUM 
 
63.3932*** 122.045 63.67356*** 23.01709 
Constant 
 
-0.8912 -0.176 10.44509 1.515505 
Adjusted R-square 0.486065 0.482606 
F-statistic 51.41241*** 50.71913*** 
Balanced panel observations 1760 1600 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows. Pakistani Corporate Governance Index (PCGI), director ownership 
(DOWNP), institutional ownership (IOWNP), government ownership (GOWNP), block ownership 
(BOWNP), foreign ownership (FOWNP), audit firm size (BIG4), size of the board of directors (BSZ), board 
diversity on the basis of Gender (BGEN), board diversity on the basis of Nationality (BNAT), firm size as 
log of total assets (LTA), profitability (ROE), growth opportunities (SALESG), leverage (LVG)and capital 
expenditures (CE). Parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation (Panel Least Squares). Year 2003 
and AUTO industry has been excluded from the analysis in order to avoid dummy variable trap.  The 
asterisks *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
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7.1.2.1 Empirical Findings of Ownership and audit firm /board Variables 
Table 7.2 presents the impact of ownership variables on PCGI for Un-lagged and 
lagged analyses. Two main cases of sensitivities can be observed. First, the statistical 
significance level of the coefficients on government and institutional ownership has changed. 
Specifically, the coefficients on government and institutional ownership, which were 
statistically significant at 1% and 5% level, are now statistically significant at 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. Second, the coefficient on foreign ownership, which was statistically 
significant at 10% level, is now no longer statistically significant. As reported in column 5 
and 6 of Table 7.2, there is a positive and significant relationship between institutional 
ownership, government ownership and foreign ownership with PCGI. Similarly, a negative 
and significant relationship between block ownership and board size is reported for lagged 
structure which is consistent with the results reported for the un-lagged. However, for the 
un-lagged analysis, the relationship between board size and PCGI is negative and 
statistically significant at 5% level rather than at10% level for the lagged. Overall, the 
results predicted by the lagged structure analysis are largely consistent with those reported by 
the un-lagged structure. 
7.1.2.2 Empirical Findings of Control Variables 
As shown in Panel B of Table 7.2, irrespective of some sensitivity in the magnitude 
of coefficients, significance level and the direction of coefficients in lagged structure, 
essentially the findings remain the same as in the main analysis. First, lagged structure 
analysis shows that the relationship between firm size and firm level CG compliance is 
positive and significant, which is consistent with the main findings significance level and the 
direction of coefficient. Second, it presents statistically insignificant relationship between firm 
growth and leverage with firm-level CG compliance and disclosure. This analysis also reports 
insignificant relationship between firm growth and leverage with firm-level CG compliance 
and disclosure, suggesting that the findings of main analysis are largely robust with lagged 
structure. However, firms’ profitability and capital expenditure with level of CG compliance 
and disclosure show changes in the lagged structure analysis. For instance, profitability 
(ROE) is negatively and significantly associated with CG compliance and disclosure in the 
main analysis however it became insignificant in the lagged structure analysis.  
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7.1.3 Results Based on Random effect Model 
As discussed in subsection 4.2.4.2, the current study employs OLS to conduct its 
analyses where firms’ characteristics differ among firms, but remain same over the time, 
which may not be captured by OLS estimation (Gujarati, 2003). Chung and Zhang (2011) 
argue that unobserved firms’ characteristics can have an influence on governance 
disclosure level because of differences in challenges and opportunities that firms face. 
 Table 7.3:Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. P value  
Cross-section random 0.000000 24 1.0000 
 
Thus, to check the extent to which the main results are sensitive to firms’ 
characteristics, one could employ either fixed or random effect model. The Hausman test is 
performed to identify the suitability between the fixed effect and random effect models. 
The null hypothesis of this test is that the random-effects model is appropriate while 
alternative hypothesis is that fixed effect model is appropriate. As shown in Table 7.3, the 
insignificant result suggests that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Therefore, the 
random effect model has been used as a robust analysis to control for the unobserved 
firms’ characteristics. The findings of random effect model (robust findings) and OLS 
analysis (main analysis) are presented in Table 7.4 simultaneously in order to compare the 
findings. 
Table 7.4 reports the main findings using OLS in columns 3 and 4 and robust 
findings using random effect model presents in Columns 5 and 6 of the same table. 
Adjusted R-square is 0.48 for main analysis and 0.56 for the random effect model, 
suggesting 48% variability in the main analysis and 56% in random effect model is jointly 
explained by all variables in each analyses. The value of F-statistic is 51.41 for main 
analysis and 71.10 for the random effect model and both are statistically significant at 1% 
level. Generally, the reported results are similar for both analyses in terms of sign 
magnitude of coefficient and level of statistical significance.    
7.1.3.1 Empirical Findings of Ownership and audit firm size/board Variables 
Panel A of Table 7.4 presents the OLS and random effect model findings. As 
presented in column 5 and 6 of Table 7.4, the random effect model finds a positive and 
significant relationship between director ownership, institutional ownership, government 
171 
 
 
 
ownership and foreign ownership with PCGI. The reported findings of the relationship 
between institutional and government ownership with PCGI are robust given the reported 
results with the random effect model. However, foreign ownership is now statistically 
significant at 10% level as compared to the main analysis where it was significant at 1% 
level while director ownership is now significant with the random effect model which was 
insignificant in the main analysis.  
The findings of negative relationship between block ownership and board size with 
PCGI is consistent with the main analysis.  Similarly, the audit firm size and board 
diversity on the basis of gender show no significant impact on level of CG compliance and 
disclosure both in random effect and in the main analysis, suggesting that these findings 
are robust. There is no significant relationship between nationality diversity and COC in 
the main analysis but it is now at 5% significance level in random effect model. Overall, 
the findings of main analysis using OLS estimation are robust with random effect model.  
7.1.3.2 Empirical Findings of Control Variables 
As shown in Panel B of Table 7.4, irrespective of observable sensitivity in the 
magnitude of coefficients, significance level and the direction of coefficients in random 
effect model, the findings largely remain the same as in the main analysis. First, the 
random effect model shows that the relationship between firm size and firm level CG 
compliance is positive and significant, which is consistent with main finding. Second, this 
analysis presents statistically insignificant relationship between firm growth and leverage with 
firm-level CG compliance and disclosure. This analysis also reports insignificant relationship 
between firm growth and leverage with firm-level governance compliance, suggesting that the 
findings of main analysis are largely robust with lagged structure. However, sampled firms’ 
profitability and capital expenditure relationship with the level of CG compliance and 
disclosure show changes in the random effect model. For instance, profitability is negative 
and significantly associated with CG compliance and disclosure in the main analysis however 
it is insignificant in random effect model analysis.  
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Table 7.4: Results Based on Random Effect Model 
Dependent Variable: PCGI 
Ordinary Least Square Random effect 
Independent 
Variable  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Panel A: CG variables 
DOWNP - 0.0352 1.252 0.1126*** 2.914371 
IOWNP + 0.0955*** 4.099 0.1283*** 3.709527 
GOWNP - 0.2989*** 7.484 0.3094*** 6.800401 
BOWNP - -0.0189*** -3.230 -0.0404*** -4.616613 
FOWNP + 0.0759*** 3.276 0.0770* 1.825455 
BIG4 + 0.8569 0.900 1.8628 1.217684 
BSZ + -0.4628** -2.237 -0.2717 -0.742531 
BGEN  + -0.5878 -0.456 1.2918 0.906741 
BNAT + 0.0557 0.068 2.7536** 2.132082 
  Panel B: Control variables 
LTA 
 
1.5234*** 5.716 0.8928** 2.024144 
ROE 
 
-3.5925*** -2.767 -1.4028 -1.307234 
SALESG 
 
0.8651 0.530 0.3897 0.279607 
LVG 
 
0.0092 0.695 0.0315 1.562978 
CE 
 
0.0000*** -3.305 0.0000 -0.922332 
CEMENT 
 
6.3499*** 3.230 5.7313 1.537175 
CHEMICAL 
 
3.3518 1.585 2.7862 0.611160 
ELECTRICITY 
 
8.7193** 2.444 8.9052 1.014122 
FOOD 
 
-4.8611*** -4.712 -5.1043 -1.537730 
HOUSHOLD 
 
4.7509** 2.302 4.5635 0.945239 
MISC 
 
-8.3676*** -12.751 -7.6283*** -3.533570 
OIL___GAS 
 
-8.1924*** -7.379 -6.8728*** -2.970803 
PHARMA 
 
-9.4477** -2.552 -10.1706 -1.127147 
TEXTILE 
 
-4.2243** -2.046 -5.0866 -0.903291 
Y_02_DUM 
 
2.5254*** 3.544 2.7929*** 4.521340 
Y_03_DUM 
 
10.0207*** 18.288 10.1713*** 21.76422 
Y_04_DUM 
 
18.8683*** 24.639 18.9664*** 29.03065 
Y_05_DUM 
 
26.0512*** 53.537 26.0506*** 60.33353 
Y_06_DUM 
 
31.9506*** 46.645 32.0894*** 55.89384 
Y_07_DUM 
 
45.2754*** 76.805 45.4053*** 86.61310 
Y_08_DUM 
 
51.4214*** 87.622 51.8860*** 100.2401 
Y_09_DUM 
 
55.2553*** 78.276 55.6048*** 90.73233 
Y_10_DUM 
 
61.6627*** 105.440 62.3046*** 120.2705 
Y_11_DUM 
 
63.3932*** 122.045 63.7789*** 135.5551 
Constant 
 
-0.8912 -0.176 3.1762 0.371509 
Adjusted R-square 0.486065 0.568077 
F-statistic 51.41241*** 71.10547*** 
Balanced panel observations 1760 1760 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows. Pakistani Corporate Governance Index (PCGI), director ownership 
(DOWNP), institutional ownership (IOWNP), government ownership (GOWNP), block ownership 
(BOWNP), foreign ownership (FOWNP), audit firm size (BIG4), size of the board of directors (BSZ), board 
diversity on the basis of Gender (BGEN), board diversity on the basis of Nationality (BNAT), firm size as 
log of total assets (LTA), profitability (ROE), growth opportunities (SALESG), leverage (LVG)and capital 
expenditures (CE). Parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation (Panel Least Squares). Year 2003 
and AUTO industry has been excluded from the analysis in order to avoid dummy variable trap.  The 
asterisks *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
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7.1.4 Results Based on 2SLS Model 
As discussed in Subsection 7.1.2, the current study seeks to mitigate endogeneity 
issues by applying non-econometrics and econometrics solutions to ascertain whether its 
findings are seriously affected by the presence of this problem. Regarding econometrics 
solutions, accounting and CG literature suggest that two-stage least square (2SLS) is 
commonly used by researchers to address endogeneity problem among other solutions. 
Following the suggestion in literature, Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test is used first 
to investigate the presence of endogeneity (e.g., Lacker and Rusticus, 2008; Beiner et al., 
2006). This test is performed in two stages. First, and as shown in equation 3 and 4, the 
regression is run on PCGI and control variables. Then predicted values from the 
regressions are named as P-PCGI. The first stage of Durbin-Wu-Hausman is performed 
using the following equation:  
∑
=
++=
n
i
ititiit CONTROLSPCGI
1
0 εβα                             (29) 
Where the PCGI refers to Pakistani Corporate Governance Index and CONTROLS 
variables are as defined in equation 1 in subsection 4.2.2.4 of chapter 4.  
 
In the Second stage of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, the PCGI is regressed on P-
PCGI and control variables as specified in equation below: 
∑
=
++−+=
n
i
ititiitit CONTROLSPCGIPPCGI
1
10 εββα                    (30) 
Where the PCGI refers to Pakistani Corporate Governance Index, P-PCGI denotes the 
predicted values from regression of equation 29, and CONTROLS variables remain the 
same as in equation 1 in subsection 4.2.2.4 of chapter 4. 
After performing Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, the current study rejects 
the null hypothesis of no endogeneity as the coefficient on P-PCGI is statistically 
significant (0.0650) at 10% level with PCGI. This result shows that the endogeneity 
problem exists.  
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Table 7.5: Results Based on 2SLS 
Dependent Variable: PCGI 
Ordinary Least Square 2SLS 
Independent 
Variable  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
Panel A: CG variables 
DOWNP - 0.0352 1.252 0.027 0.849 
IOWNP + 0.0955*** 4.099 0.11** 2.516 
GOWNP - 0.2989*** 7.484 0.293*** 5.554 
BOWNP - -0.0189*** -3.230 -0.018* -1.916 
FOWNP + 0.0759*** 3.276 0.092*** 2.739 
BIG4 + 0.8569 0.900 0.434 0.288 
BSZ + -0.4628** -2.237 -0.708* -1.762 
BGEN  + -0.5878 -0.456 -0.697 -.484 
BNAT + 0.0557 0.068 0.255 0.153 
  Panel B: Control variables 
LTA 
 
1.5234*** 5.716 1.484*** 3.818 
ROE 
 
-3.5925*** -2.767 -3.649 -1.359 
SALESG 
 
0.8651 0.530 0.89 0.564 
LVG 
 
0.0092 0.695 0.009 0.431 
CE 
 
0.0000*** -3.305 -3.14E-07*** -3.533 
CEMENT 
 
6.3499*** 3.230 6.568*** 2.657 
CHEMICAL 
 
3.3518 1.585 3.649 1.409 
ELECTRICITY 
 
8.7193** 2.444 9.126*** 2.975 
FOOD 
 
-4.8611*** -4.712 -4.72* -1.888 
HOUSHOLD 
 
4.7509** 2.302 4.976 1.587 
MISC 
 
-8.3676*** -12.751 -8.24*** -3.077 
OIL___GAS 
 
-8.1924*** -7.379 -7.601** -2.588 
PHARMA 
 
-9.4477** -2.552 -9.645*** -2.867 
TEXTILE 
 
-4.2243** -2.046 -3.936 -1.601 
Y_02_DUM 
 
2.5254*** 3.544 2.539 0.915 
Y_03_DUM 
 
10.0207*** 18.288 10.045*** 3.662 
Y_04_DUM 
 
18.8683*** 24.639 18.91*** 6.782 
Y_05_DUM 
 
26.0512*** 53.537 26.096*** 9.555 
Y_06_DUM 
 
31.9506*** 46.645 32.009*** 11.565 
Y_07_DUM 
 
45.2754*** 76.805 45.366*** 16.490 
Y_08_DUM 
 
51.4214*** 87.622 51.502*** 18.705 
Y_09_DUM 
 
55.2553*** 78.276 55.369*** 19.962 
Y_10_DUM 
 
61.6627*** 105.440 61.829*** 22.402 
Y_11_DUM 
 
63.3932*** 122.045 63.57*** 23.022 
Constant 
 
-0.8912 -0.176 1.488 0.199 
Adjusted R-square 0.4861 0.4860 
F-statistic 51.41241*** 51.432*** 
Balanced panel observations 1760 1760 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows. Pakistani Corporate Governance Index (PCGI), director ownership 
(DOWNP), institutional ownership (IOWNP), government ownership (GOWNP), block ownership 
(BOWNP), foreign ownership (FOWNP), audit firm size (BIG4), size of the board of directors (BSZ), board 
diversity on the basis of gender (BGEN), board diversity on the basis of Nationality (BNAT), firm size as 
log of total assets (LTA), profitability (ROE), growth opportunities (SALESG), leverage (LVG) and capital 
expenditures (CE). Parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation (Panel Least Squares). Year 2003 
and AUTO industry has been excluded from the analysis in order to avoid dummy variable trap.  The 
asterisks *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
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Thus, following the literature (e.g., Ntim et al., 2013) current study uses the 2SLS 
technique as a robustness test for the reported results.  Each of the nine CG variables is 
regressed on the control variables and the predicted values for each individual CG variable 
is saved in the first stage as specified in the following equations. 
 
∑
=
++=
n
i
ititiit CONTROLSCGVAR
1
0 εβα                                (31) 
Where the CGVAR denotes the 9 governance variables and control variables remain same 
as in equation 1. 
In stage two, equation 1 is regressed by replacing nine CG variables with their 
predicted values as follows: 
∑
=
+++
++++
++++=
n
i
ititiit
itititit
ititititit
CONTROLSBNAT
BGENBSZBIGFOWNP
BOWNPGOWNPIOWNPDOWNPPCGI
1
9
8765
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ˆˆˆˆ
εββ
ββββ
ββββα
       (32) 
Where all variables remain the same as in equation 1, except the nine CG variables where 
the predicted values from equation (31) are used instead of their actual values.  
The results based on 2SLS and main analyses are presented in Table 7.5 
simultaneously in order to compare the findings. Table 7.5 reports the main findings using 
OLS in columns 3 and 4 and robust findings using 2SLS are presented in columns 5 and 6. 
Adjusted R-square is 0.4861 for OLS analysis and 0.48260 for 2SLS which is similar. The 
R-square of about 48% for both analyses, suggesting that about 48% of variability in either 
main or 2SLS regressions are jointly explained by the variables. Similarly, the F-statistic 
of 51.41241 for the 2SLS and 51.432 for OLS are both statistically significant at 1% level. 
Generally, the findings for both analyses are similar and both analyses predict almost 
similar sign and magnitude of coefficient as well as level of significance.    
7.1.4.1 Empirical Findings of ownership and audit firm size/board Variables 
Panel A of Table 7.5 presents the OLS and 2SLS findings. Table 7.5 presents the 
impact of ownership variables on PCGI using 2SLS and OLS estimation techniques. As 
presented in column 5 and 6 of Table 7.5, the findings based on 2SLS finds a positive and 
significant relationship between institutional, government and foreign ownership with 
PCGI. Regardless of some sensitivity in the magnitude of coefficient and level of 
176 
 
 
 
significance, the results based on the 2SLS show that the main findings are robust. For 
example, institutional ownership is statistically significant at 5% level in 2SLS compared 
to the main analysis where the statistical significance is at 1% level. 
Similarly, a negative and significant relationship between block ownership and 
board size with PCGI are also consistent with the main analysis. For instance, the 
relationship between block ownership, board size and PCGI are statistically significant at 
1% and 5% level in main analysis and 10% in 2 SLS. In addition to the above significant 
variables, director ownership, audit firm size, board diversity on the basis of gender and 
board diversity on the basis of nationality are insignificant in both OLS and the 2SLS. 
 
7.1.4.2 Empirical Findings of Control Variables 
As shown in Panel B of Table 7.5, despite some observable sensitivity, the findings 
of 2SLS remain largely the same as in the main analysis. First, 2SLS shows that the 
relationship between firm size and firm level CG compliance is positive and significant, which 
is consistent with main finding. Second, this analysis presents statistically insignificant 
relationship between firm growth and leverage with firm-level CG compliance and disclosure. 
This analysis also reports insignificant relationship between firm growth and leverage with 
level of CG disclosure, suggesting that the findings of the main analysis are largely robust with 
2SLS analysis. However, firms’ profitability and capital expenditure with level of CG 
compliance and disclosure show some sensitivity in 2SLS. For instance, profitability is 
negative for both OLS and 2SLS but insignificant in later while capital expenditure is 
significant in both OLS and 2SLS but coefficient became negative in the later analysis.   
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7.2 ROBUSTNESS TESTS: CG AND COC 
The findings of nexus between CG and COC presented in chapter 6, Table 6.4 are 
tested as to whether these findings are sensitive to the alternative variables and models, by 
performing a number of robustness analyses. The findings of these robustness analyses are 
reported and discussed under this subsection. Main findings which have been previously 
reported in Table 6.4 and robustness results are reported in the same table in order to 
facilitate the comparison between main results and robustness tests. Irrespective of minor 
sensitivities in the magnitude of coefficient and significance level, these analyses show that 
the main findings are largely robust.  Detailed discussion on these findings is presented in 
the following subsections.  
7.2.1 Results Based on an Alternative Corporate Governance Proxy 
The current study responds to literature in order to address the possibility that the 
main findings may be sensitive to the type of CG index. Hence, a weighted CG index 
instead of un-weighted CG index is employed by assigning 20% weight to each sub index 
of PCGI whereas the un-weighted CG index has different weights assigned to each sub 
index. The procedure of weighted index previously described in 7.1.1 is employed in the 
analysis. This procedure is consistent to the previous studies (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a) that 
used the same method to test whether their main findings are sensitive to the weighted CG 
index or not. Therefore, the PCGI in equation (2) is replaced by the WPCGI and the 
findings are presented in Table 7.6.  
Table 7.6 reports the main findings using PCGI in columns 3 and 4 and robust 
findings using weighted CG index in Columns 5 and 6 of the same table. Adjusted R-
square is 0.540825 for Un-weighted Index and 0.550872 for weighted Index, suggesting 
that 54% and 55% variability in PCGI and WPCGI, are jointly explained by independent 
variables in equation (2) explained in subsection 4.2.3.4. Similarly, the F-statistic is 
60.19378 using Un-weighted Index and 60.41580 using Weighted Index and both are 
statistically significant at 1% level. This suggests that both analyses are appropriate and all 
the parameters in analyses are jointly significant. Generally, the findings of both analyses 
are similar as both predict similar sign of coefficient, magnitude of coefficient and level of 
significance either using PCGI or WPCGI. These findings are discussed in the following 
subsections, with particular focus on the main sensitivities of this analysis.  
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Table 7.6: Results Based on Weighted CG Index 
Dependent Variable: COC 
Un weighted Index Weighted Index 
 Indep.Variable Exp Sign Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
  Panel A: CG variables 
PCGI 
- -0.000256** -2.367414 -0.000285*** -2.692242 
DOWNP + 0.000448** 2.378413 0.000453** 2.409312 
IOWNP 
- 0.000110 0.968540 0.000111 0.990667 
GOWNP 
- 0.000242 1.103890 0.000253 1.140036 
BOWNP +/- -0.000165*** -3.394800 -0.000169*** -3.466370 
FOWNP 
- 0.000782*** 4.871608 0.000787*** 4.904898 
BIG4 
- -0.000387 -0.059896 -0.000282 -0.043382 
BSZ 
- 0.002998 1.642575 0.003034* 1.659411 
BGEN  
- 0.011861** 2.298860 0.011793** 2.280540 
Panel B: Control variables 
LTA 
 
-0.018664*** -4.553196 -0.018612*** -4.569124 
ROE 
 
-0.000520* -1.833582 -0.000519* -1.825441 
SALESG 
 
-0.001684 -0.295017 -0.001598 -0.280165 
LVG 
 
-0.000704*** -4.235213 -0.000706*** -4.250991 
β 
 
0.152732* 2.512878 0.152671** 2.514698 
CEMENT 
 
0.010105 0.599615 0.010074 0.595943 
CHEMICAL 
 
0.004724 0.369522 0.004721 0.366442 
ELECTRICITY 
 
0.024752** 2.282339 0.024499** 2.274621 
FOOD 
 
0.033699** 2.481303 0.032968** 2.427244 
HOUSHOLD 
 
0.039404** 2.520262 0.039455** 2.516284 
MISC 
 
0.016622 1.192062 0.015925 1.126001 
OIL___GAS 
 
0.037005** 2.474791 0.035346** 2.326878 
PHARMA 
 
-0.012422 -0.652965 -0.013435 -0.697934 
TEXTILE 
 
0.024341* 1.918665 0.024093* 1.890246 
Y_02_DUM 
 
0.050828*** 19.45041 0.050724*** 19.57160 
Y_03_DUM 
 
-0.107665*** -10.98564 -0.107157*** -10.87289 
Y_04_DUM 
 
-0.094688*** -8.721466 -0.093805*** -8.562953 
Y_05_DUM 
 
-0.184587*** -13.67361 -0.183452*** -13.48365 
Y_06_DUM 
 
-0.138946*** -11.16315 -0.137606*** -10.93193 
Y_07_DUM 
 
-0.322375*** -24.26807 -0.320551*** -23.76597 
Y_08_DUM 
 
0.067629*** 5.772046 0.069609*** 5.822728 
Y_09_DUM 
 
-0.121282*** -19.59109 -0.119146*** -18.77869 
Y_10_DUM 
 
-0.265995*** -36.62020 -0.263461*** -35.71425 
Y_11_DUM 
 
-0.050639*** -6.622276 -0.048183*** -6.188803 
Constant 
 
0.493347*** 13.13452 0.493092*** 13.17160 
Adjusted R-square 0.540825 0.550872 
F-statistic 60.19378*** 60.41580*** 
Balanced panel observations 1760 1760 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows. Cost of Capital (COC) Pakistani Corporate Governance Index 
(PCGI), director ownership (DOWNP), institutional ownership (IOWNP), government ownership 
(GOWNP), block ownership (BOWNP), foreign ownership (FOWNP), audit firm size (BIG4), size of the 
board of directors (BSZ), board diversity on the basis of gender (BGEN) , firm size as log of total assets 
(LTA), profitability (ROE), growth opportunities (SALESG), leverage (LVG) and Systematic risk (β) . 
Parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation (Panel Least Squares). Year 2003 and AUTO 
industry has been excluded from the analysis in order to avoid dummy variable trap.  The asterisks *, ** and 
*** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
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7.2.1.1 Empirical findings of ownership and audit firm size/board variables 
Panel A of Table 7.6 presents the findings of nexus between CG and COC using 
both PCGI and WPCGI as a main independent variable. Table 7.6 presents the impact of 
PCGI and WPCGI on COC. As presented in column 5 and 6 of Table 7.6, the analysis 
using WPCGI finds a negative and significant association between PCGI and block 
ownership with COC. Irrespective of observable minor sensitivities in the magnitude of 
coefficient and level of significance, these findings show that the main findings are robust 
with WPCGI. For instance, the relationship between PCGI and COC is significant at 5% 
level of significance in main analysis using PCGI as compared to the robust analysis using 
WPCGI where it is significant at 1% level. 
Similarly, a significant and positive association between foreign ownership, board 
diversity and director ownership with COC are also consistent with the findings of main 
analysis, however, a minor sensitivity in the magnitude of coefficients can be observed.  
The board size which was insignificant in main analysis is now significant at 10% level of 
significance. 
 
7.2.1.2 Empirical Findings of Control Variables 
As shown in Panel B of Table 7.6, despite observable minor sensitivities in the 
magnitude of coefficients, significance level and the direction of coefficients in robust 
analysis using WPCGI, the results remain essentially the same as in the main analysis 
using PCGI. First, in the robust analysis, a significant and negative association between 
firm size, firms’ profitability and leverage with firm level COC which are significant at 1% 
level are consistent with main finding’s significance level and the direction of coefficients. 
Second, the analysis shows that systematic risk is positively and significantly associated 
with COC at 1% which is also in line with the findings of the main analysis.  Finally, this 
analysis presents statistically insignificant relationship between sales growth and COC, 
suggesting that the findings of main analysis are robust with alternative CG proxy.  
7.2.2 Results Based on COE: an alternative COC Proxy 
The current study employs alternative proxies for COC in order to account for the 
possibility that the main findings are sensitive to different proxies. In particular, and 
consistent to the previous literature (e.g., Pham et al., 2012), cost of equity (COE) is used 
as alternative COC’s measurement. The relationship between PCGI and COC are re-
regressed with COE as an alternative of COC as stated bellow. 
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Where all variables remain the same as in equation 2, except the Cost of Equity (COE) 
used as dependent variable rather than COC.  
Table 7.7 reports the main findings using COC in columns 3 and 4 and robust 
findings using COE in columns 5 and 6 of the same table. Generally, the findings of both 
analyses are similar as both analyses predict similar sign of coefficient, magnitude of 
coefficient and level of significance either using COC or COE. These findings are 
discussed in the following subsections, with particular focus on the main sensitivities in 
this analysis.  
7.2.2.1 Empirical findings of ownership and audit firm size/board variables 
Panel A of Table 7.7 presents the findings of nexus between CG and COC using 
both COC and COE as a dependent variables. As presented in column 5 and 6 of Table 7.7, 
this analysis using COE as a main dependent variable, finds a negative and significant 
nexus between PCGI and block ownership with COE. Irrespective of some noticeable 
sensitivity in the magnitude of coefficient and level of significance, these results show that 
the main findings are robust with COE. For instance, PCGI is negative and significant at 
5% level in both analyses using COC or COE as dependent variable. However, the 
relationship between block ownership and COE is negative but insignificant in robust 
analysis whereas it was significant in the main analysis.  
Similarly, a positive association between director ownership, foreign ownership 
and board diversity on the basis of gender with COE are also consistent with the findings 
reported for the main analysis. However, some sensitivity in the magnitude of coefficients 
and level of significance can be observed. For instance, director ownership is significant at 
5% level in the main analysis, but insignificant in robust analysis. Similarly, gender 
diversity is insignificant with COE which was previously significant at 5% level of 
significance. Finally, the findings of institutional, government ownership, audit firm size 
and board size using COE are consistent to those reported in main analysis using COC. 
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Table 7.7: Results Based on Cost of Equity 
Dependent Variable: COC/COE 
Dependent Variable: COC      Dependent Variable: COE 
 Indep.Variable Exp Sign Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
  Panel A: CG variables 
PCGI 
- -0.000256** -2.367414 -0.000158** -2.204032 
DOWNP + 0.000448** 2.378413 0.000176 1.101021 
IOWNP 
- 0.000110 0.968540 1.21E-05 0.082011 
GOWNP 
- 0.000242 1.103890 0.000146 0.605721 
BOWNP +/- -0.000165*** -3.394800 -0.000101 -1.558801 
FOWNP 
- 0.000782*** 4.871608 0.000411*** 2.638581 
BIG4 
- -0.000387 -0.059896 0.006483 0.905017 
BSZ 
- 0.002998 1.642575 0.004159 1.500352 
BGEN  
- 0.011861** 2.298860 0.007951 1.085436 
Panel B: Control variables 
LTA 
 
-0.018664*** -4.553196 0.001458 0.795485 
ROE 
 
-0.000520* -1.833582 -0.000397** -2.385347 
SALESG 
 
-0.001684 -0.295017 -0.006968 -0.894314 
LVG 
 
-0.000704*** -4.235213 5.89E-05 0.881462 
β 
 
0.152732* 2.512878 0.262360*** 2.959989 
CEMENT 
 
0.010105 0.599615 0.001034 0.129406 
CHEMICAL 
 
0.004724 0.369522 -0.011374 -0.672846 
ELECTRICITY 
 
0.024752** 2.282339 -0.008664 -0.442859 
FOOD 
 
0.033699** 2.481303 0.008284 1.064973 
HOUSHOLD 
 
0.039404** 2.520262 0.022184 1.591867 
MISC 
 
0.016622 1.192062 -0.014294 -1.285527 
OIL___GAS 
 
0.037005** 2.474791 -0.010638 -0.971212 
PHARMA 
 
-0.012422 -0.652965 -0.010169 -0.652053 
TEXTILE 
 
0.024341* 1.918665 0.007607 0.570009 
Y_02_DUM 
 
0.050828*** 19.45041 0.072188*** 22.86867 
Y_03_DUM 
 
-0.107665*** -10.98564 -0.138754*** -7.675312 
Y_04_DUM 
 
-0.094688*** -8.721466 -0.120677*** -6.395655 
Y_05_DUM 
 
-0.184587*** -13.67361 -0.309031*** -16.44785 
Y_06_DUM 
 
-0.138946*** -11.16315 -0.214983*** -10.89812 
Y_07_DUM 
 
-0.322375*** -24.26807 -0.536020*** -26.93127 
Y_08_DUM 
 
0.067629*** 5.772046 0.106917*** 6.311324 
Y_09_DUM 
 
-0.121282*** -19.59109 -0.214256*** -20.10931 
Y_10_DUM 
 
-0.265995*** -36.62020 -0.483644*** -40.63108 
Y_11_DUM 
 
-0.050639*** -6.622276 -0.112500*** -9.112842 
Constant 
 
0.493347*** 13.13452 0.217037*** 3.344781 
Adjusted R-square 0.540825 0.744496 
F-statistic 60.19378*** 147.4412*** 
Balanced panel observations 1760 1760 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows. Cost of Capital (COC) Pakistani Corporate Governance Index 
(PCGI), director ownership (DOWNP), institutional ownership (IOWNP), government ownership 
(GOWNP), block ownership (BOWNP), foreign ownership (FOWNP), audit firm size (BIG4), size of the 
board of directors (BSZ), board diversity on the basis of Gender (BGEN), firm size as log of total assets 
(LTA), profitability (ROE), growth opportunities (SALESG), leverage (LVG) and Systematic risk (β). 
Parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation (Panel Least Squares). Year 2003 and AUTO 
industry has been excluded from the analysis in order to avoid dummy variable trap.  The asterisks *, ** and 
*** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
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7.2.2.2 Empirical Findings of Control Variables 
Panel B of Table 7.7 presents the findings of main analysis and robust findings. A 
negative and significant relationship between firms’ profitability and COE is observed. Also, a 
positive and significant association is observed for sampled firms’ systematic risk and COE are 
in line with the main analysis. A significant and negative association between the size of the 
firm and leverage with COE became insignificant in the robust findings. The insignificant 
nexus between sales growth and COE is in line with the main findings of CG and COC. 
7.2.3 Results Based on COD: an alternative COC Proxy 
As discussed in subsection 4.3.2.3, the main findings are based on COC as a main 
measurement to calculate COC. Thus, the current study employs another alternative proxy 
for COC in order to account for the possibility that the main findings are sensitive to 
different COC’s proxies. In particular, and consistent with previous literature (e.g., Pham 
et al., 2012), cost of Debt (COD) is used as an alternative COC’s measurement. The 
relationship between PCGI and COC are re-regressed with COD as an alternative of COC 
and stated bellow. 
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Where all variables remain the same as in equation 2, except the Cost of Debt (COD) used 
as dependent variable instead of COC.  
Table 7.8 reports the main findings using COC in columns 3 and 4 and robust 
findings using COD presents in columns 5 and 6 of the same table. Generally, the findings 
of both analyses are similar as both predict similar direction of coefficient and level of 
significance either using COC or COD.  
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Table 7.8: Results Based on Cost of Debt 
Dependent Variable: COC/COD 
Dependent Variable: COC Dependent Variable: COD 
 Indep.Variable Exp Sign Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
  Panel A: CG variables 
PCGI 
- -0.000256** -2.367414 -0.000556*** -3.764441 
DOWNP + 0.000448** 2.378413 0.000150** 2.021592 
IOWNP 
- 0.000110 0.968540 4.21E-05 0.209547 
GOWNP 
- 0.000242 1.103890 -0.000204 -1.365303 
BOWNP +/- -0.000165*** -3.394800 -0.000258*** -7.090828 
FOWNP 
- 0.000782*** 4.871608 0.000926*** 5.473368 
BIG4 
- -0.000387 -0.059896 -0.016931*** -3.138824 
BSZ 
- 0.002998 1.642575 -0.001615 -0.854725 
BGEN  
- 0.011861** 2.298860 0.006309 1.638559 
Panel B: Control variables 
LTA 
 
-0.018664*** -4.553196 -0.029582*** -8.405904 
ROE 
 
-0.000520* -1.833582 -0.000696*** -2.721204 
SALESG 
 
-0.001684 -0.295017 -0.006232 -1.136623 
LVG 
 
-0.000704*** -4.235213 -0.000348**** -9.934225 
β 
 
0.152732* 2.512878 0.005018 1.022498 
CEMENT 
 
0.010105 0.599615 -0.108863*** -6.655512 
CHEMICAL 
 
0.004724 0.369522 -0.085767*** -6.805960 
ELECTRICITY 
 
0.024752** 2.282339 -0.032952 -1.093311 
FOOD 
 
0.033699** 2.481303 -0.116980*** -11.29308 
HOUSHOLD 
 
0.039404** 2.520262 -0.039804*** -2.583380 
MISC 
 
0.016622 1.192062 -0.101445*** -6.597592 
OIL___GAS 
 
0.037005** 2.474791 -0.009387 -0.439813 
PHARMA 
 
-0.012422 -0.652965 -0.184223*** -9.579359 
TEXTILE 
 
0.024341* 1.918665 -0.100337*** -7.269902 
Y_02_DUM 
 
0.050828*** 19.45041 -0.002534 -1.335294 
Y_03_DUM 
 
-0.107665*** -10.98564 -0.041724*** -15.94742 
Y_04_DUM 
 
-0.094688*** -8.721466 -0.024114*** -5.140635 
Y_05_DUM 
 
-0.184587*** -13.67361 -0.018813*** -3.160709 
Y_06_DUM 
 
-0.138946*** -11.16315 -0.006469 -0.906201 
Y_07_DUM 
 
-0.322375*** -24.26807 0.017339* 1.942072 
Y_08_DUM 
 
0.067629*** 5.772046 0.022637** 2.167550 
Y_09_DUM 
 
-0.121282*** -19.59109 0.015678 1.457604 
Y_10_DUM 
 
-0.265995*** -36.62020 0.023112** 2.055828 
Y_11_DUM 
 
-0.050639*** -6.622276 0.044381*** 3.870213 
Constant 
 
0.493347*** 13.13452 0.756528*** 9.673746 
Adjusted R-square 0.540825 0.270132 
F-statistic 60.19378*** 19.60072*** 
Balanced panel observations 1760 1760 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows. Cost of Capital (COC) Pakistani Corporate Governance Index 
(PCGI), director ownership (DOWNP), institutional ownership (IOWNP), government ownership 
(GOWNP), block ownership (BOWNP), foreign ownership (FOWNP), audit firm size (BIG4), size of the 
board of directors (BSZ), board diversity on the basis of Gender (BGEN), firm size as log of total assets 
(LTA), profitability (ROE), growth opportunities (SALESG), leverage (LVG) and Systematic risk (β) . 
Parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation (Panel Least Squares). Year 2003 and AUTO 
industry has been excluded from the analysis in order to avoid dummy variable trap.  The asterisks *, ** and 
*** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
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7.2.3.1 Empirical findings of ownership and audit firm size/board variables 
Panel A of Table 7.8 presents the findings of the relationship between CG and COC 
using both COC and COD as a dependent variable. As presented in column 5 and 6 of 
Table 7.8, this analysis using COD as a main dependent rather than COC, finds a negative 
and significant relationship between PCGI and block ownership with COD. Regardless of 
observable sensitivities in the magnitude of coefficient and level of significance, these 
findings show that the main findings are similar to the use of COD as the dependent 
variable. For instance, block ownership is negative and significant at 1% level in both 
analyses either by using COC or COD as dependent variable. However, the relationship 
between PCGI and COD is negative and significant at 5% level but significant at 1% level 
in robust analysis.  
Similarly, a positive association between director ownership, foreign ownership 
and board diversity on the basis of gender with COD are also consistent with the findings 
of main analysis. However, sensitivity in the magnitude of coefficients and level of 
significance can be observed. For instance, gender diversity in board is insignificant with 
COD whereas it was previously significant at 5% level. In addition, the insignificant 
relationship between institutional ownership, government ownership and board size with 
COD is consistent with main findings. However, audit firm size is negative and significant 
with COD which was negative and insignificant with COC in the main analysis.    
7.2.3.2 Empirical Findings of Control Variables 
As shown in Panel B of Table 7.8, in spite of  the observable minor sensitivities in 
the magnitude of coefficients, significance level and the direction of coefficients in robust 
model using COD, overall findings remain the same as in the main analysis using COC as 
the independent variable. First, significant and negative association between the size of the 
firm, firms’ profitability and leverage with COD is consistent with the main analysis. Second, 
insignificant relationship between sales growth and COD is also consistent with the main 
analysis. Finally, systematic risk is positively and significantly associated at 10% with COC 
but became insignificant with COD.  
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7.2.4 Results Based on Lagged Structure 
The current study employed lagged structure to investigate the level to which the 
study results are affected by endogeneity problem. The specification of this model is 
similar to that one specified previously in section 7.1.2 and the equation is presented 
below. 
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Except for the one year lag of explanatory and control variables, all variables are similar as 
explained in equation 2 in subsection 4.2.3.4 of chapter 4. 
 Generally, the findings of both analyses are similar as both analyses predict almost 
similar sign of coefficient, magnitude of coefficient and level of significance. These 
findings are discussed in the following subsections, with particular focus on the main 
sensitivities of the analysis.    
7.2.4.1 Empirical Findings of Ownership and audit firm size/board Variables 
Table 7.9 presents the impact of Un-lagged and lagged ownership variables on 
COC. As presented in column 5 and 6 of Table 7.9, the analysis of lagged structure finds 
that  PCGI and block ownership are negatively associated with COC. Although some 
observable minor sensitivity in the magnitude of coefficient and level of significance can 
be seen, the main results are robust with lagged structure. For instance, PCGI significant at 
10% level of significance while it was significant at 5% in the main analysis.  
Similarly, a positive and significant association of director ownership and foreign 
ownership with COC is also consistent with the findings of main analysis, however, a 
minor sensitivity in the magnitude of coefficients and level of significance can be 
observed. For instance, director ownership is statistically significant at 1% level while it 
was significant at 5% level in the main analysis. Institutional ownership and board 
diversity on the basis of gender show some level of sensitivities. For instance, institutional 
ownership is significant at 1% level while it was insignificant in the main analysis. 
Similarly, gender diversity in board is insignificant while it was significant in 5% level in 
the main analysis. 
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Table 7.9: Results Based on Lagged Structure 
Dependent Variable: COC 
Un-Lagged Structure      Lagged Structure 
 Indep.Variable Exp Sign Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
  Panel A: CG variables 
PCGI(-1) 
- -0.000256** -2.367414 -0.000250* -1.838121 
DOWNP(-1) + 0.000448** 2.378413 0.000496*** 2.613038 
IOWNP(-1) - 0.000110 0.968540 0.000270* 1.802866 
GOWNP(-1) - 0.000242 1.103890 -8.92E-05 -0.285109 
BOWNP(-1) +/- -0.000165*** -3.394800 -0.000196*** -2.968802 
FOWNP(-1) - 0.000782*** 4.871608 0.000795*** 4.081046 
BIG4(-1) - -0.000387 -0.059896 0.001296 0.151817 
BSZ(-1) - 0.002998 1.642575 0.002940 1.359421 
BGEN (-1) - 0.011861** 2.298860 0.010384 1.204158 
Panel B: Control variables 
LTA(-1) 
 
-0.018664*** -4.553196 -0.018774*** -8.242142 
ROE(-1) 
 
-0.000520* -1.833582 -0.000559* -1.820631 
SALESG(-1) 
 
-0.001684 -0.295017 -0.001323 -0.135539 
LVG(-1) 
 
-0.000704*** -4.235213 -0.000705*** -8.992319 
β(-1) 
 
0.152732* 2.512878 0.152765*** 19.22891 
CEMENT 
 
0.010105 0.599615 0.010137 0.636258 
CHEMICAL 
 
0.004724 0.369522 0.001964 0.132510 
ELECTRICITY 
 
0.024752** 2.282339 0.026850 1.534219 
FOOD 
 
0.033699** 2.481303 0.035288** 2.527793 
HOUSHOLD 
 
0.039404** 2.520262 0.039856** 2.153012 
MISC 
 
0.016622 1.192062 0.017636 0.935508 
OIL___GAS 
 
0.037005** 2.474791 0.042451** 2.232807 
PHARMA 
 
-0.012422 -0.652965 -0.013447 -0.737611 
TEXTILE 
 
0.024341* 1.918665 0.024908* 1.718005 
Y_02_DUM 
 
0.050828*** 19.45041 0.051004*** 3.259694 
Y_03_DUM 
 
-0.107665*** -10.98564 -0.108369*** -6.960392 
Y_04_DUM 
 
-0.094688*** -8.721466 -0.095440*** -5.994008 
Y_05_DUM 
 
-0.184587*** -13.67361 -0.185397*** -11.77733 
Y_06_DUM 
 
-0.138946*** -11.16315 -0.140445*** -8.609766 
Y_07_DUM 
 
-0.322375*** -24.26807 -0.323608*** -19.40903 
Y_08_DUM 
 
0.067629*** 5.772046 0.065392*** 3.911418 
Y_09_DUM 
 
-0.121282*** -19.59109 -0.122687*** -7.145642 
Y_10_DUM 
 
-0.265995*** -36.62020 -0.266950*** -15.29352 
Y_11_DUM 
 
-0.050639*** -6.622276 -0.052837*** -3.001795 
Constant 
 
0.493347*** 13.13452 0.496610*** 12.83157 
Adjusted R-square 0.540825 0.540752 
F-statistic 60.19378*** 58.53265*** 
Balanced panel observations 1760 1600 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows. Cost of Capital (COC) Pakistani Corporate Governance Index 
(PCGI), director ownership (DOWNP), institutional ownership (IOWNP), government ownership 
(GOWNP), block ownership (BOWNP), foreign ownership (FOWNP), audit firm size (BIG4), size of the 
board of directors (BSZ), board diversity on the basis of Gender (BGEN), firm size as log of total assets 
(LTA), profitability (ROE), growth opportunities (SALESG), leverage (LVG) and Systematic risk (β) . 
Parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation (Panel Least Squares). Year 2003 and AUTO 
industry has been excluded from the analysis in order to avoid dummy variable trap.  The asterisks *, ** and 
*** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
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7.2.4.2 Empirical Findings of Control Variables 
As shown in Panel B of Table 7.9, despite the observable minor sensitivities in the 
magnitude of coefficients and significance level in the robust analysis, the findings remain 
statistically the same as in the main analysis. First, the robust findings show a significant and 
negative nexus between firm size, firms’ profitability and leverage with firm level COC which 
are consistent with main analysis’s findings except for some minor sensitivity in level of 
significance. Second, this analysis shows significant and positive relationship between 
systematic risk and COC which is also in line with the findings of main analysis. Finally, it 
reports statistically insignificant relationship between sales growth and COC, suggesting that 
the overall findings of main analysis are robust.  
7.2.5 Results Based on Random effect Model 
Fixed or random effect model is applied to test the degree to which the main 
findings are sensitive to unobservable firms’ characteristics. Following the procedure 
discussed in subsection 7.1.3, this study employs Hausman test to identify the suitability 
between the fixed effect and random effect models. As shown in Table 7.10, the p value 
suggests that the random effect model is appropriate as a robust analysis to control for the 
unobserved firms’ characteristics. The findings of random effect model (robust findings) 
and OLS estimation (main analysis) are presented in Table 7. 
 
 Table 7.10:Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. P value.  
Cross-section random 0.000000 24 1.0000 
 
Adjusted R-square is 0.540825 for main analysis and 0.345833 for random effect 
model. Similarly, F-statistic is 60.19378 for main analysis and 27.56898 for the random 
effect model and both are statistically significant at 1% level. Generally, the findings of 
both analyses are similar as the sign of coefficient, magnitude of coefficient and level of 
significance are similar. These findings are discussed in the following subsections, with 
particular focus on the main sensitivities in this analysis.   
 
7.2.5.1 Empirical Findings of Ownership and audit firm size/board Variables 
Panel A of Table 7.11 presents the OLS and random effect models findings. As 
presented in column 5 and 6 of Table 7.11, the random effect model finds a negative and 
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significant nexus between PCGI and block ownership with COC. Although minor 
sensitivities in the magnitude of coefficient and level of significance can be noticed, these 
findings show that the main findings are robust with unobservable firm characteristics. For 
instance, PCGI is significant at 5% level of significance in the main analysis whereas it is 
significant at 10% level in random effect model. 
Similarly, a significant and positive association of foreign ownership and director 
ownership with COC are also consistent with the findings of main analysis. However, 
institutional ownership and board diversity shows some level of sensitivities in robust 
analysis. For example, institutional ownership is significant at 10% level of significance 
while it was insignificant in the main analysis. Similarly, board diversity on the basis of 
gender is significant in both random effect and OLS analysis but the coefficient has 
changed from positive to negative in the robust analysis. 
 
7.2.5.2  Empirical Findings of Control Variables 
As shown in Panel B of Table 7.11, the findings for control variables in the random 
effect model remain largely the same as in the main analysis except for some observable 
sensitivity in the magnitude of coefficients and significance level. First, the random effect 
model shows that significant and negative association between the size of the firm, firms’ 
profitability and leverage with COC, which is consistent with the main analysis. However, 
sampled firms’ profitability became statistically significant at 1% level which was previously 
significant at 10% level. Second, the random effect model report asignificant and positive 
association between systematic risk and COC, which is also consistent with the main analysis.  
However, systematic risk became highly significant, at 1% level in the robust findings which 
was previously significant at 5% level. Finally, the figures reported in the table shows a 
statistically insignificant relationship between firm growth and firm-level COC, suggesting that 
the findings of the main analysis are largely robust with random effect model.  
 
 
  
189 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.11: Results Based on Random effect Model 
Dependent Variable: COC 
  
Ordinary Least Square Random effect 
 Indep.Variable Exp Sign Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
  Panel A: CG variables 
PCGI 
- -0.000256** -2.367414 -0.001193* -1.859904 
DOWNP + 0.000448** 2.378413 0.000768** 2.563165 
IOWNP 
- 0.000110 0.968540 0.000448* 1.649500 
GOWNP 
- 0.000242 1.103890 0.000365 0.703903 
BOWNP +/- -0.000165*** -3.394800 -0.000245*** -2.704907 
FOWNP 
- 0.000782*** 4.871608 0.001188*** 5.928747 
BIG4 
- -0.000387 -0.059896 0.005355 0.526697 
BSZ 
- 0.002998 1.642575 0.000219 0.042486 
BGEN  
- 0.011861** 2.298860 -0.017972* -1.707922 
Panel B: Control variables 
LTA 
 
-0.018664*** -4.553196 -0.025381*** -4.907045 
ROE 
 
-0.000520* -1.833582 -0.000981*** -2.586850 
SALESG 
 
-0.001684 -0.295017 -0.010722 -0.348259 
LVG 
 
-0.000704*** -4.235213 -0.000760*** -3.637288 
β 
 
0.152732* 2.512878 0.171212** 2.394239 
CEMENT 
 
0.010105 0.599615 0.027762 0.872298 
CHEMICAL 
 
0.004724 0.369522 0.023853 0.788389 
ELECTRICITY 
 
0.024752** 2.282339 0.057958 1.339660 
FOOD 
 
0.033699** 2.481303 0.030918 1.102371 
HOUSHOLD 
 
0.039404** 2.520262 0.058436** 2.009510 
MISC 
 
0.016622 1.192062 0.031300 0.921679 
OIL___GAS 
 
0.037005** 2.474791 0.040242 1.311495 
PHARMA 
 
-0.012422 -0.652965 -0.044457 -1.502836 
TEXTILE 
 
0.024341* 1.918665 0.046541* 1.683848 
Y_02_DUM 
 
0.050828*** 19.45041 0.053000*** 7.706434 
Y_03_DUM 
 
-0.107665*** -10.98564 -0.127128*** -8.630683 
Y_04_DUM 
 
-0.094688*** -8.721466 -0.113086*** -7.392718 
Y_05_DUM 
 
-0.184587*** -13.67361 -0.205311*** -9.451115 
Y_06_DUM 
 
-0.138946*** -11.16315 -0.151037*** -7.130157 
Y_07_DUM 
 
-0.322375*** -24.26807 -0.341802*** -15.58416 
Y_08_DUM 
 
0.067629*** 5.772046 0.040661*** 2.308330 
Y_09_DUM 
 
-0.121282*** -19.59109 -0.144043*** -15.56460 
Y_10_DUM 
 
-0.265995*** -36.62020 -0.311461*** -30.73740 
Y_11_DUM 
 
-0.050639*** -6.622276 -0.079397*** -6.463321 
Constant 
 
0.493347*** 13.13452 0.558114*** 4.445384 
Adjusted R-square 0.540825 0.345833 
F-statistic 60.19378*** 27.56898*** 
Balanced panel observations 1760 1760 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows. Cost of Capital (COC) Pakistani Corporate Governance Index 
(PCGI), director ownership (DOWNP), institutional ownership (IOWNP), government ownership 
(GOWNP), block ownership (BOWNP), foreign ownership (FOWNP), audit firm size (BIG4), size of the 
board of directors (BSZ), board diversity on the basis of Gender (BGEN), firm size as log of total assets 
(LTA), profitability (ROE), growth opportunities (SALESG), leverage (LVG) and Systematic risk (β) . 
Parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation (Panel Least Squares). Year 2003 and AUTO industry 
has been excluded from the analysis in order to avoid dummy variable trap.  The asterisks *, ** and *** 
denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
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7.2.6 Results Based on 2SLS Model 
The current study employed the same procedure as explained in section 7.1.4 to 
address further the possibility of the existence of endogeneity in the relationship between 
CG and COC.  This investigation is implemented in two stages. First, and as shown in 
equation 3 and 4, the regression is run on PCGI and the controls. Then predicted values 
from the regressions are named as P-PCGII. The first stage of Durbin-Wu-Hausman is 
performed using the following equation:  
∑
=
++=
n
i
ititiit CONTROLSPCGI
1
0 εβα                                   (36) 
Where the PCGI refers to Pakistani Corporate Governance Index and CONTROLS 
variables remain the same as explained in equation 2 in subsection 4.2.3.4 of chapter 4.  
In the Second stage of Durbin-Wu-Hausman, the COC is regressed on PCGI, P-
PCGII and control variables as follows: 
∑
=
++−++=
n
i
ititiititit CONTROLSPCGIIPPCGICOC
1
210 εβββα          (37) 
Where the COC refers to weighted average cost of capital, PCGI refers to Pakistani 
CG Index, P-PCGII denotes the predicted values from regression of control variables over 
PCGI from equation (36), and CONTROLS variables remain the same as in equation 2 in 
subsection 4.2.3.4 of chapter 4. 
After carrying out Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity investigation, the current 
study rejects the null hypothesis of no endogeneity as the coefficient on P-PCGI is 
statistically significant (0.000) at 1% level of significance with PCGI. The finding of this 
investigation shows that the endogeneity problem exists. Therefore, following, the current 
study uses the 2SLS technique as a robust to find out how far the findings are biased and 
inconsistent due to this problem.  
2SLS is performed in two stages. In the first stage, the PCGI is regressed on four 
alternative CG variables, nationality diversity in board, the non-executive members of the 
board, the board meetings number, and capital expenditure. The alternative CG variables’ 
selection is based on literature (e.g, Ntim et al., 2012; Pham et al., 2012; Tariq et al., 
2014). The equation below specifies this regression where the predicted value of PCGI and 
residuals will be saved as P-PCGII and R-PCGI respectively. As shown in Table 7.12, the 
study accepts the P-PCGII as a valid instrumental variable as P-PCGII is significantly 
associated with PCGI and insignificantly related to R-PCGI. This decision is taken on the 
basis of correlation matrix that includes PCGI, P-PCGII, and R-PCGI. 
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Table 7.12: Results Based on  Correlations 
  PCGI P-PCGII R-PCGI 
PCGI 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .092
**
 .996** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
0.000 0.000 
N 1760 1760 1760 
P-PCGII 
Pearson 
Correlation .092
**
 1 0.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 
 
1.000 
N 1760 1760 1760 
R-PCGI 
Pearson 
Correlation .996
**
 0.000 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 1.000 
 
N 1760 1760 1760 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). PCGI denotes Pakistani Corporate Governance Index,  
P-PCGII denotes Standardized Predicted Value and R-PCGI denotes Standardized Residual.  
 
∑
=
++++++=
n
i
ititiititititit CONTROLSCEBMFNEXDBNATPCGI
1
43210 εβββββα      (38) 
Where PCGI denotes the Pakistani governance index, and BNAT, NED, BFM, and 
CE are termed as nationality diversity in board, the non-executive members of the board, 
the board meetings number, and capital expenditure. Controls remain similar as explained 
in equation 2.  
In the second stage, equation 2 is re-estimated using P-PCGII instead of PCGI as 
follows: 
∑
=
+++
++++
+++−+=
n
i
ititiit
itititit
ititititit
CONTROLSBGEN
BSZBIGFOWNPBOWNP
GOWNPIOWNPDOWNPPCGIIPCOC
1
9
8765
43210
4
εββ
ββββ
ββββα
       (39) 
Where all variables remain same as in equation 2 in subsection 4.2.3.4 of chapter 4, 
except the P-PCGII, that is being used as instrumental variable for the main independent 
variable.  
The findings of 2SLS (robust findings) and OLS estimation (main analysis) are 
presented in Table 7.13 simultaneously in order to compare the findings. Table 7.13 reports 
the main findings using OLS in columns 3 and 4 and robust findings using 2SLS presents 
in columns 5 and 6 of the same table.  
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Table 7.13: Results Based on  2SLS 
Dependent Variable: COC 
  Ordinary Least Square 2SLS 
 Indep.Variable Exp Sign Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
  Panel A: CG variables 
PCGI 
- -0.000256** -2.367414 -0.003473** -2.368299 
DOWNP + 0.000448** 2.378413 0.000808*** 2.755872 
IOWNP 
- 0.000110 0.968540 0.000451 1.036336 
GOWNP 
- 0.000242 1.103890 0.001057* 1.668139 
BOWNP +/- -0.000165*** -3.394800 -0.000312*** -2.802401 
FOWNP 
- 0.000782*** 4.871608 0.001167*** 4.033018 
BIG4 
- -0.000387 -0.059896 0.012895 0.909296 
BSZ 
- 0.002998 1.642575 -0.001324 -0.341998 
BGEN  
- 0.011861** 2.298860 -0.002020 -0.148545 
Panel B: Control variables 
LTA 
 
-0.018664*** -4.553196 -0.015608*** -3.683365 
ROE 
 
-0.000520* -1.833582 -0.001147*** -2.668026 
SALESG 
 
-0.001684 -0.295017 -0.008931 -0.574553 
LVG 
 
-0.000704*** -4.235213 -0.000756*** -6.888064 
β 
 
0.152732* 2.512878 0.151077*** 13.68539 
CEMENT 
 
0.010105 0.599615 0.038009 1.435644 
CHEMICAL 
 
0.004724 0.369522 0.019447 0.752682 
ELECTRICITY 
 
0.024752** 2.282339 0.066610** 2.044975 
FOOD 
 
0.033699** 2.481303 0.013120 0.523226 
HOUSHOLD 
 
0.039404** 2.520262 0.055672* 1.765461 
MISC 
 
0.016622 1.192062 0.004592 0.157366 
OIL___GAS 
 
0.037005** 2.474791 0.007353 0.234713 
PHARMA 
 
-0.012422 -0.652965 -0.070214* -1.950258 
TEXTILE 
 
0.024341* 1.918665 0.025023 1.014281 
Y_02_DUM 
 
0.050828*** 19.45041 0.063890** 2.318367 
Y_03_DUM 
 
-0.107665*** -10.98564 -0.091923*** -2.986079 
Y_04_DUM 
 
-0.094688*** -8.721466 -0.047307 -1.214524 
Y_05_DUM 
 
-0.184587*** -13.67361 -0.116177** -2.482431 
Y_06_DUM 
 
-0.138946*** -11.16315 -0.041004 -0.753458 
Y_07_DUM 
 
-0.322375*** -24.26807 -0.186725*** -2.594431 
Y_08_DUM 
 
0.067629*** 5.772046 0.217326*** 2.705040 
Y_09_DUM 
 
-0.121282*** -19.59109 0.046495 0.542313 
Y_10_DUM 
 
-0.265995*** -36.62020 -0.099240 -1.047143 
Y_11_DUM 
 
-0.050639*** -6.622276 0.137427 1.414382 
Constant 
 
0.493347*** 13.13452 0.565122*** 8.267790 
Adjusted R-square 0.540825 0.264234 
F-statistic 60.19378*** 28.47540*** 
Balanced panel observations 1760 1760 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows. Cost of Capital (COC) Pakistani Corporate Governance Index 
(PCGI), director ownership (DOWNP), institutional ownership (IOWNP), government ownership 
(GOWNP), block ownership (BOWNP), foreign ownership (FOWNP), audit firm size (BIG4), size of the 
board of directors (BSZ), board diversity on the basis of gender (BGEN) , firm size as log of total assets 
(LTA), profitability (ROE), growth opportunities (SALESG), leverage (LVG) and Systematic risk (β) . 
Parameter estimates are obtained by OLS estimation (Panel Least Squares). Year 2003 and AUTO 
industry has been excluded from the analysis in order to avoid dummy variable trap.  The asterisks *, ** and 
*** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
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7.2.6.1 Empirical Findings of Ownership and audit firm size/board Variables 
As presented in column 5 and 6 of Table 7.13, the 2SLS finds a negative and 
significant association between PCGI and block ownership with COC. Similarly, a positive 
and significant nexus between director ownership and foreign ownership with COC is also 
consistent with the findings of main analysis. However, minor sensitivity in the magnitude 
of coefficients and in level of significance can be observed. For instance, Director 
Ownership is statistically significant at 1% level which was previously significant at the 
5% level in the main analysis. . Similarly, government ownership is significant at 10% 
level in the 2SLS analysis whereas it was insignificant in the main analysis. Further, 
gender diversity in board is negative and insignificant while it was positive and statistically 
significant at 5% level in the main analysis. 
7.2.6.2 Empirical Findings of Control Variables 
Panel B of Table 7.13 shows that the findings of control variables in 2 SLS are 
largely similar to the main analysis by using OLS. For instance, 2SLS shows that size of the 
firm, firms’ profitability and leverage are negatively associated with COC while a positive and 
significant relationship between systematic risk and COC is consistent with main analysis. 
However, firms’ profitability became significant, at 1% level which was previously significant 
only at 10% level. Similarly, systematic risk became significant, at 1% level in robust analysis 
which was previously significant at 5% level of significance.  
7.3 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION ON FINDINGS  
This chapter presented and discussed the findings of a number of robustness analyses. 
Specifically, four tests were employed to check the extent to which the findings obtained in 
chapter 6 are sensitive or robust to alternative estimations and models, including, (i) the a 
weighted CG index as an alternative; (ii) use of COE and COD as alternative COC 
variables; (iii) the use of fixed or random effects; and (iv) the use of lagged structure to test 
the endogeneity problems. Regardless of observable minor sensitivities in the magnitude of 
coefficient and significance level, these analyses show that the findings of main analysis 
performed in chapter 6 are robust with the alternative variables, lagged structure, fixed or 
random effect and to the presence of endogeneity.  
Robustness tests regarding factor influencing level of compliance shows that overall 
findings are unchanged. All robustness tests suggest a positive and significant relationship 
between institutional ownership, government ownership and foreign ownership with PCGI. 
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As discussed in section 6.2, these finding shows that Pakistani firms with higher level of 
institutional ownerships are likely to comply with more CG standards than those with less 
or no institutional ownership. From agency theory viewpoint, Aggarwal et al. (2011) 
suggests that the presence of institutional ownership ensures some degree of accountability 
and this potentially influence firms to adopt better CG practices, either directly by 
influencing managements by using their voting rights or indirectly by their decisions to 
buy or threaten to sell their shares. This finding also shows that Pakistani firms with higher 
level of government ownerships are likely to comply with more CG regulations than those 
firms with less or no government ownership. The agency theory literature suggests that the 
firms with government ownership are expected to disclose more CG information since 
there is less divergence between shareholders and government interest. The reported 
finding also shows that Pakistani firms with higher level of foreign investors are likely to 
provide additional CG information than those with less or with no foreign investors. 
Theoretically, this positive relationship between foreign ownership and firm-level of CG 
compliance is consistent with information asymmetry and imperfect information issues. 
The reported negative and significant relationship between block ownership and board 
size with PCGI is consistent with the main analysis with respect to the coefficient and 
significance level. As discussed in section 6.3, this shows that Pakistani firms with higher 
level of block ownerships are expected to less comply with CG rules than those with lower 
block ownership. This significant and negative relationship between CG disclosure level 
and block ownership is consistent with theoretical prediction.  In this regard, block 
shareholders may influence the management to disclose less CG information as their 
interest may not necessarily align with minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Laidroo, 2009). This issue is more evident in the emerging markets such as Pakistan due to 
the weak legal system in protecting minority shareholders. Further, the findings of no 
relationship between director ownership, audit firm size, board diversity on the basis of 
gender and board diversity on the basis of nationality with level of compliance are in line 
with those reported in the main test.  
Robustness results regarding the nexus between CG and COC are also consistent with 
the main findings. For example, a negative and significant association between PCGI and 
block ownership with COC is consistent with the main findings. As reported in section 6.3, 
the coefficient on PCGI is negative and statistically significant at 5% level, suggesting that 
firms with high level of CG standards have a lower COC. Similarly, the coefficient on 
block ownership is significant at 1%  and negative suggesting that there is relationship 
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between the block ownership and firm-level COC. This shows that Pakistani firms with 
higher level of block ownership have lower COC than those firms with lower percentage of 
block ownership. This is consistent with the prediction of agency theory in which the 
dominance of majority shareholders in publically traded firms demonstrates that minority 
shareholders have the risk of expropriation. 
The significant and positive association between foreign ownership, board diversity 
and director ownership with COC are also consistent with the findings of the main 
analysis. The coefficient on director ownership is positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that firms with high level of director ownership have a higher COC. 
Theoretically, this positive relationship between director ownership and COC is consistent 
with the prediction of agency theory. It has been argued that a higher level of director 
ownership may worsen agency problems (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Similarly, the finding 
shows that Pakistani firms with higher level of foreign investors have higher COC than 
those with less or no foreign investors. Theoretically, this positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and COC is consistent with the prediction of information asymmetry. 
This issue is relatively higher among foreign investors because of language and distance 
obstacles (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007) which may leads to higher COC. 
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CHAPTER 8 
8 CONCLUSION AND AVENUE FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
This chapter discusses the conclusion of the study. Specifically, it aims to attain the 
following objectives. First, it recaps the findings of study. Second, it explains the policy 
implications of the study, and where appropriate, makes recommendations. Third, this 
chapter summarises the contributions of the study. Fourth, it identifies the limitations of 
the current study. Finally, it highlights perspective avenues for the future research.  
The chapter is organised into five sections. Section 8.1 discusses the summary of the 
study. Section 8.2 presents the policy implications of the current study, and makes 
recommendations accordingly. Section 8.3 provides the contributions of the current study. 
Section 8.4 reports the limitations of the study, while section 8.5 reports the perspective 
avenues for the future research.   
 
8.1 SUMMARY OF THE REAEARCH FINDINGS 
This thesis sought to empirically ascertain whether Pakistani listed firms that comply 
with 2002 PCCG have improved firm value and lowered COC than those with less or no 
compliance. Specifically, using a sample of 160 Pakistani listed firms from 2003 to 2013, 
this study has examined the relationship between CG structure and firm COC. The level of 
compliance with PCGI and factors influencing the level of compliance and disclosure are 
also examined in this study. Distinct from prior literature, the CG-COC relationship is 
examined by using three main variables i.e. unique compliance CG index, the ownership 
structures and audit/board characteristics. These findings summaries are provided in the 
subsections below.  
8.1.1 Findings of CG Compliance level with PCGI 
The prior literature has studied CG either by individual CG mechanisms or by CG 
compliance index. Briefly, individual CG mechanisms involves examining the relationship 
between single CG variables and firms’ decisions while CG compliance index involves the 
construction of broad CG index that encapsulates a wide set of CG mechanisms and then 
investigating the nexus between CG compliance index and firms’ decisions. This study 
uses a unique compliance CG index to examine the relationship between CG and COC. 
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Specifically, by using a sample of 160 Pakistani listed firms from 2003 to 2013, this study 
seeks to answer the first research question about the level of CG compliance and disclosure 
with the 2002 PCCG. In addition, it seeks to answer three sub-questions: (i) the extent to 
which the introduction of the PCCG 2002 has improved CG standards among Pakistani 
listed firms; (ii) the CG provisions that Pakistani firms comply with most and (iii) the 
extent to which the reliance on the Anglo-American model has led to better CG practices 
in Pakistan.  
First, the reported findings suggest that the mean score of PCGI (average 
compliance level) has improved from 20.6% in 2003 to 85.2% in 2013 with an overall 
increase of 64.6% in eleven years. This improvement in level of compliance and disclosure 
is in line with research performed in other developing countries (e.g., Akkermans et al., 
2007; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazura, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012a). The overall PCGI ranges 
from a minimum of 0.00 to a maximum of 97.18, with an average of 54.23 for the 1760 
firm-year observations over eleven years from 2003 to 2013. In contrast to the concerns 
about the capability of CG codes to enhance CG practices in a developing country setting, 
the findings suggest that listed Pakistani firms have increasingly complied with governance 
requirements over the eleven years from 2003 to 2013.  
Second, the findings of the study suggest that the introduction of the PCCG in 2002 
has improved CG standards among Pakistani listed firms. For instance, the overall level of 
compliance with PCGI was 20.56% in 2003 which has risen to 85.16% in 2013. This is 
further supported by the findings of sub-indies’ findings where the PCGI shows a higher 
compliance level with the provisions related to the five sub-indices. Finally, and in contrast 
to the probability that the PCCG’s dependence on Anglo-American style may not be able 
to improve CG practices due to the differences between the developed world and Pakistan, 
the findings of the study suggest that PCCG is capable to some extent to promote CG 
standards of Pakistani listed firms.  
8.1.2 Findings Based on Factors Influencing Level of CG Compliance  
The findings related to the nine hypotheses investigated for the factors influencing 
CG compliance level have been stated and discussed in section 6.2, and are now briefly 
summarised in this subsection. The first hypothesis examining the relationship between 
director ownership and level of CG disclosure find that the coefficient on director 
ownership is positive and statistically insignificant, meaning that there is no statistically 
significant relationship between the director ownership and level of CG compliance and 
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disclosure.  The second hypothesis testing the connection between institutional ownership 
and level of CG disclosure shows that the coefficient on institutional ownership is positive 
and statistically significant at a 1% level, meaning that Pakistani firms with higher level of 
institutional ownerships are likely to comply with more CG standards than those with less 
or no institutional ownership.  
The third hypothesis investigating the relationship between government ownership 
and level of CG disclosure finds that the coefficient of government ownership is positive 
and statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that Pakistani firms with higher level of 
government ownership are likely to comply with more CG practices than those with less or 
no government ownership. The fourth hypothesis examining the relationship between 
block ownership and level of CG disclosure reports that the coefficient of block ownership 
is negative and statistically significant at 1% level. It suggests that Pakistani firms with 
higher level of block ownerships are less likely to comply with CG standards than those 
with lower block ownership.  
The fifth hypothesis testing the relationship between foreign ownership and level of 
CG disclosure finds that the coefficient of foreign ownership is positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level. This finding shows that Pakistani firms with higher level of foreign 
investors are likely to provide additional CG information than those with less or no foreign 
investors. The sixth hypothesis investigating the relationship between audit firm size and 
level of CG disclosure find that the coefficient of audit firm size is positive, but statistically 
insignificant, indicating that there is no significant relationship between audit firm size and 
firm-level of CG compliance and disclosure.  
The seventh hypothesis examining the nexus between the board size and level of 
CG disclosure report that the coefficient of board size is negative and statistically 
significant at 5% level. This suggests that small board tend to increase the level of CG 
compliance and disclosure rather than larger boards. The eighth hypothesis investigating 
the relationship between the presences of foreigners on the firm’s board and level of CG 
disclosure show no explanatory power in explaining the variations in CG compliance and 
disclosure. This finding suggests that the presence of foreign directors on firms’ board do 
not encourage firms to provide more CG information.  
The ninth hypothesis testing the relationship between the presence of female on 
firms’ board and level of CG disclosure reports evidence of no explanatory power in 
explaining the variations in CG disclosure. This suggests that the presence of female on 
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firms’ boards do not encourage Pakistani listed firms to provide additional CG 
information. 
8.1.3 Findings Based on CG-COC Relationship  
The findings of the association between CG and COC have been reported and 
discussed in chapter 6, section 6.3, and are now briefly summarised in this subsection. The 
tenth and main hypothesis tested for the relationship between CG and COC finds that there 
is a negative and statistically significant relationship between PCGI and COC. The negative 
evidence of a statistically significant PCGI-COC relation implies that, on average, better 
governed Pakistani listed firms tend to be associated with lower COC than their poorly-
governed counterparts.  
The eleventh hypothesis tested is that there is positive relationship between director 
ownership and firms’ COC. The finding shows that the coefficient of director ownership is 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firms with high level of director 
ownership have a higher COC. The twelfth hypothesis of intuitional ownership and firms’ 
COC has been tested in the current study. The finding suggests that the coefficient of 
institutional ownership on COC is positive and statistically insignificant, suggesting that 
the percentage of institutional ownership do not explain the variation in firm level COC.  
The thirteenth hypothesis testing the nexus between government ownership and 
firms’ COC reports a positive and statistically insignificant relationship. This means that 
the level of government ownership has no power in explaining the variation in firm level 
COC. The fourteenth hypothesis examined the relationship between block ownership and 
firms’ COC. Its finding shows that the coefficient of block ownership is negative and 
statistically significant at 1% level of significance, suggesting that Pakistani firms with 
higher level of block ownership have lower COC than those firms with lower percentage of 
block ownership.  
The fifteenth hypothesis tested the relationship between foreign ownership and 
firms’ COC. It finds a positive and statistically significant nexus, indicating that Pakistani 
firms with higher level of foreign investors have higher COC than those with less or no 
foreign investors. The sixteenth hypothesis examined the nexus between board size and 
firms’ COC. The finding shows that the coefficient of board size is positive and 
statistically insignificant indicating that size of board not explaining the variations in firm 
level COC.  
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The seventeenth hypothesis tested the relationship between audit firm size and firms’ 
COC and finds that the coefficient of audit firm size is negative and statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that there is no association between audit firm size and firm-level 
COC. The final hypothesis examined the association between gender diversity and firms’ 
COC. It finds a positive and statistically significant nexus at 5% level of significance.  
8.1.4 Findings Based on the Robustness Analyses 
As it has been discussed in chapter four and reported in chapter seven, four 
robustness analyses were performed to ascertain the extent to which the findings presented 
in chapter six are robust to alternative theoretical and empirical explanations, as well as 
estimations. These analyses include: alternative governance index; alternative COC 
measures; and random effect model. It also includes analyses examining different 
endogeneity problems including: lagged structure and a two stage least square model.  
8.1.4.1 Robustness Findings Based on Factors Influencing Level of CG Compliance  
The robustness findings of the investigation of factors influencing level of CG 
compliance and disclosure are discussed in section 7.1 are now summarised in this 
subsection. First, in order to ascertain whether the findings are sensitive to the un-weighted 
CG index used in this study, a weighted Pakistani CG Index (WPCGI) is constructed and 
used instead of un-weighted CG index. The finding shows that the main findings are robust 
with alternative CG proxy and not sensitive to the weighted CG index. Second, to test the 
extent to which the main results are sensitive to firms’ characteristics, random effect model 
is applied after identifying the suitability between the fixed and random effect models 
through the Hausman test. Despite minor conflicting results, the findings in random effect 
model are in line with the original findings of the study.  
Third, the presence of endogeneity problem among the CG variables is addressed 
by using lagged structure model to test whether main findings are robust or not. Regardless 
of observable minor sensitivities in the magnitude of coefficient and significance level, 
these analyses show that the findings in lagged structure are robust with the findings of un-
lagged structure, suggesting that the study’s findings are robust to the presence of 
endogeneity. Finally, the presence of endogeneity among the CG variables is further 
addressed by using two-stage least square model to examine whether findings are sensitive 
to the endogeneity problems that may arise due to the omitted variables problem. The 
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findings of 2SLS suggest that the overall findings of the model are in line with the main 
findings of the study and; hence, it is clearly evident that findings of main study presented 
in section 6.2 are robust to the presence of endogeneity.   
8.1.4.2 Robustness Findings Based on CG and COC 
The robustness results of the nexus between CG and COC are discussed in section 
7.2 and summarised in this subsection. First, in order to make sure that the findings are 
robust to the un-weighted CG index used in this study, a weighted Pakistani CG index 
(WPCGI) is constructed and used to test the relationship between CG and COC. Using 
WPCGI as a main independent variable instead of PCGI, the findings show that the results 
of CG and COC relationship are largely robust with alternative CG index and not sensitive 
to the WPCGI. In addition to the alternate CG index, the current study also employs 
alternative proxies for COC in order to account for the possibility that the main findings 
are sensitive to different COC proxies. In this regard, Cost of equity (COE) is used as 
alternative COC’s measurement. The relationship between PCGI and COC has been re-
estimated by using COE. The result shows a negative and significant impact of PCGI on 
the cost of capital in the form of COE which is consistent with the main study’s findings. 
Likewise, the current study employs Cost of Debt (COD) as another alternative proxy for 
COC. The nexus between PCGI and COC has been re-estimated by using COD as a main 
dependent variable. The finding shows a negative and significant relationship between 
PCGI and COD which is consistent with the original study’s findings. Therefore, it is 
obvious that findings of study presented in section 6.3 are robust to the alternative CG and 
COC variables.   
Second, to examine the level to which the results of the current study are sensitive 
to firms’ characteristics, random effect model is applied. Irrespective of observable 
sensitivities in the nexus between institutional ownership and board diversity on the basis 
of gender with COC, these findings show that the main results are robust to unobserved 
firms’ characteristics. Third, the presence of endogeneity problem was addressed by using 
lagged structure model to examine whether main findings of the study are robust. 
Regardless of minor sensitivities in the relationship between institutional ownership and 
board diversity on the basis of gender with COC, these results show that the main findings 
are robust to the presence of endogeneity. The findings of institutional ownership and 
board diversity on the basis of gender show some level of sensitivities in lagged structure 
model. For example, institutional ownership is significant at 10% level of significance 
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while it was insignificant in the main study. Finally, the presence of endogeneity among 
the CG variables is further addressed by using two-stage least square model. The results of 
2SLS suggest that the overall findings of the model are in line with the main findings of 
the study and; hence, it is evident that findings of study presented in section 6.3 are robust 
to the presence of endogeneity.   
8.1.5 Summary of the Key Findings 
Using the data of 160 Pakistani firms for eleven years from 2003 to 2013, this 
thesis has examined the level of compliance with PCGI, factors influencing the level of 
compliance and the relationship between CG structure and firm COC. The reported 
findings relating to the CG disclosure suggest that governance disclosure has improved 
over the study period with an overall increase of 64.6% over eleven years of the PCGI 
from 2003 to 2013. The findings of the study also suggest that the introduction of 2002 
PCCG has improved CG standards among Pakistani listed firms.  The results of the study 
suggest a positive and significant relationship between institutional ownership, government 
ownership and foreign ownership with PCGI. However, study report significant and 
negative nexus between board size and block ownership with PCGI. Further, the findings 
report no relationship between director ownership, audit firm size, board diversity on the 
basis of gender and board diversity on the basis of nationality with level of governance 
disclosure compliance.  
The results on the relationship between CG and COC suggest that there is a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between PCGI and COC. Similarly, a 
negative and significant association between block ownership with COC is reported. The 
reported results indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
director ownership, foreign ownership and board diversity with COC. However, the 
relationship between Institutional and government ownership, big4 and board size with 
COC reports no significant relationship. 
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8.2 POLICY IMPLICATION OF THE STUDY AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section discusses the policy implications of the current study’s findings 
summarised in section 8.1. It also proposes some recommendations to investors, regulatory 
authorities, firms and policy makers.   
8.2.1  Policy Implications and Recommendations: Level of CG 
Compliance and Disclosure 
A number of important implications and recommendations can be listed from the 
findings of factors influencing the level of CG compliance and disclosure reported in 
section 6.2.  
First, the finding of the level of CG compliance and disclosure with PCGI shows 
that the CG standards have generally improved over the period of study. This indicates that 
the efforts of various CG stakeholders, notably the Security and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan and Karachi Stock Exchange Pakistan, among others, have positive influence on 
improving CG standards among Pakistani listed firms. Specifically, the findings of study 
states that the introduction of 2002 PCCG, alongside the Companies Ordinance 1984, and 
the KSE listing rules have significantly helped in improving the CG standards. This 
evidence of enhancement in CG practices also infers that the UK-style CG compliance 
regime appears to be working to some extent, and therefore may be appropriate for 
Pakistani listed firms. This conclusion is in line with the prior studies that have examined 
CG standards in countries with UK style CG regime (e.g., Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013).  
Second, the improvement in level of CG compliance and disclosure recommends 
that the implementation of high governance principles in the form of CG codes can 
increase CG practices in developing countries even with weak legal enforcement.  
Therefore, it is recommended that the countries have not issued CG code yet, are highly 
encouraged to adopt a CG code according to their local settings in order to improve the 
firms’ level of CG compliance and disclosure. 
Third, the findings also show that there are significant differences in complying 
with CG standards among Pakistani listed firms.  In practice, it is likely due to the fact that 
compliance with CG provisions is expensive in terms of time and finance.  Therefore, it is 
expected that larger firms can afford this more easily compared to smaller firms. Following 
the current study’s empirical evidence, and given that Pakistan is generally classified as a 
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developing market with high ownership concentration (for instance, as shown in Table 5.4, 
block ownership ranges from 0 to 99.806% with an average of 55.45%), thus, it can be 
recommended that there can be some level of flexibility and judgment in applicability of 
CG standards in PCCG to evade excessive monitoring and redundant expenses to the 
smaller firms.  
Finally, it is recommended that there should be an effective co-ordination and co-
operation among the key stakeholders of CG compliance and disclosure. Such as key 
corporate regulators and independent directors of firms to constitute such provision which 
can be applicable for both large and small firms or there should be some level of flexibility 
in applicability of some provisions to increase level of CG compliance among.  
                                                                                                                                      
8.2.2 Policy Implications and Recommendations: Factors influencing 
Level of CG Compliance and Disclosure 
Several policy implications and recommendations can be concluded from the 
findings of factors influencing the level of compliance and disclosures with PCGI are 
reported in section 6.2.  
First, institutional, government and foreign ownerships are positively and 
significantly associated with level of CG compliance and disclosure. These findings 
suggest that institutional, government and foreign ownership assists as alternate CG 
mechanisms to motivate Pakistani firms to offer more CG information in annual reports to 
their stakeholders. This may help investors to invest in firms with higher institutional, 
government and foreign ownership. It can also motivate investors to invest through 
institutions rather than making individual investments to ensure higher return and more CG 
disclosure. Further, this finding can also be a source of motivation for Pakistani 
government and policy makers to relax the restrictions on foreign investors in order to 
increase investment in Pakistani firms and for improvement in the CG standards. 
Second, the finding of the study shows that there is a negative and significant 
relationship between each of block ownership and board size and level of CG compliance 
and disclosure among Pakistani listed firms. These findings suggest that Pakistani firms 
with higher level of block ownership (on average 55.45% in sampled firms) and bigger 
board size (on average 8.22 in sampled firms) are likely to comply less with governance 
standards among Pakistani listed firms. These findings of decreasing level of CG 
compliance and disclosure with higher level of block ownership suggest that CG standards 
need to be reviewed by policy makers accordingly. One way to improve CG standards can 
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be in line with UK Combined Code, 2006 by introducing some level of flexibility and 
judgment in applicability of CG standards among Pakistani firms based on their individual 
requirements. For instance, small and family firms can have more relaxed requirements in 
relation to number of non-executive directors. Similarly, in case of board size, firms can be 
relaxed from the requirement of minimum seven directors in the board in case of small 
firms to improve the level of compliance and disclosure with PCCG.  
Finally, the relationships between director ownership, audit firm size, presence of 
female director in the board and presence of foreign director in the board with CG 
compliance and disclosure show no significant nexus. In this regard, policy makers may 
introduce some monitoring mechanisms for firms with higher level of director ownership 
to improve the level of compliance and disclosure. The negative relationship between 
board size and CG disclosure is in line with the theoretical prediction that large boards are 
likely to have poor monitoring. Therefore, Pakistani policy makers can be motivated to 
relax the board members requirements (minimum 7 member), specifically for smaller firms 
as it may cost effective and; hence, increase the level of compliance and disclosure at 
large. The finding of no nexus between audit firm size and CG disclosure is different to the 
theoretical prediction that external auditors influence considerably the level of disclosure 
in firms’ annual reports. This finding can result from the fact that the PCCG recommends 
auditors report on very few CG issues. Therefore, Pakistani policy makers can encourage 
external auditors to demand higher level of CG disclosure.  
8.2.3 Policy Implications and Recommendations: CG and COC 
As discussed in section 6.3, the findings obtained from investigating the nexus 
between the CG standards and COC have several implications, and recommendations can 
be drawn from these findings.  
First, the findings of the current study demonstrate that there is a negative and 
significant association between the PCGI and block ownership with firm-level COC. This 
implies that Pakistani listed firms with better governance are expected to have lower COC 
than their poorly-governed counterparts.  
Second, the relationships between each of institutional ownership, government 
ownership, audit firm size and board size and firm-level COC demonstrate no significant 
nexus among Pakistani listed firms. Findings advocate that these variables show no 
influence on firm-level COC. Therefore, Pakistani policy makers can be motivated to relax 
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the board members requirements (minimum 7 member), specifically for smaller firms as it 
may cost effective and may make it easy to external financing at a lower cost. 
Finally, director ownership, foreign ownership and female director in the firms’ 
board are positively and significantly associated with firm-level of COC. This implies that 
firms can minimise director ownership to attract external financings at a lower cost. Hence, 
policy makers may encourage firms to further improve their CG structures in order to 
attract foreign investors.  
8.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The current study may have some limitations which need to be acknowledged. 
First, although using a sample of 160 firms can be considered as a large sample than 
previous international studies (e.g., Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2013; Ntim et al., 2014), and especially those in Pakistani context (e.g., Javed and Iqbal, 
2007; Javed and Iqbal, 2008; Tariq and Abbas, 2013), the generalisability of this study’s 
findings can be further improved. The excluded 282 firms from initial sample could 
improve the current study’s generalisability, but due to unavailability/insufficient data, 
these firms were not included in the final sample.  
Second, limiting the study to a sample of balanced panel may introduce 
survivorship bias. However, this criterion generated a larger sample size as compared to 
those of prior Pakistani studies to the extent that the generalisation of the study findings 
may not be noticeably impaired.  For capital structure and regulatory differences, the 
sample also excludes financial firms. As it is in line with the prior CG literature (e.g., 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; 
Ntim et al., 2014), which helps the current study to compare the findings with these 
studies. Together, these weaknesses may potentially limit the generalisation of the study 
findings.   
Third, using other methods of data collection, such as interviews, and/or using 
additional sources of data, such as interim reports, could improve both the quantity and 
quality of data. In this regard, using other methods and sources were extremely difficult as 
the current study had to take into consideration time, funding and accessibility to data. 
However, as compared to the manually collected data in CG literature (e.g., Elghuweel et 
al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2012a) a sample of 160 listed firms with 1760 firm-year 
observations over 2003-2013 is sufficient enough to make significant contributions to the 
extant literature. 
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Fourth, and as it has been explained in subsection 3.5.2 chapter three, there can be a 
validity and reliability problems with the self-constructed CG compliance and disclosure 
index such as the PCGI. Although efforts were made to improve the validity and reliability 
of PCGI, few limitations regarding the construction of index were identified. For instance, 
the current study uses binary coding scheme, where all CG provisions are equally 
important. Therefore, the use of a weighted index26 may improve the validity and 
reliability of PCGI. Similarly, the reliability of PCGI could be improved by applying inter-
coder reliability27. Additionally, the scoring processes of indices may result in some 
inherent subjectivity (Beattie et al., 2004).  
The PCGI is constructed by binary coding rather than ordinal coding scheme. It is 
argued that binary coding is less informative (Hassan and Marston, 2008). Similarly, the 
PCGI is an un-weighted index which has been criticised for considering all CG provisions 
to be of same importance, which is inconsistent with both theory and practice (Barako et 
al., 2006a). There is a general lack of rigorously developed theoretical basis on which 
weights can be accurately assigned to the various CG provisions (Black et al., 2006a). In 
this regard, the use of un-weighted CG index may avoid subjective judgments in assigning 
values with relative importance to each CG provision. The use of binary index also 
prevents subjectivity in weights assigning process. Additionally, empirical literature of 
disclosure suggests that the use of weighted and un-weighted indices is likely to give the 
similar findings (e.g., Beattie et al., 2004; Barako et al., 2006a). Finally, in line with 
previous CG literature (Black et al., 2006a; Henry, 2008; Morey et al., 2009; Ntim et al., 
2014) an un-weighted index is constructed, which makes is easier for  comparing the 
findings of the current study. Reliability and validity of the PCGI has been explained in 
subsection 4.2.1.2 and briefly, according to Allegrini and Greco (2013), the Cronbach’s 
alpha value above 0.80 proposes that the instrument is consistent. As shown in Table 4.2, 
the coefficient alpha value for five subcategories of PCGI is 96.4% which indicates that 
the constructed index is highly reliable. 
Fifth, there may be defining problems with some of the variables. In addition, COC 
is measured by using WACC. In this regard, only COE and COD constitute WAAC. COE 
is calculated using CAPM while interest rate on the firm’s debt is used as a method to 
calculate COD. There is no theory suggesting which model should be used as a best proxy 
                                                 
26Efforts have been made to contact an independent professional organisation called Pakistan Institute of Corporate 
Governance in Islamabad, Pakistan to improve the PCGI, but no response was received. 
27Inter-coder reliability can be achieved if results are similar while the coding is performed by different coder.   
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to calculate COE and COD capital, and thus, following the literature these proxies has been 
used in the current study. These defining limitations may possibly influence the findings of 
the study and therefore, these findings must be interpreted in the light of above limitations.  
8.4 FUTURE RESEARCH AVENUES 
As it has been discussed in section 8.4, limitations of the study potentially represents 
avenues for the future research. Hence, there are several research avenues and 
improvements which can be made in the future research. First, this research can be 
extended by using the data from across Asia. This may assist the understanding of CG-firm 
value nexus across the different Asian markets. Second, and in addition to director 
ownership, to examine the nexus between directors (i.e., executive, non-executive and 
CEO) pay and firm value can be an interesting area for future research. Third, the 
relationship between CG structures and risk can be examined in future as better governed 
firms are likely associated with lower risk.   
Fourth, the current study can be improved by increasing the sample size. Future 
studies can also estimate both balanced and un-balanced panels to avoid survivorship bias. 
Financial and non-financial firms can be examined together for comparison purposes and 
to ascertain whether the findings of current study are robust to different sample 
specifications. Fifth, future studies can improve the construction of CG compliance index 
to enhance the reliability and validity. This can be performed by examining the robustness 
of findings to: binary and ordinal coding scheme; and weighted and un-weighted indices. 
The reliability of index can also be enhanced by coding of index with more than one coder 
so that inter-coder consistency can be measured.  
Sixth, additional sources for data collection can be used to supplement that 
information provided in the firms’ annual reports to improve the data availability. Seventh, 
definition of variables can be improved. For instance, board diversity can be measured in 
percentages, while director ownership may be distinguished as by executive and non-
executive directors, beneficially and non-beneficially, and directly and indirectly. 
Similarly, COC measure can be re-estimated by using different approaches to calculate 
COE and COD to make sure that findings are robust.  
Eighth, mixed models of research methodology, namely qualitative and quantitative 
can be used together to eliminate some limitations associated with quantitative approach. 
Ninth, to measure CG standards, both CG compliance index and individual CG variables 
can be used in parallel in order to compare the findings from both models. Tenth, inclusion 
209 
 
 
 
of listed and non-listed firms in the study sample is likely to improve the generalisability of 
the findings. Finally, future research may focus on motivations and main drivers of CG 
reforms in Pakistan. This can be done by conducting face to face interviews with some of 
the key stakeholders of CG reforms in Pakistan, such as SECP and KSE officials, among 
others. This may assist to understand how CG structures can be improved in emerging 
markets.    
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Pakistani CG Index (PCGI) List of Provisions and Measurement 
CG Variables Code Reference 
CO and  PCCG* 
Measurement 
1. BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
1. Directors Categorization28 
Disclosed in Reports 
DCDA PCCG, 2002 (i.c)   
LR, p. 34 (1) 
PCCG, 2012 (i) 
Binary number 1is assigned if it 
discloses the categorization of 
directors in annual reports, 0 
otherwise 
2. Board Composition (Ratio of 
Independent Directors) 
BCOM PCCG, 2002 (i.b) 
PCCG, 2012 (i.b) 
A binary number of 1 if at least 
one member of the board is 
independent, 0 otherwise 
3. Director Representing Minority 
Shareholders 
DRMS PC, 2002 (i.a) 
PCCG, 2012 (i.a) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  
director representing minority 
shareholders, 0 otherwise 
4. Board Classification (Ratio of 
Non-Executive Directors) 
RNED PC, 2002 (i.c) 
PCCG, 2012 (i.d) 
A binary number of 1 if at least 
one fourth of the board is non-
executive, 0 otherwise 
5. The Membership  of Directors 
in Other Boards 
 
MDOB PC, 2002 (iii) 
PCCG, 2012 (ii) 
Binary number 1is assigned if it 
discloses the director’s 
membership in other boards of 
listed companies in their annual 
reports, 0 otherwise 
6. Maximum Directorship in 
Other Boards of Listed 
Companies 
MDSB PCCG, 2002 (iii) 
PCCG, 2012 (ii) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  
directors are not serving at the 
same time for the board of more 
than ten/seven, 0 otherwise 
7. Non-Executive  Chairman  NECH PCCG, 2002 (ix) 
PCCG, 2012 (vi) 
Binary number 1is assigned if the 
Chairman of the board is a Non-
Executive  director, 0 otherwise 
8. Clear Definition of Respective 
Role of Chairman and CEO29 
 PCCG, 2002 (ix) 
PCCG, 2012 (vi) 
Binary number 1is assigned if 
there is a description that 
categorises the role of chairman 
and CEO, 0 otherwise 
9. CEO Duality Role CEOD PCCG, 2002 (ix) 
PCCG, 2012 (vi) 
Binary number 1is assigned if the 
chairman position is separate than 
CEO, 0 otherwise 
10. Orientation Courses for the 
Directors to enable them to 
Manage the Affairs on Behalf 
of Shareholders  
OCDS PCCG, 2002 (xiv) 
PCCG, 2012 (xi) 
A binary number of 1 if firm 
disclose the directors attendance 
in the orientation course , 0 
otherwise 
11. Board Meeting Disclosure  BRMD PCCG, 2002 (xi) 
PCCG, 2012(xvi, h) 
A binary number of 1 if the board 
meetings are disclosed in annual 
reports , 0 otherwise 
12. Board Meeting Frequency BRMF PCCG, 2002 (xi) 
PCCG 2012 (xvi, h) 
A binary number of 1 if at least 
board meet 4 time in a year, 0 
otherwise 
13. National Tax Payer Director NTPD PCCG, 2002 (iv, a) 
PCCG, 2012 (xi, 3) 
A binary number of 1 if the name 
of the directors is born on the 
register of National Tax Payers is 
disclosed, 0 otherwise 
14. No Defaulter Director in the NDDB PCCG, 2002  (iv, b) A binary number of 1 if no 
                                                 
28
 Categorization of directors in term of Independent, Non-Executive or Executive 
29
 Chief Executive Officer 
*CO stands for Companies Ordinance 1984 by Pakistani Government and PCCG stands for Pakistani Code of CG  
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Appendix 1: Pakistani CG Index (PCGI) List of Provisions and Measurement 
CG Variables Code Reference 
CO and  PCCG* 
Measurement 
Board 
 
PCCG, 2012 (xi, 3) defaulter information about 
directors is disclosed , 0 otherwise 
15. Directors and their Spouses 
involvement in Brokerage 
Business 
 
DSBB PCCG, 2002 (xix, j) 
PCCG, 2012 (xvi, l) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  no 
directors involvement in 
brokerage business is disclosed in 
annual reports, 0 otherwise 
16. Statement of ethics and 
Business Practices 
SEBP PCCG,2002 (viii, a) 
PCCG,2012 (xxxiv) 
A binary number of 1 if firm 
discloses that the statement of 
ethics and business practices is 
prepared and circulated  , 0 
otherwise 
17. Power and duties of BOD PBOD PC 2002  (vii) 
PCCG, 2012 (iv) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
disclose their fiduciary powers are 
exercised by the board of 
directors  , 0 otherwise 
18. Future outlook FUTO PCCG,2002 (xix, f) 
PCCG,2012 (xvi, f) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
disclose future outlook  by board 
members  , 0 otherwise 
COMMITTEES & AUDITING 
 
19. Existence of R&HR Committee RHRC PCCG, 2002 (xxx) 
PCCG, 2012 (xxv) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
has HR Committee or a 
Remuneration one , 0 otherwise 
20. Committee Composition 
 
CCOM PCCG, 2002 (xxx) 
PCCG, 2012 (xxv) 
A binary number of 1is assigned  
if Committee has at least three 
members with a majority of non-
executive directors, 0 otherwise 
21. Committee Meetings held 
During the Year 
CMDY PCCG, 2002 (xxxi) 
PCCG, 2012 (xxv) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
disclose different committees 
meetings with numbers held 
during year, 0 otherwise 
22. Committee Meeting Attended 
by each Directors 
 
CMAD PCCG, 2002 (xxx) 
LR p. 27 (16a2) 
PCCG, 2012 (16h) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
discloses committees meetings 
attended by each director, 0 
otherwise 
23. The Names of the Members of 
the Committees of the Boards 
 
NMCB PC 2002 p.6  (xxx) 
LR p. 29 (26) 
PCCG, 2012 (xxvi) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
discloses their members’ names 
attended committees of the board 
in each annual reports, 0 
otherwise 
24. Existence and Disclosure of  
Audit Committee Members  in 
Annual Reports 
EDAC PCCG, 2002 (xxx) 
PCCG, 2012 (xxiv) 
A binary number of 1 if the names 
of audit committee are discloses 
in annual reports, 0 otherwise 
25. Minimum Members of Audit 
Committee 
MMAC PCCG, 2002 (xxx) 
PCCG, 2012 (xxiv) 
A binary number of 1 if minimum 
members of Audit Committee is 
at least three, 0 otherwise 
26. Non-Executive Chairman of the 
Committee 
NECC PCCG, 2002 (xxx) 
PCCG, 2012 (xxiv) 
A binary number of 1 if Non-
Executive director is the 
Chairman of the audit  
Committee, 0 otherwise 
27. Majority of Non-Executives in 
Audit Committee 
MNEC PCCG, 2002 (xxx) 
PCCG, 2012 (xxiv) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  its 
Non-Executives have the majority 
in audit  Committee, 0 otherwise 
28. Minimum Meetings of  the 
Audit Committee in a Financial 
MMAC PCCG, 2002 (xxxi) 
PCCG, 2012 (xxvii) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
audit  Committee meets at least 4 
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Appendix 1: Pakistani CG Index (PCGI) List of Provisions and Measurement 
CG Variables Code Reference 
CO and  PCCG* 
Measurement 
Year time in a year and this 
information is available in annual 
reports, 0 otherwise 
29. CFO, The Head of Internal 
audit Committee and a 
Representative of External 
Auditors attendance  
CIEA PCCG, 2002 (xxxii) 
PCCG,2012 (xxviii) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  the 
CFO, The Head of Internal audit 
Committee and a Representative 
of External Auditors attended 
Audit Committee meetings and 
this information is discloses in 
annual reports, 0 otherwise 
30. Review of quarterly, Half-
yearly and annual financial 
statements prior to the approval 
of Board of Director 
RQHY PCCG,2002 
(xxxiii, c) 
PCCG, 2012 
(xxix, b) 
A binary number of 1 if Audit 
Committee Review of quarterly, 
Half-yearly and annual financial 
statements prior to the approval of 
Board of Director and discloses in 
annual reports, 0 otherwise 
31. Review of Management letter 
issued by external auditor   
RMLE PCCG,2002  
(xxxiii, e) 
PCCG, 2012  
(xxix, e) 
A binary number of 1 if Review 
of Management letter issued by 
external auditors and discloses in 
annual reports  , 0 otherwise 
32. Appointment of Secretary by 
the Committee of Audit 
 
ASAC PCCG,2002 (xxxiv) 
PCCG, 2012 (xxx) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  its 
audit committee appointed a 
secretary and this information is 
discloses in the annual reports, 0 
otherwise 
RIGHT OF SHAREHOLDER AND ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 
33. Notice of the Annual General 
(AGM) to shareholders 
NAGM CO 1984 p.111 
(160a) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  
they issued a notice of AGM 
about  the meeting to 
shareholders, 0 otherwise 
34. Well in Time Notice of the 
AGM to shareholders 
WITN CO 1984 p.111 
(160a) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  
they issued a notice of AGM at 
least 21 days before the meeting 
date, 0 otherwise 
35. AGM with in a Period of Four 
Months Following the Close of 
it Financial Year  
AFFY CO 1984 p.108 
(158/1) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
held AGM within three/four30 
months following the close of its 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
36. AGM in Same Town as 
Registered Office of the 
Company  
ASRO CO 1984 p.108 
(158/2) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  
firm held AGM within the same 
town as company has registered 
office, 0 otherwise 
37. Notice of the Meeting with 
Specifying the Following 
Details31 
 
NMFD CO 1984 p.111 
(160/1a) 
A binary number of 1 if the notice 
of the AGM specify the date, 
place, time, and the business to be 
transacted, 0 otherwise 
38. Right of Shareholder to 
Appoint a Proxy for AGM to 
Vote for Directors 
 
RSAP CO 1984 p.111 
(160/1d) 
A binary number of 1 if the notice 
of the AGM specify that 
shareholder can participate 
personally or through proxy, 0 
otherwise 
TRANSPARENCY AND  DISCLOSURES  
39. Disclosure of Ownership DOWS PCCG,2002 (xix, i) Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
                                                 
30
 According to Companies Ordinance 1984, till 2008 this period was 4 month and then changed to 3 months. Data is 
collected accordingly.  
31
 Notice of AGM to shareholders contains specifying the date, place, time, and the business to be transacted.  
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Appendix 1: Pakistani CG Index (PCGI) List of Provisions and Measurement 
CG Variables Code Reference 
CO and  PCCG* 
Measurement 
pattern 
 
PCCG, 2012 (xvi, j) publishes ownership pattern 
reports, 0 otherwise 
40. Directors, CEO, their Spouse 
and Minor Children’s’ 
Ownership Disclosure 
 
BDOD PCCG,2002 (xix, i) 
PCCG, 2012 (xvi, j) 
A binary number of 1 if firm 
discloses the name wise detail of 
shareholdings of directors, CEO, 
their spouse and minor children’s 
, 0 otherwise 
41. Shareholding Ten/five32 
Percent or More Voting Rights 
STMV PCCG,2002 (xix, i) 
PCCG, 2012 (xvi, j) 
A binary number of 1 if firm 
discloses the shareholdings of 
ten/five percent or more voting 
rights, 0 otherwise 
 
42. Going Concern Disclosure in 
Annual Reports 
GCDR PCCG,2002 (xix, a) 
PCCG,2012 (xvi, f) 
A binary number of 1 if it is 
discloses that firm is a going 
concern entity and explanation if 
not, 0 otherwise 
43. Outstanding Taxes and Other 
Charges disclosed  
OTOC PCCG,2002 (xix, e) 
PCCG, 2012(xvi, e) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
discloses its outstanding taxes and 
other charges with reason in 
annual reports, 0 otherwise 
44. Presentation of Operations, 
Cash Flows, and Change in 
Equity 
POCE PCCG,2002 (xix, a) 
PCCG, 2012(xvi, a) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
discloses the operations, cash 
flows and change in equity in 
annual reports, 0 otherwise 
45. Key Operating and Financial 
Data for Last Six Years 
OFSY PCCG,2002 (xix, c) 
PCCG, 2012(xvi, c) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
discloses the last six years 
financial and operating 
performance in annual reports, 0 
otherwise 
46. Significant Deviation from Last 
Year Operating Outcomes 
SDOR PCCG,2002 (xix, b) 
PCCG, 2012(xvi, b) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
discloses operating results and 
significant deviation from last 
year, if any  and reasons 
explained in annual reports, 0 
otherwise 
47. Trades of Share Carried out by 
the director and Other 
Executives33 
TSDE PCCG,2002 (xix, j) 
LR p. 28 (16l) 
PCCG, 2012(xvi, l) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
discloses the trade of shares of 
companies  carried out by 
directors, executives, their 
spouses and minor child, 0 
otherwise 
48. Disclosure of Objectives and 
Corporate Strategy  
DOCS PCCG,2002 (viii, b) 
PCCG, 2012(v, c) 
A binary number of 1 if firm 
discloses Mission, Vision and 
Corporate strategies in annual 
reports, 0 otherwise 
 
49. Statement on Compliance with 
Corporate Governance Code 
SCCG PCCG,2002 (xlv) 
LR p. 34 (11) 
PCCG, 2012(xl) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
provides a positive statement on 
PCCG34 in the reports, 0 
otherwise 
50. Disclosure of Dividend Policy DODP PCCG,2002 (xix, d) Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
                                                 
32
 Shareholding to be disclosed was ten percent in PCCG 2002 which have been changed to five percent shareholding in 
PCCG 2012. 
33
 Here “executives” means the CEO, COO, CFO, head of internal audit and company secretary.   
34
 PCCG stands for Pakistani Code of Corporate Governance.  
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Appendix 1: Pakistani CG Index (PCGI) List of Provisions and Measurement 
CG Variables Code Reference 
CO and  PCCG* 
Measurement 
(Reason for any bonus share or 
no dividend) 
PCCG, 2012(xvi, d) discloses the reason of a bonus 
share (if any) or not paying 
dividend, 0 otherwise 
51. Disclosure of Detail of Related 
Party Transaction 
DRPT PCCG,2002 (xiii, b) 
PCCG, 2012(x) 
A binary number of 1 if firm 
discloses facts of any contract in 
which executives or any director 
was interested and clear statement 
in case of no such transaction, 0 
otherwise 
52. Director’s Detailed 
Remuneration Disclosure 
DDRD PCCG,2012(xvii, b) Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
publishes board members’ 
remuneration in annual reports , 0 
otherwise 
2. INTERNAL CONTROL, EXTERNAL AUDITOR AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
53. Presence of Effective Internal 
Control System 
EICS PCCG,2002 (viii, c) 
PCCG,2012(xxix,i) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
publishes that there is an effective 
and sound internal control system 
established, implemented, and 
monitored by the BoD , 0 
otherwise 
54. Disclosure of Firm Risk in 
Annual Reports 
 
DFRR PCCG,2002 (xix, f) 
PCCG,2012(ix) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
offers an explanation of actual 
and potential risk of the company 
, 0 otherwise 
55. Risk Management Policies by 
the BOD 
RMPB PCCG,2002 (viii, b) 
PCCG,2012(ix) 
A binary number of 1 if firm 
provides a clear description of 
risk management policies in 
annual report , 0 otherwise 
56. Auditor review of Internal 
Control System 
ARIS PCCG,2002 
(xxxiii, j) 
PCCG,2012(xiv, d) 
A binary number of 1 if auditor 
reports provide a narrative that  
internal control system has been 
reviewed by the auditor , 0 
otherwise 
57. Auditor Review of Firm 
Financial Reports 
ARFR PCCG,2002  
(xxxiii, c) 
PCCG,2012 
(xxix, b) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  its 
auditor reports provide 
description financial reports have 
been reviewed by the auditor , 0 
otherwise 
58. Approval of Firm Financial 
Reports 
 
AFFR PCCG,2002 (xxiv) 
PCCG,2012 (xxi) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  its 
reports are ratified by BOD and 
signed by the authorized 
executives, CFO and CEO earlier 
than rotation, 0 otherwise 
59. Proper Book of Account 
Maintained  
 
PBAM 
 
PCCG,2002 (xix, b) 
PCCG,2012 (xvi, b) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
publishes that proper book of 
accounts are maintained in annual 
reports, 0 otherwise 
60. Appropriate Accounting 
Policies Applied in Preparation 
of Accounting Estimations and 
Financial Statement 
APAE PCCG,2002 (xix, c) 
PCCG,2012 (xvi, c) 
Binary number 1is assigned if  it 
discloses appropriate accounting 
rules applied in preparation of 
accounting estimations and  
financial statements in annual 
reports, 0 otherwise 
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Appendix 1: Pakistani CG Index (PCGI) List of Provisions and Measurement 
CG Variables Code Reference 
CO and  PCCG* 
Measurement 
61. Financial Statements According 
to IAS35 
FIAS PCCG,2002 (xix, d) 
PCCG,2012 (xxix) 
A binary number of 1 if firm 
discloses that financial statements 
are according to IAS, 0 otherwise 
62. External Auditor’s Satisfactory 
Rating by Institute of Charted 
Accountants of Pakistan 
EARI PCCG,2002 
(xxxvii) 
PCCG,2012 (xxxiii) 
A binary number of 1 if External 
Auditors have Satisfactory rating 
under the Quality Review 
Program by Institute of Charted 
Accountants of Pakistan and this 
information is discloses, 0 
otherwise 
63. Compliance with IFAC36 
Gridlines on Code of Ethics as 
Adopted by ICAP37.  
CGCE PCCG,2002 
(xxxviii) 
PCCG,2012 (xxxiii) 
A binary number of 1 if 
Compliance with International 
Federation of Accountants 
Gridlines on code of ethics is 
published in annual reports , 0 
otherwise 
64. Auditor Duties According to 
IFAC  
ADIM PCCG,2002 (xl) 
PCCG,2012 (xxxiv) 
A binary number of 1 Auditor 
perform duties according to 
IFAC,  no management role and 
this information is discloses in 
annual reports, 0 otherwise 
65. Attendance of AGM38 by 
external Auditor 
AAGM PCCG,2002 (xliv) 
PCCG,2012 (xli) 
A binary number of 1 if external 
auditor of the company attends 
the annual general meeting and 
this information is discloses in 
annual reports, 0 otherwise 
66. Statutory Auditor’s Review of  
Corporate Governance 
Compliance Statement 
SARC PCCG,2002 (xlvi) 
PCCG,2012 (xli) 
A binary number of 1 if Statutory 
Auditors of company  Reviews 
the  Corporate Governance 
Compliance Statement and 
disclose this information in 
annual reports, 0 otherwise 
67. Half yearly financial statements 
with statutory auditor’s review 
HYFS PCCG,2002 (xxi) 
PCCG,2012  
(xxix, b) 
A binary number of 1 if Half 
yearly financial statements with 
statutory auditor’s review 
information discloses in annual 
reports, 0 otherwise 
68. Annual audited financial 
statements not later than four 
month from close of financial 
year 
AAFS PCCG,2002 (xxii) 
PCCG,2012  
(xxix) 
A binary number of 1 if Annual 
audited financial statements not 
later than four month from close 
of financial year discloses in 
annual reports, 0 otherwise 
69. Determination of Compliance 
with relevant Statutory 
Requirements  
DCSR PCCG,2002 (xxx, l) 
PCCG,2012  
(xxix, l) 
A binary number of 1 if 
Compliance with relevant 
Statutory Requirements is 
determined by external auditors 
and discloses in annual reports, 0 
otherwise 
                                                 
35
 IAS stands for International Accounting Standards and Pakistan follows these standards in preparation of financial 
statements.   
36
 IFAC stands for International Federation of Accountants and this institute issued guidelines on code of ethics.  
37
 ICAP stands for Institute of Charted Accountants of Pakistan and this institute adopted the same code of ethics. 
38
 AGM stands for Annual General meeting of a company.  
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Appendix 1: Pakistani CG Index (PCGI) List of Provisions and Measurement 
CG Variables Code Reference 
CO and  PCCG* 
Measurement 
70. Monitoring Compliance with 
Best Practices of Corporate 
Governance and Identification 
of Violence 
MCGV PCCG,2002 
(xxx, m) 
PCCG,2012  
(xxix, m) 
A binary number of 1 if external 
auditors are Monitoring 
Compliance with Best Practices 
of Corporate Governance and 
Identification of Violence if any 
discloses in annual reports, 0 
otherwise” 
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